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This text posits the emergence of language as a function of brain-hemispheric 
feedback, where “emergence” refers to the generation of complex patterns from relatively 
simple interactions, “language” refers to an abstraction-based and representational-
recombinatorial-recursive mapping-signaling system, “function” refers to an input-output 
relationship described by fractal algorithms, “brain-hemispheric” refers to 
complementary (approach-abstraction / avoidance-gestalt) cognitive modules, and 
“feedback” refers to self-regulation driven by neural inhibition and recruitment. The 
origin of language marks the dawn of human self-awareness and culture, and is thus a 
matter of fundamental and cross-disciplinary interest. 
This text is a synthesized research essay that constructs its argument by drawing 
diverse scholarly voices into a critical, cross-disciplinary intertextual narrative. While it 
does not report any original empirical findings, it harnesses those made by others to offer 
a tentative, partial solution—one that can later be altered and expanded—to a problem 
that has occupied thinkers for centuries. 
The research contained within this text is preceded by an introductory Section 1 
that contextualizes the problem of the origin of language. Section 2 details the potential 
of evolutionary theory for addressing the problem, and the reasons for the century-long 
failure of linguistics to take advantage of that potential. Section 3 reviews the history of 
the discovery of brain lateralization, as well as its behavioral and structural 
characteristics. Section 4 discusses evolutionary evidence and mechanisms in terms of 
increasing adaptive complexity and intelligence, in general, and tool use, in particular. 
ix 
 
Section 5 combines chaos theory, brain science, and semiotics to propose that, after the 
neotenic acquisition of contingency-based abstraction, language emerged as a feedback 
interaction between the left-hemisphere abstract word and the right-hemisphere gestalt 
image.  
I conclude that the model proposed here might be a valuable tool for 
understanding, organizing, and relating data and ideas concerning human evolution, 
language, culture, and psychology. I recommend, of course, that I present this text to the 
scholarly community for criticism, and that I continue to gather and collate relevant data 
and ideas, in order to prepare its next iteration.  
 
 
1.0 - INTRODUCTION 
The sign must “tell its story” before it can acquire a formal signification. In the 
resulting model of narrative as the constitution of the sign, the story is the 
generation of transcendence from immanence. 
-Eric Gans,
1
 cultural anthropologist and philosopher of language 
 
1.1 - TREE OF KNOWLEDGE 
 What does it mean to be human? We are flesh-and-blood animals, to be sure, but 
we have been variously defined as tool-using, artistic, meaning-making, story-telling, 
religious, rhetorical, ethical, rational, and self-aware. Since each of these traits depends 
upon, or at least involves language use, we are, most essentially: the ape that speaks. 
 Where did language come from? If we can answer that question, we can better 
understand not only whence we came, but whither we are bound. However, that question, 
although much-addressed, remains unanswered. Indeed, the origin of language might be 
the hardest problem in science (Christiansen & Kirby, 2003); anyone hoping to not 
simply further polish that already-smooth nut through worried handling, but to crack it 
apart to get at its meat, must carefully contextualize it, and in light of that 
contextualization, choose from the disciplinary nut-cracking tools available. 
 Where is the problem of the origin of language situated? The Tree of Knowledge 
(ToK) model
2
 developed by psychologist Gregg Henriques is useful here (see Figure 1).
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 From his electronic essay “Originary Narrative” (1997 / 1998). 
2
 An outline of the ToK published in Review of General Psychology (2003), and two special issues of the 




The ToK is a macro-evolutionary model intended to meta-theoretically encompass 
phenomena amendable to scientific investigation, in general, and to contextualize and 
organize the psychological sciences, in particular. Its scale is cosmic, its structure is 
nested, and it 
. . . maps the pieces of the scientific puzzle in a novel way that connects Quantum 
Mechanics to Sociological processes and everything in between into a coherent 
whole. The most novel aspect of the ToK is its visuo-spatial depiction of 
knowledge as consisting of four dimensions of complexity (Matter, Life, Mind, 
                                                                                                                                                                             





and Culture) that correspond to the behavior of four classes of objects (material 
objects, organisms, animals, and humans), and four classes of science (physical, 
biological, psychological, and social). (Henriques, ToK FAQs) 
Between the ToK’s “dimensions of complexity” are what Henriques calls the “theoretical 
joint points” that address the moments of discontinuity before the emergence of novel 
properties—moments rather like the phase transitions that mark transformations between 
different states of matter in physics, or the paradigm shifts that mark transformations 
between different scientific models. 
I will discuss such discontinuous change further in Section 5.1, but here it is 
enough to understand, in an admittedly simplified fashion, that a theory of Quantum 
Gravity (once achieved) would be a combination of quantum mechanics and general 
relativity that might explain the emergence of matter out of energy, that the Modern 
Synthesis (or “Neo-Darwinism”) is a combination of evolutionary theory and genetics 
which might explain the emergence of life, that Behavioral Investment Theory is a 
combination of behavioral science and neuroscience which might explain the emergence 
of animal awareness, and that the Justification Hypothesis is a combination of 
psychology and sociology which might explain the emergence of culture and self-
awareness. 
According to Henriques, self-awareness “is an evolutionarily novel mental 
apparatus that functions to build justification narratives that legitimize actions and 
claims” and “is the language-based portion of one’s mind that is narrating what is 
happening, why it is happening, and why one is doing what in that context.” Furthermore, 




recent, emerging in close conjunction with the evolution of language in general.” 
(Henriques, 2011, p.115) 
So the problem of the origin of language can be narrowly situated at the very base 
of the joint point addressed by the Justification Hypothesis. And the disciplinary tools 
that can properly be brought to bear upon the nut of the problem—the acorn that, nested 
in the soil of animal awareness, has grown into the oak tree of culture and self-
awareness—are those belonging to evolutionary systems theory, neuropsychology, and 
linguistics, where evolutionary systems theory constitutes a metanarrative or totalizing 
explanatory framework, neuropsychology addresses anatomy and physiology related to 
awareness, and linguistics addresses language as a signaling system capable of generating 
culture and self-awareness.  
 
1.2 - SPIRAL OF EVOLUTION 
The relationships among those three primary disciplinary perspectives, employed 
in varying proportions throughout this text, can be visually modeled in different ways to 
provide insight into the problem of the origin of language. They can be simply 
interwoven (see Figure 2a) and draped over the problem to suggest its contours, but this 
tends to obscure a wealth of important details. Better, they can be overlapped (see Figure 
2b) to emphasize cross-disciplinary contact zones—for example: evolutionary 
psychology, psycholinguistics, and generative anthropology—that might aid in 
understanding the problem. Best yet, they can be nested (see Figure 2c) to reflect the 
ontological underpinnings of the problem, so that evolutionary systems theory is treated 




and language is treated as an emergent property of mind. And if the nested model is 
represented in terms of scaled self-similarity (see Figure 2d), the emergent character of 
complexity is dramatically emphasized, as is the entropic fact that much less energy-
space-time is available to each emerging dimension. Of course, if evolution traditionally 
relates to life, neuropsychology relates to mind, and linguistics relates to culture, then 
further involutions of this sequence denote the novel cultural structures that depend most 




A consideration of the oral structures of mimetic-cultural evolution in nested 
relation to the preceding structures of genetic-biological evolution  (see Figure 3) 
suggests a technical distinction between proto-culture and culture proper, where the 
former marks a proto-human / proto-language phase transition between animal  
signaling systems and human speech—the point where genetic water begins to boil into 
mimetic steam. The evidence for as well as the nature and significance of proto-language 
will be discussed in Section 4.3, but here it is enough to note that the first true cultural 
structure to emerge was art-religion, followed by agriculture, then writing. It is likely that 
each of those novel structures simultaneously caused and was caused by changes in 




structures of consciousness proposed by philosopher-linguist Jean Gebser (1905-1973) in 
his book The Ever-Present Origin (1986) can be applied to the structures of this emergent 
model so that the emergence of proto-speech and proto-culture roughly corresponds to 
the emergence of Archaic consciousness, art-religion to Magic consciousness, agriculture 
to Mythical consciousness, and writing to Mental consciousness. 
Since it is proto-linguistic, Archaic consciousness is undifferentiated and pre-self-
aware, and “can be likened to a dimly lit mist devoid of shadows.” Perhaps it might be 
compared developmentally to a toddler’s experience of the world, or mythically to Adam 
being limited to naming the animals in the Garden before he has eaten the fruit of the 
Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil, that is, before he has acquired speech proper. 
Magic consciousness, on the other hand, is linguistic; humanity has eaten the fiery 
fruit (or is making regular use of the fiery gift provided by another light-bearer who 
incurred divinely jealous wrath). And when speech starts to really divide the world, 
hunter-gatherers become aware of each other and especially of nature—and they use their 
newfound powers of symbolism not only to encompass and manipulate their world, but to 
express a primal sense of awe. 
Starting with Mythical consciousness, though, speech becomes complex enough 
that human culture begins to displace nature as the center of concern in which the still-
nascent individual remains embedded. Through increasingly skillful retelling, the dreams, 
inspirations, and actions of peoples in relation to their environments and especially each 





And finally, Mental consciousness features the emergence of the perspectival, 
unified self, subjectively separated, as with a double-edged sword (the symbol of the 
intellect), from both nature and from other individuals. That separation was made 
possible by self-referential language, and made increasingly specialized and hierarchical 
societies possible—and unprecedented cruelty and greed, too. 
 
1.3 - EVOLUTION BY ABSTRACTION 
The next involution of the spiral, literate mimetic-cultural evolution (see Figure 
4), is precipitated by the emergence of a novel information-processing system: writing. 




structure (Henrigues, 2011, 247-248), represented in these figures as a kind of hook that 
slingshots the evolving system into states of greater complexity against the pull of 
entropy, thus creating order out of chaos. Writing allows for the full flowering of 
Gebser’s mental structure of consciousness, as expressed through the development of 
philosophy and science—and unprecedented alienation and anxiety, too. 
What is the general relationship between speech and writing? They are both 
systems of abstraction, where “abstraction” here refers to the removal or isolation of 
information for purposes of representation, recombination, and recursion. For all its 
emotional immediacy, speech begins as an abstraction of perception—which is an 
abstraction of sensation, which is treated by any non-solipsistic episteme as an 
abstraction of an independently existing world—but speech is employed externally. 
Writing is an abstraction of speech, but that fourth-order abstraction is employed 
internally. While speech develops objective relationships with others, writing develops 
the self’s relationship to itself. While speech builds group identity and cohesion, writing 
tends to enhance internal feedback or recursion, and heighten subjectivity. If “reflective 
thought is public or social conversation internalized” (Bruffee, 1984, p. 639), then writing 
is reflective thought polished and externalized. 
Different forms of writing are related by their degree of abstraction. The image 
constitutes the most concrete form of writing (even paintings, petroglyphs, and 
photographs are abstractions), conveying a gestalt impression—a field of ideas. At one 
symbol per idea, pictographic writing is still somewhat concrete, but its symbols tend to 
become more abstract / less visually recognizable over time. Syllabic writing is abstract 




or encode every discernible uttered sound. And binary code seeks to reduce language to 
the simplest differences of pure information. 
Speaking of binary code, the nature of the information-processing system that can 
slingshot us around the next turn of the evolutionary spiral remains unclear (as do the 
structures of the next “wave”), but an obvious possibility, given the place of science, is 
something involving computers and cybernetics. In his books The Age of Intelligent 
Machines (1990), The Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human 
Intelligence (1999), and The Singularity is Near: When Humans Transcend Biology 
(2005), inventor and futurist Ray Kurzweil waxes lucidly but excitedly about such things 
as artificial intelligence, machine-human interface, and immortality—all to be 
precipitated according to an exponentially increasing “Law of Accelerating Returns.” 
And in his chapter titled “The Fifth Joint Point,” Henriques agrees that the next structures 
will likely be machine-mediated and meta- (or post- or trans-) human / cultural: 
A pattern is apparent. Matter emerges out of Energy, Life emerges out of Matter, 
Mind emerges out of Life, and Culture emerges out of Mind. The natural question 
that follows is, what emerges out of culture? The sensible answer is MetaCulture. 
(2011, p. 247) 
It is, however, uncertain that humanity will successfully negotiate the limits to growth 
that can obstruct such technological achievement. Simply put, our numbers and drive for 
artificial luxuries might have already placed too great a burden on the natural structures 
that precede and sustain our cultural structures (McKibben, 2012; Meadows, Meadows, 




Moreover, if the medium is related to the message, increasing abstraction might 
simply code for analysis as opposed to synthesis, hierarchy as opposed to equality, and 
self-involvement as opposed to community (Rossi, 2005). Hence we might witness the 
unfolding of a digital “paradise,” a virtual world written by human, machine, or cyborg 
programmers and most accessible to elect members of society. Disembodied subjects 
might eventually revel in crystalline isolation, basking in illusory relationships—all light, 
no substance—and anticipating the finest cog-and-gear assimilation into some post-
human cloud mind (Cranford, 1996). The projected Word may triumphantly dwell in 
such blissful hyper-abstraction, until the real world upon which it depends collapses 
(Diamond, 2004). 
It is interesting to note that Gebser identified a fifth, non-technologically-
mediated structure in the “unfolding” of consciousness—a structure he called “integral” 
consciousness—which seems to involve some kind of superrational merging principle, or 
transcendence of dualism and perspective. But relatively few people have experienced 
more than flashes of such mystical states, and the language that describes it is difficult 
and even paradoxical, so its contours are necessarily vague. 
In any case, across the linguistic-cultural evolution or unfolding of self-awareness 
thus far can be discerned a trajectory from immanence to transcendence, from 
embeddedness to separation, from implication to explication, from the concrete to the 
abstract, from orality to literacy, and from the image to the word. And although Gebser’s 
structures of consciousness are fundamentally different ways of experiencing reality that 




only in that all previous stages are found in subsequent ones, but in that the seeds of all 
subsequent structures are found in the current one.  
That idea of what Gebser calls “latency” explains why he preferred “unfolding” 
over “evolution”—the latter term connotes both randomness and progress, whereas the 
former connotes the increasing “transparency” of a cosmic entelechy or intrinsic law 
normally hidden from us by our deictic frame (hence The Ever-Present Origin). If 
unfoldment is a deterministic but unpredictable revelation of what ultimately already is, 
then teleological questions are not simply projections of linguistic self-reference, but 
category mistakes. If we can move beyond both ego and error, perhaps a scientific 
pantheism can prevail, and we can cease to appeal to anything beyond energy. 
However, the assumption of cosmic purpose, whether couched in religious or 
quasi-religious terms or simply left unstated (e.g. Behe, 2006), is of central importance to 
understanding the historical stultification of efforts to solve the problem of the origin of 
language. Inasmuch as essentially human behaviors are bound up in language-use, that 
stultification has blocked definitive solutions to the problems of the origins of self-
awareness, culture, and our species. Conversely, we shall see, teleological assumptions 
have motivated and reinforced various strains of human exceptionalism, some more 
unabashedly unscientific than others. 
 
2.0 - EVOLUTION AND LANGUAGE 
Absolute uniformity of atoms and forces would probably have led to the 
production of straight lines, true circles, or other closed curves. Inequality starts 
curves, and when growth is diverted from the straight path it almost necessarily 





2.1 - BAN ON ORIGIN 
The 1859 publication of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species by Means of 
Natural Selection of the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life forever 
altered the scientific world, and fanned the fires of the popular imagination into an uproar 
that still rages, over 150 years later. Essentially, Darwin proposed an elegant model 
involving adaptive feedback between species and their environments—a process that 
despite its simplicity could begin to explain the dizzying complexity of life on Earth. His 
gradualist theory of organic evolution by natural selection sparked an intellectual 
conflagration that, according to its supporters, promised to burn away the dross of 
superstition, and according to its detractors, threatened to consume the very foundations 
of faith itself (Desmond & Moore, 1991). 
Darwin’s dangerous idea (to use Daniel Dennett’s phrasing) was initially 
contested even by many scientists, but the majority quickly recognized that the evidence 
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 From a personal letter to Isaac Bickerstaffe (reprinted in 1912), as quoted on the back cover of T. A. 
Cook’s The Curves of Life: Being an Account of Spiral Formations and Their Application to Growth in 




presented in its favor was overwhelming and that its time had come. Consequently, there 
was a desire within then-differentiating scientific disciplines to treat evolution in more 
general terms. The attendees of the 1866 conference of the Linguistic Society of Paris, for 
example, were very much interested in the origin and evolution of language. The Société 
had been established only a couple of years previously, in 1864, but was an expression of 
a modern philosophical tradition that included thinkers such as political philosopher-
sociologist Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and epistemologist-psychologist Étienne 
Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780). 
In his posthumously published “Essay on the Origin of Languages” (1781), 
Rousseau had hypothesized that humanity and language began in warm, southern 
environments, and then diffused to colder, northern environments. He had also suggested 
that primal language had a musical quality and exercised emotional, rather than rational, 
power (Rousseau, 2010). Earlier, Rousseau’s friend, Condillac, who held that language 
sublimated sensation into culture and compared ideas to harpsichord notes, had intimated 
in his “Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge” (1746) that language has its roots in 
instinctive gesticulation, but was fully realized in vocal signification or meaning-making. 
He also hinted that that poetic myth had been a pre-rational rhetorical and pedagogical 
device that was superseded by the invention of writing, which while a more precise 
method of communication, is relatively lacking in vividness and emotional impact 
compared with speech (Condillac, 2001). 
Unfortunately, such interesting guesswork was based upon scattered philological 
or anecdotal data, rather than upon the systematically collected results of rigorously 




Linguistic Society of Paris, such methodologies still did not exist, and the admixture of 
philosophical speculation regarding language and scientific longing regarding Darwinian 
theory apparently generated such a cacophony of scholarly controversy that the Sociéte 
took the drastic step of indefinitely banning any further discussion of the origin and 
evolution of language! (Kenneally, 2007, p. 9). 
Since science is predicated upon open communication and free inquiry, it would 
be interesting to know exactly what dramatic events transpired at that conference to elicit 
such a seemingly unscientific (re)action, but the details are elusive. The controversy must 
have been both intense and international since several years later, in 1872, the London 
Philological Society instituted an identical ban on the discussion of the origin and 
evolution of language (Kenneally, 2007, p. 22). Significantly, the previous year had seen 
the publication of Darwin’s The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex, in 
which the author had compared the development of languages to organic evolution in ten 
different ways, after stating that “the formation of different languages and of distinct 
species, and the proofs that both have been developed through a gradual process, are 
curiously parallel” (Darwin, 1981, p. 59). 
The ban within the discipline of linguistics held for over a century, during the 
greatest expansion of knowledge in history up to that point. Perhaps, though, an 
understanding of that situation is not too difficult. Beyond the science-reinforced, 






 and beyond the issue of initial methodological inadequacies and a dearth of 
data, two intertwining factors contributed to the development of a science that, 
eventually, did not even really require an active ban, but simply no longer considered the 
evolutionary origins or development of language. The first was an accumulating 
archeological record that did not seem to support the idea of humanity and language 
originating from geologically gradual processes, and the second was a synchronic theory 
of signs that precluded an evolutionary understanding of language. These factors are the 
subjects of the next two Sections. 
 
2.2 - PROBLEMS WITH GRADUALISM 
 Darwinian gradualism was made possible by the idea of deep time pioneered in 
the West by geologist James Hutton (1726-1797). While the traditional Christian 
conception of time—beginning with Creation and ending with New Jerusalem—was 
measured in thousands of years, Hutton’s geological observations instead led him to 
conclude that “we find no vestige of a beginning, no prospect of an end” (Hutton, 2010, 
p. 90). His exponentially expansive understanding of time was measured in millions of 
years, leading one colleague to exclaim that “the mind seemed to grow giddy by looking 
so far into the abyss of time” (Playfair, 1805).  
Gradual geological changes imply vast stretches of time, and the contemplation of 
such changes over such time inspired the theory of uniformitarianism, which is the idea 
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 See the “Science and Society” chapters of Jason Colavito’s Knowing Fear: Science, Knowledge, and the 
Development of the Horror Genre (2008), as well as Part 1 of Eric La Freniere’s “An Awe-ful Integrity: 




that the laws of nature and the rates of natural change are constant, and that “the present 
is the key to the past.” Interestingly, the early Victorian scholar who coined the term 
“uniformitarianism” also coined the term “catastrophism” (Yeo, 1993, p. 101), which 
designates the idea that geological processes can trigger violently sudden 
transformations. But it was uniformitarianism, as presented by geologist Charles Lyell 
(1797-1875) in his massive and massively influential Principles of Geology: Being an 
Attempt to Explain the Former Changes of the Earth's Surface, by Reference to Causes 
Now in Operation (1830-33), which informed Darwinian gradualism. Not only had 
Darwin read the first volume of Lyell’s Principles of Geology while aboard the Beagle, 
but Lyell had befriended Darwin after the latter had returned to England, and had later 
encouraged Darwin to publish The Origin of Species when it had become known to them 
that Alfred Russel Wallace, another naturalist-explorer, was about to publish his own 
theory of evolution (Desmond & Moore, 1991). 
The uniformitarian emphasis on constant rates of change by means of small, 
steadily building increments came to underlie Darwinian gradualism, and the longer the 
stretches of time considered in the archeological record, the more such rates of change 
seemed plausible in terms of biology as well as geology. However, as the nineteenth 
century bled into the twentieth, researchers examining evidence of prehistoric proto-
humans and humans discovered that the data did not support the idea of a geological rate 
of change when it came to remains and artifacts. I will examine that evidence further in 
Section 4, but suffice to say here, the relative abruptness with which lithic technologies 
and art entered the archeological record was such that strictly Darwinian explanations 




indicators of culture, in general, and language-use, in particular, the archeological record 
seemed to offer little of value in terms of a gradual evolutionary origin of language. 
Indeed, archeology seemed to indicate that language emerged somewhat miraculously, 
resulting in a historical situation that can be bookended by the words of two language 
experts, separated by nearly a hundred years. 
The first was Max Muller (1823-1900), who held the chair of Philology at the 
University of Oxford. In 1873, Muller delivered three lectures to the Royal Institution, in 
which he criticized Darwinian theory by arguing that it could not accommodate the 
radical nature of human language: 
My object is simply to point out a strange omission, and to call attention to one 
kind of evidence—I mean the evidence of language—which has been most 
unaccountably neglected, both in studying the development of the human 
intellect, and determining the position which man holds in the system of the 
world. (Muller, 1873, p. 77) 
Muller forcefully stated that the idea that “man being the descendent of some lower 
animal, the development of the human mind out of the mind of animals, or out of no 
mind, is a mere question of time, is certainly enough to make me a little impatient” ( p. 
82) and he pointed out that: 
There is one specific difficulty which Mr. Darwin has not sufficiently appreciated 
. . . There is between the whole of the animal kingdom on the one side, and man, 
even in his lowest state, on the other, a barrier which no animal has ever crossed, 




Nearly a hundred years later, in 1968, Noam Chomsky (b. 1928)—who authored the 
revolutionary Syntactic Structures (1957) and is now Professor Emeritus of the 
Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at MIT, published six of his lectures under the 
title Language and Mind. In that book, Chomsky argued that “human language appears to 
be a unique phenomenon.” Regarding Karl Popper’s idea that “the evolution of language 
passed through several stages, in particular a ‘lower stage’ in which vocal gestures are 
used for expression of emotional state, for example, and a ‘higher state’ in which 
articulated sound is used for the expression of thought” (p. 59), Chomsky objected that  
[H]e establishes no relation between the lower and higher stages and does not 
suggest a mechanism whereby transition can take place from one stage to the 
next. In short, he gives no argument to show that the stages belong to a single 
evolutionary process. In fact, it is difficult to see what links these stages at all 
(except for the metaphorical use of the term “language”). There is no reason to 
suppose that the “gaps” are bridgeable. There is no more of a basis for assuming 
an evolutionary development of “higher” from “lower” stages, in this case, than 
there is for assuming an evolutionary development from breathing to walking; the 
stages have no significant analogy, it appears, and seem to involve entirely 
different processes and principles. (p. 59) 
The linguist-philosopher was firm that language cannot be viewed in evolutionary terms: 
There seems to be no substance to the view that human language is simply a more 
complex instance of something to be found elsewhere in the world. This poses a 




appearance of a qualitatively different phenomenon at a specific stage of 
complexity of organization. ( p. 62) 
Reading Chomsky here, we might be reminded of Darwin’s (in)famous words from The 
Origin of Species: 
To suppose that the eye with all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus 
to different distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the 
correction of spherical and chromatic aberration, could have been formed by 
natural selection, seems, I freely confess, absurd in the highest degree. (p. 186) 
Just as contemporary creationists frequently cite this passage out of context to claim that 
the eye is too complex a structure to have been produced by Darwinian evolutionary 
processes, Chomsky argued that language is too complex to have been produced by 
Darwinian evolutionary processes. 
 That comparison might seem harsh, but consider that Chomsky has presented 
his linguistic modules—his Universal Grammar (UG) and Language Acquisition Device 
(LAD)—as innate without any discussion of how they came to be so. In the absence of 
any natural explanation for the origin of a complex phenomenon, and in the presence of 
curiosity about the same phenomenon, supernatural or mythic “explanations” proliferate 
(e.g. gods and / or ancient astronauts). Science, of course, deals with neither incuriosity 
nor the supernatural. 
 It is true that evidence of language-use entered the archeological record with an 
abruptness that contraindicates gradualism. But what if there was an evolutionary 
mechanism other than gradualism that could explain that abruptness—a mechanism of 




evolutionary bridge (or series of bridges) between the eyespot of a planarian and the 
human eye, or between the signaling systems of other animals and human language? In 
Section 4.3, I will examine such a mechanism and bridge(s), but first I must turn to the 
development of a synchronic theory of signs that, along with a strictly gradualist 
understanding of natural selection, precluded an evolutionary understanding of language. 
 
2.3 - SIGNS ABOUT IDEAS 
 Language is a signaling system, and linguists are therefore concerned with 
signs, or units of meaning. The study of signs is called semiotics, and Ferdinand de 
Saussure (1857-1913) is considered the founder of semiotics, as well as one of the 
founders of twentieth-century linguistics. Saussure was a philologist with philosophical 
inclinations, and after his death, a group of his students collected, edited, and published 
notes from his lectures as A Course in General Linguistics (1916), a text that profoundly 
impacted not only linguistics, but a wide range of disciplines, including anthropology, 
sociology, psychology, philosophy, and literary criticism. However, in 1996, a 
manuscript in Saussure’s own handwriting was discovered in a piece of his family’s 
furniture, which resulted in the publication of Writings in General Linguistics (2002), a 
text which also includes his original lecture notes.  
 Scholars continue to compare and contrast A Course and Writings, but for our 
purposes the important thing is how Saussure defined the sign as “complex” or “dual,” 
that is, as a conjunction of a signifier (significant) and a signified (signifié). While 
common sense or scientific naiveté might suggest that a signifier could be something 




observed to be on a mat), for Saussure, the signified is always an idea: “there is no 
linguistic entity possible which would be directly accessible through the senses, because 
none exists apart from the idea which can be attached to it.” That position is 
philosophically sophisticated—and is perhaps not entirely incompatible with empiricism, 
at least of the Berkeleyan variety—but scientists might have some concern that Saussure 
abandoned the world, or at least any form of representationalism, for some kind of 
linguistic idealism. His Writings did nothing to alleviate such concern: 
Does linguistics come face to face, as its primary and immediate object, with a 
readily defined object, a group of items perceptible to the senses, as is the case for 
physics, chemistry, botany, astronomy, etc.? In no way and at no time is this the 
case: linguistics is situated at the opposite extreme to those sciences which are 
able to take the data of the senses as their starting point. 
Since, for Saussure, signs and meaning could never be about the world but only about 
ideas, then linguistics was more akin to abstraction-based logic or mathematics than it 
was to sensation-based biology or neurology—and curiosity about the evolution of 
language simply evaporated. The structural linguistics that followed from A Course broke 
even with historical considerations of language development, to consider language only 
as it exists at a given time; thus, structural linguistics is characterized as synchronic 
(“same time”), as opposed to diachronic (“across time”). 
 Such a historical-disciplinary development seems odd given that philology as 
Saussure knew it had been based on studies that showed languages as diverse as Hindi 
and Icelandic were derived from a common, extinct ancestor, now called Proto-Indo-




groups—which, in turn, might ultimately descend from a “Proto-World” language
5
 that 
marks the beginning of culture, and even the origin of our species—Saussure insisted on 
a sharp division between linguistics and the study of natural systems: 
 . . . ‘A language is born, grows, weakens, and dies like any organic being.’ This 
sentence is absolutely typical of the conception, so widespread even among 
linguists that one wearies of fighting it, which leads directly to a definition of 
linguistics as a natural science. No, a language is not an organism, it is not a plant 
with an existence independent of humankind, it does not have a life of its own 
which leads to birth and death. Everything in the sentence that I quoted is wrong: 
a language is not an organic being, it does not of itself die, weaken, or grow, since 
it has no more a childhood than middle or old age, and it is not even born . . . (p. 
102) 
Although, as previously mentioned, Darwin had compared the development of language 
to organic evolution in The Descent of Man, it is doubtful that anyone had actually argued 
that language has “an existence independent of mankind.” Indeed, in The Origin of 
Species, the great naturalist had stated: 
If we possessed a perfect pedigree of mankind, a genealogical arrangement of the 
races of man would afford the best classification of the various languages now 
spoken throughout the world; and if all extinct languages, and all intermediate and 
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slowly changing dialects, were to be included, such an arrangement would be the 
only possible one. 
This idea that there might be a significant diachronic relationship between human 
genealogy and language—as opposed to any alleged idea that language has “an existence 
independent of mankind”—has since been vindicated by comparisons of painstakingly 
acquired genetic and linguistic data (see Figure 5). 
 Not only is Saussure’s independent-of-mankind straw man troubling from a 
scholarly point of view, but it is also puzzling given his own crucial distinction between 
parole, or language as it is actually spoken by persons, and langue, or language as an 
impersonal system of signs—that is, language as it exists apart from persons. Leaving 
aside the possibility of psychological projection, however, we should note that Saussure’s 
desire to isolate linguistics from the natural sciences, in general, and from organic 




respect to his understanding of Darwinian theory, or he engaged in willful (if eloquent) 
misrepresentation of the same: 
The actual birth of a new language has never been reported anywhere in the 
world. We have seen new stars appear suddenly in the midst of the known 
constellations of the sky, and we have seen new islands rise up one day from the 
surface of the some sea, but we have never known a language which was not 
spoken the day before or which was not spoken in the same way the day before.  
Here, if we but substitute “species” for “language,” and “did not exist” for “was not 
spoken,” the general form of this false argument stands revealed as being identical with 
that used by contemporary creationists to attack “Darwinism.” 
 
2.4 - SIGNS OF CHANGE 
 In 1976, evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins argued in The Selfish Gene that, 
through language, evolution had transitioned from the merely genetic or organic to 
include the mimetic or cultural. Just as genes partake of materiality both literally as 
molecules, and figuratively as conveyers of information or meaning, “memes” (Dawkins 
coined the word, which has entered common parlance, that is, become a successful 
meme) also partake of materiality both literally as cultural artifacts, and figuratively as 
language-based and -transferred behaviors and ideas. And like genes, memes are subject 
to replication, recombination, mutation, and selective pressures—that is, language is an 
evolutionary system. Interestingly, Dawkins considered genes and, by implication, 








 Shortly thereafter—even though linguist John Lyons had asserted in his 
authoritative, two-volume Semantics (1977) that “there is no actual evidence from 
language” of its having “evolved from some non-linguistic signaling system”—self-
described “street linguist” Derek Bickerton discussed in his Roots of Language (1981) the 
possibility of a “proto-language” or an evolutionary precursor to language proper. While 
it is unlikely that a single text ended linguistics’ more-than-century-long ban on the 
discussion of the evolutionary origin of language, Roots seemed to mark the beginning of 
a paradigm shift, where the language-related data that had been steadily accumulated by 
biologists, neurologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and ethologists had reached a 
point of self-organizing criticality, and a novel cross-disciplinary imperative or attractor 
emerged, forcing linguists to take heed. 
 However, that attractor needed time to stabilize due to disciplinary biases that 
impeded full commitment to the problem of the evolutionary origin of language; 
basically, a new generation of cross-disciplinary researchers has to construct their careers 
in terms of addressing the problem, which has long suffered a quixotic reputation. That 
process is ongoing, but some interesting partnerships and arguments have already 
occurred as scholars struggle to piece together and join sections of the puzzle at the 
center of all puzzles. For example, in “Natural Language and Natural Selection” (1990), 
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psycholinguist Steven Pinker and cognitive psychologist Paul Bloom confronted 
Chomsky and evolutionary theorist Stephen Gould—who had been separately arguing 
that language is too complex to be anything other than a non-adaptive byproduct of 
evolution—by contending that the very complexity of language production and structure 
indicates its evolutionary centrality. 
 Then, in “The Faculty of Language: What Is It, Who Has It, and How Did It 
Evolve?” (2002), Chomsky collaborated with evolutionary biologists Mark Hauser and 
Tecumseh Fitch to point out that “developments in linguistics can be profitably wedded 
to work in evolutionary biology, anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience”—but 
mainly they argued for a distinction between “broad” and “narrow” senses of the 
language faculty, where the former refers to the sensory-motor, conceptual-intentional, 
and computational underpinnings of language, and the latter refers to its recursive, or 
nested, syntactical structure—Chomsky’s focus. Then, in “The Nature of the Language 
Faculty and Its Implications for the Evolution of Language” (2005), Pinker and cognitive 
linguist Ray Jackendoff argued against Chomsky, Hauser, and Fitch by pointing out that 
an arbitrary distinction that isolates syntactical recursion hampers a full understanding of 
the evolutionary bases of language—and that “recursion, though absent from other 
animals’ communications systems, is found in visual cognition, hence [it] cannot be the 
sole evolutionary development that granted language to humans.” Then, in “The 
Evolution of the Language Faculty: Clarifications and Implications” (2005), Chomsky, 
Hauser, and Fitch accused Pinker and Jackendoff of “blurring” their distinction, which 
led those two to “mischaracterize” an offered hypothesis and conduct “irrelevant” 




aid interdisciplinary rapprochement”—and perhaps this line could have been lifted 
directly from that controversy-ridden, 1866 conference of the Linguistic Society of Paris: 
Concerning evolution, we believe that Pinker and Jackendoff’s emphasis on the 
past adaptive history of the language faculty is misplaced. Such questions are 
unlikely to be resolved empirically due to a lack of relevant data, and invite 
speculation rather than research. 
These important examples provide some sense of the individuals and issues, as well as 
the contentiousness involved in contemporary discussions relating to the origin of 
language (interestingly, both Fitch and Jackendoff have conducted research into the 
evolution of music, and Pinker specializes in visual cognition). These examples also 
might indicate that some remnant of the linguistics old guard is still working behind the 
scenes to thwart any diachronic or “adaptationist” attempt to address the problem. 
I know first-hand that the attempt to relate language to biological evolution can be 
controversial. For example, when I first broached the subject with English professor and 
philosopher David Bleich, he maintained that “language was there as long as there was 
people” and “it’s wiser to decide that there’s no origin of language.” Regarding evolution 
in general, Bleich stated, “I don’t care about the origin of life” (Bleich, 2010). At another 
event, during which linguist Frank Arasanyin claimed that “language production is 
biocultural,” Bleich asked him, “Do you think it matters how language came about?” 
Arasanyin responded in the affirmative, stating that “to know where you are going, you 
should know where you are coming from; for me to put a step forward, I must know 
where my last step was.” To that, Bleich retorted, “But no one actually tries to find the 




inquiry; it’s also part of curiosity” (Arasanyin, 2011). On that point, I agree with 
Arasanyin. 
Fortunately, we have two other primary disciplines besides linguistics to assist us: 
evolutionary theory and neuropsychology. And as the next Section shows, 





3.0 - LANGUAGE AND THE BRAIN 
Again, I hear voices, I sort of lost touch with reality. Humming in my ears and a 
small feeling like a warning . . . Voices, the same as before. I was just losing 
touch with reality again. 
-20-year-old college student, while his right temporal lobe was being 




3.1 – DISCOVERY OF LATERALIZATION  
In the treatise titled “On the Sacred Disease,” it was recorded that the ancient 
Greek physician-teacher and pioneer of rational empiricism Hippocrates (460-377? BCE) 
maintained that epilepsy—or seizures driven by storms of electrical feedback within the 
brain—is not “any more divine or sacred than other diseases, but has a natural origin” 
(1959, p. 139). He was also said to have held that 
Men ought to know that from the brain, and from the brain only, arise our 
pleasure, joys, laughter, and jests, as well as our sorrows, pains, griefs, and tears. 
Through it, in particular, we think, see, hear, and distinguish the ugly from the 
beautiful, the bad from the good, the pleasant from the unpleasant, in some cases 
using custom as a test, in others perceiving them from their utility. (p. 175) 
Such observations led to the assertion that “the brain is the interpreter of consciousness” 
(p. 179). But while the treatise “Of Injuries of the Head” reported that patients who had 
                                                          
7
 As quoted in Julian Jaynes’ book The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind 




received a wound or incision on one side of the head often exhibited seizures on the 
opposite side of the body (§13 and §19), and the treatise “Of the Epidemics” reported a 
case involving right-side seizures and paralysis associated with loss of speech abilities 
(Book 1, Section III, case xiii), the students of the father of Western medicine did not 
collate that data. Later, in his treatise “On Sleep and Sleeplessness,” Aristotle (384-322 
BCE) designated the heart as the point where the mind interfaces with the body, and he 
claimed that the brain functions to cool the blood. Both the Hippocratic school and 
Aristotle may have been hindered in their understanding of the brain by a prohibition 
against dissection and the theory of humors, which involved harmony among four 
precious bodily fluids and their occult correspondences, and which survived even into the 
modern era to undergird the practice of bloodletting. 
 The physician-anatomist Herophilus of Alexandria (335-280 BCE) reinstated the 
brain as the seat of the mind, but he espoused the ventricular theory, which posited that 
brain functions are pneumatic, or air-based, and that the loci of cognition are situated 
along the brain’s midline, in the third ventricle. That theory may have reinforced the 
already-existing appeal of symmetry
8
 to select against a theory of lateralization, or 
against even the recognition of data that might suggest such a theory. Under the first 
Ptolemaic pharaohs, Herophilus was permitted to conduct dissections of and experiments 
on living prisoners, and thereby discovered that sensory impulses travel into the spinal 
cord and brain, while motor impulses travel out of the brain and spinal cord. Later, the 
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Roman physician-anatomist Galen (129-209), a champion of ventricular theory who 
considered wounds to be “windows into the body,” also conducted live dissections as 
well as nerve ligation experiments on living prisoners in order to investigate how the 
brain controls the body’s muscles, but he failed to discern the contralateral nature of that 
control. The ventricular theory was elaborated by the Christian philosophers Nemesius (c. 
390) and Augustine of Hippo (354-430), but with the collapse of classical culture, 
learning and knowledge went into a more-than-millennium-long general decline.  
 In the sixteenth century, the physician-anatomist and teacher Andreas Vesalius 
(1514-1564) began to question or at least qualify ventricular theory, and he reintroduced 
the practice of dissection—long banned under Christianity—in the context of a 
pedagogical theater, and he made empirical diagrams of human anatomy. Pioneering 
modern philosopher René Descartes (whose eventual distrust of the senses marks the split 
between philosophy and science) also held to a version of ventricular theory, although he 
proposed that brain functions are hydraulic, or liquid-based, and that the pineal gland—a 
pinecone-shaped midline structure attached to the posterior roof of the third ventricle—is 
the site of mind-body interface. 
Then, in the seventeenth century, the English physician-anatomist Thomas Willis 
(1621-1675), a founding member of the Royal Society, focused his research on the brain, 
nerves, and muscles. He held the locus of crucial cognitive functions to be the corpus 
callosum (Latin for “tough body”): the thick, subcortical bundle of nerve fibers that 
connects the hemispheres of the cerebral brain and is nested within the cingulate cortex 
(see Figure 6). In fact, the corpus callosum is not only the largest commissure—or cross-




body. It is estimated to contain 200-250 million highly myelinated (fat-insulated and 
conductive) axons or nerve cells, compared to about 1.5 million for each optic nerve and 
about 32,000 for the auditory nerve, and its cross-sectional area is about 700 square 
millimeters, compared with a few square millimeters for the optic nerve.  
A century later, the French physician-anatomist Félix Vicq-d’Azyr (1746-1794), a 
member of the French Academy of Sciences, postulated that the corpus callosum served 
“to establish sympathetic communications between different parts of the brain”—namely, 
the brain’s hemispheres. Since “sympathetic communications” implies the existence of at 
least initial differences (or else information transfer would be unnecessary), the idea of a 
hemispheric bridge could have hinted at some kind of lateralization, that is, difference 




belief in it was strained, and here we might be reminded of how the appeal of the perfect 
circle hindered astronomy until Kepler’s elliptical orbits. 
For example, the Germanic neuroanatomist Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828), 
member of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences and originator of phrenology, when 
presented with a case of amnestic aphasia—or defective recall of words for speech, with 
intact abilities of comprehension—following injury to the left frontal lobe, maintained 
that trauma to one hemisphere “upset the balance between the hemispheres, thus affecting 
the faculties on both sides.” In other words, Gall incorrectly postulated an early form of 
diaschisis—or damage across the brain—rather than question an unstated principle of 
symmetry. 
 However, in 1836, the French neuroanatomist Marc Dax (1771-1837) submitted 
notes to the French Academy of Sciences in which he claimed a link between aphasia—
or impairment of language functions—and damage to only the left hemisphere 
(contralateral control was by then known through the study of the brain lesions of stroke-
paralysis victims), but he died soon thereafter, and his work remained obscure. 
Bolstered by phrenological thinking, and despite the rarity of ambidexterity, 
symmetry prevailed until a few years after the first printing of The Origin of Species, 
when Pierre Paul Broca (1824-1880)—the French neuroanatomist and anthropologist, 
subversive freethinker, and eventual lifetime member of the French Senate—published a 
short paper titled “Loss of Speech, Chronic Softening and Partial Destruction of the 
Anterior Left Lobe of the Brain” (1863). Broca reported on a recently deceased patient 
who had been only able to say “tan” for three decades, even though he could usually 




syphilitic damage: “a large cavity, capable of holding a chicken egg, and filled with 
serous fluid,” centering on “the middle part of the frontal lobe of the left hemisphere” (on 
the posterior section of the inferior frontal gyrus). There was no discernible damage 
across the brain, into the right hemisphere, and Broca concluded that “the lesion of the 
frontal lobe was the cause of the loss of speech.” The left hemisphere area identified by 
Broca would be named after him (see Figure 7), as would the expressive aphasia—or loss 
of speech and writing, with defective abilities of comprehension—resulting from its 
injury. Thus Broca (who may have read Dax) publicly announced the lateralization of 
language functions, and further research possibilities suggested themselves. 
Most significantly, the Germanic neuropsychiatrist and anatomist Carl Wernicke 
(1848-1905) took advantage of the fact that wounds are “windows into the body” and that 
specific behavioral abnormalities can be correlated with specific damaged regions of the 




could speak, but the content of his speech was nonsensical, and he could not understand 
the speech of others. When the patient died, Wernicke performed an autopsy, and found a 
lesion on the left hemisphere of the man’s cerebral cortex; the area of the lesion was 
posterior to Broca’s area (on the posterior section of the superior temporal gyrus). This 
area identified by Wernicke would be named after him (see Figure 7), as would the 
receptive aphasia—or loss of comprehension, with defective abilities of speech and 
writing—resulting from its injury. Thus language was understood as having at least two 
correlative, left hemisphere loci along the lateral sulcus: one for grammar or speech 
(Broca’s area), the other for semantics or understanding (Wernicke’s area). The nascent 
theory of brain lateralization was thus reinforced.   
 Based on the emerging correlative methodology, other lateralized findings 
followed Broca and Wernicke’s. For example, it was shown that damage to the posterior 
right hemisphere could result in spatial impairment (Jackson, 1876); damage to the left 
occipital cortex and the corpus callosum could result in alexia without agraphia—or loss 
of abilities to read, with intact abilities to write (Dejerine, 1892); damage to the left 
parietal lobe could result in apraxia—or loss of abilities to move purposefully (Liepmann 
1905); and damage to the corpus callosum could prevent the left hand from executing 
verbal commands (Liepmann & Maas, 1907). Then, when research indicated that 
contralateral verbal movement-command reaction time was faster than ispilateral, the 
difference was used to calculate the speed of information transfer across the corpus 
callosum (Poffenberger, 1912), and a concept of hemispheric interaction was proposed 
(Liepmann, 1912; Poffenberger, 1912), which further supported the concept of lateralized 





3.2 - DETERMINATION OF DIFFERENCES 
 Shortly after World War II, Juhn Wada (b. 1924), a Japanese-Canadian studying 
to become a neurosurgeon, published a report describing an elegant test for evaluating 
language lateralization prior to ablative surgery for epilepsy (1949). It had already been 
noted that speech lateralization was not entirely consistent; a minority patients of seemed 
right hemisphere “dominant” (lateralized) for speech, and fewer still seemed neither right 
nor left. A surgeon preparing to conduct a hemispherectomy needed to determine 
individual lateralization in order to best preserve speech and memory functions. Wada 
discovered that by introducing a sedative via cannula or catheter into either internal 
carotid artery of a still awake patient, the artery’s respective cerebral hemisphere could be 
temporarily anaesthetized. Using a series of language and memory tests, the functions of 
the non-sedated hemisphere could then be studied in isolation. 
 As expected, left hemisphere sedation usually impaired or eliminated speech and 
the understanding of speech, although the ability to sing was sometimes retained. 
Contralateral hemiplegia—or total paralysis of the arm, leg, and trunk on the side of the 
body opposite the anaesthetized hemisphere—was the rule (Broca, Wernicke, and others 
had observed it), as was profound hemispatial neglect—or loss of the ability to perceive 
stimuli on one side of the body (see Figure 8). Hemispatial neglect takes a variety of 
forms—with massive blindspots extending into even imaginary data such as memories, 
dreams, and hallucinations—but its victims usually have difficulty recognizing that 
anything is amiss. Various other unusual cognitive and affective behaviors also 




interaction via neural inhibition and its converse, recruitment. But the Wada test 
procedure is invasive and not without risk, and its effects last only a few minutes. It is a 
powerful diagnostic tool, but its value for research is limited; something else was needed. 
 In the early 1960s, American neurobiologist Roger Sperry (1913-1994) began 
working with previously severe epileptics whose seizures had been curtailed by the 
surgical transection of the corpus callosum: so-called “split-brain” patients, their small 
commissures and subcortical structures remained intact. Sperry had previously researched 
brain plasticity (past a certain age, major neural pathways remain more or less fixed), and 
was very much interested in the mind-body problem at a time when behaviorism 
dominated the field. His controversial split-brain research with cats had already 




learning, but his research with human split-brain patients would eventually win him the 
Nobel Prize for Medicine (1981) and the National Medal of Science (1990). 
 Over the course of three decades, Sperry’s research concentrated on teasing apart 
the cognitive differences between the hemispheres of the typical human brain. (Here, 
“typical” means the 97% of right-handers who exhibit left hemisphere lateralization for 
language functions; 3% of right-handers and 30% of left-handers exhibit either right 
hemisphere or bi-lateralization—and “handedness” has no single, agreed-upon 
operational definition). Through a series of clever experiments taking advantage of the 
fact that, in split-brain subjects, the left and right visual fields each provide sensory 
information only to the contralateral half of the cerebral cortex, Sperry, his protégé-
colleague Michael Gazzaniga (b. 1939), and other researchers established that the left 
hemisphere specializes in relatively abstract-focused, linear-logical, lexical-syntactical 
cognitive functions, while the right hemisphere specializes in relatively gestalt-
contextual, associative-affective, imagistic-semantical cognitive functions (Carlson, 
2011, pp. 71-72; Bradshaw & Nettleton, 1981; Gazzaniga, 2002; Lovseth & Atchley, 
2010; and Vigneau et al., 2011). 
For example, in an early experiment designed by Sperry and Gazzaniga (see 
Figure 9), the researcher made sure the split-brain subject fixed his eyes on a point on a 
screen, then the researcher flashed a word or image to one side of that point. The subject 
then attempted to say what the flashed stimulus had been, and reached under a partition 
with his left hand to select an object corresponding to it. Split-brain subjects typically 
could not say what a stimulus flashed to their left visual field had been, even though their 




image-isolation effect could be ameliorated with practice and time, due to subject 
strategization and neural plasticity, but the experiment showed that while the right 
hemisphere does well with nouns and adjectives, it does poorly with verbs and syntax, 
and is not the seat of narrative self-awareness, but of some sort of separate and proto-
linguistic mind or “implicit self” (Morin, 2002; Schore, 2010). And Gazzaniga reported 
that: 
We then asked the left hemisphere, the only one that can talk, why the left 
handing was pointing to the object. It did not know, because the decision to point 
was made in the right hemisphere. Yet it quickly made up an explanation. We 
dubbed this creative, narrative talent the interpreter mechanism. (2002, p. 29) 
That massive blindspot or seamless narrative effect could extend into more significant 
actions. For example, when Gazzaniga flashed to a subject’s isolated right hemisphere 




obey those commands—and when asked by the researcher to explain his behavior, would 
provide an easy rationalization such as “I am going to get a drink” or “Because you guys 
are so funny” (Henriques, 2011, p. 133). 
It must be emphasized that differences based on left hemisphere lexical-
grammatical versus right hemisphere imagistic-semantic cognitive specialization are 
generalizations; the concept of human brain lateralization denotes trends that vary across 
individuals and functions, presumably in accordance with genetic parameters, 
environmental factors, and neuro-developmental plasticity. Nevertheless, despite the 
almost overwhelming complexity of the brain itself, as well as the popular 
oversimplification of lateralization,
9
 the data that denote hemispheric functional 
emphases are impressive. Laboratory experiments have consistently demonstrated that 
severed hemispheres yield separate, different minds or sets of behavior. 
Before considering the structural hierarchy of lateralization, we should note the 
1976 publication of a provocative, cross-disciplinary work by American psychologist 
Julian Jaynes (1920-1997): The Origin of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the 
Bicameral Mind. Like Sperry, whose split-brain research he prominently cites, Jaynes 
was interested in the mind-body problem, but Jaynes had a theory, albeit one that remains 
controversial. He recognized that the bulk of information transfer across the hemispheres 
occurs via the corpus callosum; however, he hypothesized that, in times past, information 
generated in the right hemisphere locus corresponding to Wernicke’s area had been 
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communicated across the anterior commissure to the left temporal lobe, where that 
information was interpreted as auditory-verbal hallucinations.
10
 
 Jaynes cited research spearheaded by Wilder Penfield (1891-1976), the Canadian 
neurosurgeon who co-created the somatic-sensory homunculus—research involving the 
experience of hazy voices, music, and images sometimes evoked by electrical stimulation 
of the posterior Section of the right superior temporal gyrus—and he also devoted entire 
chapters of The Origin of Consciousness to hypnosis and schizophrenia. In brief, Jaynes 
speculated that as recently as 1000 BCE  the human mind had been “bicameral” (two 
houses on the same foundation), and that a non-subjective humanity had heard and 
obeyed without question the hallucinatory voices of the right hemisphere “gods.” There 
had been no opposition to those voices, because there had been no unitary self to mount 
opposition. With the evolution of sufficiently recursive metaphors, however, the 
multiplicity of voices was integrated into a single voice expressing the self and having its 
seat in the language loci of the left hemisphere. An anxiously stochastic humanity, Jaynes 
concluded, has longed for the lost voice(s) of certainty ever since. 
 
3.3 - LEVELS OF LATERALIZATION 
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hemispheric communication between humans and other primates: 
When this commissure is left intact in otherwise split-brain monkeys, the animals retain the ability 
to transfer visual information from one hemisphere to the other. People, however, do not transfer 
visual information in any way. Hence the same structure carries out different functions in different 




Evolution works by affecting hierarchically nested levels of organic structure, 
namely (from most implicit to most explicit), molecules, cells, tissues, and organs. We 
would expect functional lateralization to be accompanied by general structural 
lateralization, and that is exactly what we find. For example, on a molecular level, 
neurotransmitters, hormones, and neuropeptides and neuropeptidases are chemicals 
involved in neural development and potentiation—and they show asymmetric 
concentrations varying by species, environment, time of day, season, age, the female 
reproductive cycle, the sleep cycle, and in humans, psychological disorder (Ramirez et 
al., 2004). On a cellular level, neurons have been shown to exhibit asymmetric 
localizations (for a comprehensive review, see Toga & Thompson, 2003), sizes (Hutsler 
& Gazzaniga, 1996), densities (Diaz, Pinto-Hamuy, & Fernandez, 1994), and dendritic 
branching morphologies (Seldon, 1981; Scheibel, 1985)—which, on a tissue level, 
generate left-right differences in circuit microarchitecture (Bianco et al. 2008), resulting 
most notably in the uniquely asymmetric minicolumn morphologies of the human planum 
temporale (Dorsaint-Pierre et al., 2006). 
 The planum temporale is a roughly triangular area that, on the left hemisphere, is 
centered in Wernicke’s area (Broca’s area is located towards the other end of the left 
lateral fissure) and participates in the initial processing of incoming auditory information 
(Shapleske et al., 1999). The tissues of the left planum temporale exhibit wider columns 




organ level, in the most significant asymmetry of any brain on the planet: in humans, the 
left planum temporale can be up to five times as large as the right.
11
 
That massive asymmetry is the most prominent feature of Yakovlevian torque, 
which is named after its discoverer, the neuroanatomist Paul Yakovlev (1894-1983), and 
is a global anatomical twisting of the cerebral tissues such that the human brain’s left 
occipital and right frontal lobes are wider and protrude farther than its right occipital and 
left frontal lobes (see Figure 10). That situation results in the left occipital lobe slightly 
crossing the midline so that the posterior interhemispheric fissure skews right, and the left 
lateral fissure is both lower and longer than the right—which effectively bunches extra 
neural tissue into the left planum temporale.
12
 The distortion designated as Yakovlevian 
torque is so pronounced that the protruding left occipital and right frontal lobes produce 
differential petalia, or slight impressions upon the inner surface of the skull. Those 
differential petalia will be of interest in the next chapter, when we consider the fossilized 
remains of extinct hominid lines. 
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which affects the functions of the auditory cortex and the corpus callosum (Chance et al., 2008). 
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 It is possible that the sometimes heightened language functions of hydrocephalic children (Pinker, 1994, 
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3.4 - EVOLUTION OF LATERALIZATION 
Once human brain lateralization was generally accepted and the unstated principle 
of symmetry relaxed, functional lateralization became something of a mark of 
distinction—evidence of humanity’s privileged place along the scala naturae. Since 
speech is associated with reason and was also the first function recognized as lateralized, 
that recognition reinforced the already-existing tendency toward human exceptionalism, 
likely based on fear, in general, and fear of death, in particular (Becker, 1973). Obvious 
non-human lateralizations—for example, the fiddler crab’s claws, the narwhal’s tusk, and 




solely on the asymmetry of the human brain, a trait often interpreted as the sign and the 
seal of our uniqueness. 
Over the past 30 years, however, researchers have been accumulating evidence of 
perceptual and cognitive lateralization in a wide variety of other chordates, from fish and 
frogs to lizards and domestic chickens to cats and chimpanzees. How did that occur? 
Evolution is driven by adaptation, and by extending developmental-cognitive 
psychologist Howard Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences (2006, 2011), we may 
broadly define intelligence as adaptability, thus embracing such diverse examples as the 
negative phototropism of amoebae and the improvisational interactions of jazz musicians. 
While talk of evolutionary progress now seems naïve, we can still speak of increasing 
complexity, and it is apparent that increasing complexity means the emergence of novel 
forms of intelligence in response to selective pressures. 
The geological pace of most of evolutionary history reflects corresponding 
geophysiological selective pressures (see Figure 11). Our Earth is estimated to be about 
4.6 billion years old. Simple single-celled (prokaryotic) life seems to have been around 
for about 3.8 billion years—but nucleated (eukaryotic) life for only about the last two 
billion years. Multi-cellular life apparently emerged about a billion years ago, at which 
point something interesting happened: the primary selective pressures began to be other 
organisms. An evolutionary arms race or feedback loop ensued, with the deployment of 
various “arms” centering about developing nervous systems.  
By just over 500 million years ago, brains had evolved, and the development of 
eyes and vision kicked off what biologists and archeologists call the “Cambrian 




including the emergence of most of the major animal groups existing today—notably 
chordates, including the fish from which we eventually evolved. An interesting thing 
about fish, which have largely lateralized (as opposed to binocular) vision and no fore- or 
midbrain commissures, is that they exhibit lateralized behavior—that is, they engage their 
environment according to left-right preferences or fundamental cognitive modules 
corresponding to the halves of the fish brain. 
Here “cognitive” is broadly defined as neural information-processing, and 
“modules” refers to the organization of such processing as described by philosopher and 
cognitive psychologist Jerry Fodor in his book Modularity of Mind (1983). According to 




adaptive problems. Those fixed functions operate irrespective of other cognitive systems, 
and cannot be bypassed; moreover, they are input-specific, with simple outputs that 
condition more flexible, higher-level cognitive systems. 
In any case, fish typically respond more quickly when predators are first seen 
through one eye, and they find prey more efficiently when using the other eye. Brain 
lateralization differs by species in that individuals within shoaling species tend to share 
the same left-right preferences, while individuals within non-shoaling species show more 
variation in the direction of preference (Vallortigara, Rogers, & Bisazza, 1999). But in 
general, one eye and its contralateral half of the brain (since the optic nerves cross to 
connect each eye with the opposite side of the brain) perceive the environment in a more 
contextual fashion for what can be called “avoidance” perceptions and behaviors, while 
the other eye and half of the brain perceive the environment in a more focused fashion for 
what can be called “approach” perceptions and behaviors. We can say that the avoidance 
brain is neurologically geared towards recognizing changes in gestalt fields to generate 
more automatic “fight-or-flight” responses, while the approach brain is neurologically 
geared towards abstracting or isolating particular objects to generate more deliberative 
“feed-or-breed” responses (see Figure 12). 
 Similarly, domestic chicks have laterally-situated eyes, almost complete chiasmic 
crossing of the optic nerves, and no corpus callosum; these natural split-brain subjects 
(cover an eye to isolate the ipsilateral hemisphere) were actually the first non-human 
animals strenuously studied for functional lateralization, and they continue to be fruitfully 
employed. A domestic chick’s normal feeding routine consists of pecking about for seed 




Experiments show that this arrangement allows for an efficient balance of seed-gathering 
and predator-detection behaviors: covering the right eye results in poor predator detection 
and even worse seed gathering, while covering the left eye results in poor seed gathering 
and even worse predator detection (Vallortigara & Regolin, 2006).  
  Why is there lateralization of the brain? According to Henriques’ Behavioral 
Investment Theory (BIT)—the first principle of which is energy economics—the animal 
mind is an epiphenomenon of the brain and evolved as “a decision-making system that 
calculates the value of the resources obtained and losses avoided, relative to the costs of 
spending the actions in the first place, the risks involved, and the value of other avenues 
of investment” (Henriques, 2011, p. 46). Inasmuch as the mind is a phenomenological 
mapping system, the most fundamental decision an animal can make is how to move in 
relation to landmarks—that is, approach or avoidance. The lateralized halves of the brain 




movement of the organisms of which they are a part, and those vision-specific systems 
are the most fundamental and most influential cognitive modules possessed by animals, 
including humans. 
The nature of the cognitive contest or feedback interaction between the approach 
and avoidance modules can be considered in terms described by economist George Zipf 
in his book Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort (1949). Zipf discovered an 
empirical relationship among words such that the second most commonly used word 
(“of”) in a given language occurs one-half as frequently as the first (“the”), the third 
(“and”) occurs one-third as frequently, the fourth occurs one-fourth, the fifth one-fifth, 
etc. In short, the frequency of any word is inversely proportional to its frequency rank—a 
fact that holds true across all tested languages. Zipf proposed that the observed high-
frequency use of a small fraction of available words indicates that neither speakers nor 
hearers want to work any harder than necessary to reach understanding, and the process 
that results in the approximately equal distribution of their efforts leads to the highly 
skewed distribution of word frequencies. 
I will revisit the principle of least effort in Section 5.3, when discussing the 
evolutionary emergence of word forms, but here it is enough to apply it to the animal 
mind vis-à-vis BIT and approach-avoidance modularity by modifying Zipf (as quoted by 
Henriques, 2011, p. 50) to state that an animal  
will strive to solve [its] problems in such a way as to minimize the total work [it] 
must expend in solving both [its] immediate problems and [its] probable future 




probable average rate of [its] work expenditure (over time). And in so doing [it]  
will be minimizing [its] effort. 
Emerging forms of structural-behavior intelligence can be viewed in terms of maximizing 
energy efficiency as a general adaptive strategy. For example, while the unconnected 
halves of a fish brain allow for relatively discrete and less flexible interactions between 
the approach and avoidance modules (more inter-hemispheric competition than 
cooperation), the emergence of the corpus callosum among placental mammals—the 
earliest known example is 160 million years old—allows for relatively blended and more 
flexible interactions (more inter-hemispheric cooperation than competition), and we 
would expect evolution to take advantage of that trajectory. Indeed, biologist and early 
champion of Darwinian evolution Thomas Henry Huxley (1825-1895) commented that  
[T]he appearance of the “corpus callosum” in the placental mammals is the 
greatest and most sudden modification exhibited by the brain in the whole series 
of the vertebrated animals—it is the greatest leap anywhere made by Nature in her 
brain work. For the two halves of the brain being once thus knit together, the 
progress of cerebral complexity is traceable through a complete series of steps, 
from the lowest Rodent, or Insectivore, to Man; and that complexity consists 
chiefly in the disproportionate development of the cerebral hemispheres …. 
(Huxley, 2001, p. 97) 
And more recently, evolutionary neurologists have suggested that “the origin of the 
mammalian corpus callosum is related to the need to integrate the two topographic 




Another important callosal function may have been bimanual coordination . . . 
[which] may have involved the corpus callosum at later stages of cortical 
evolution, after the topographic maps were already established and the cerebral 
cortex had begun to exert significant control in motor behavior. (Aboitiz & 
Montiel, 2003, p. 414) 
“Bimanual coordination” will be discussed in terms of the avoidance and approach 
modules, as well as their derivatives, in the next Section. 
The fundamental nature of the approach-avoidance behavioral binary—which 
underlies brain asymmetry, in general, and cerebral hemispheric lateralization, in 
particular—cannot be overemphasized. In their article “Approach and Avoidance 
Motivation” (2001), which introduced a special issue of Educational Psychology Review 
dedicated to goal theory, psychologists Andrew Elliot and Martin Covington stated: “We 
contend that approach-avoidance is not just an important motivational distinction, but that 
it is fundamental and basic, and should be construed as the foundation on which other 
motivational distinctions rest” (p. 74). The authors note that “one argument for the 
fundamental importance of the approach-avoidance distinction is that it has a long and 
rich history in intellectual thought.” They trace that history from the pleasure-pain 
dichotomy central to ancient Greek ethical hedonism and Benthamite utilitarianism to the 
formulations of James, Jung, Pavlov, Skinner, Maslow, and a host of other psychologists 
(pp. 74-76). The authors then note that  
A second argument for the fundamental importance of the approach-avoidance 




avoidance motivation is not only manifest in humans, but also in lower organisms 
as simple as the single-cell amoeba. (p. 76) 
In particular, Elliot and Covington reference the work of animal psychologist Theodore 
Schneirla (1902-1968), who coauthored several books in his field, contributed many 
scientific papers, researched the behavior of army ants, and who 
argued that organisms at all levels of complexity possess what he termed A-type 
(approach-type) mechanisms, which evoke approach reactions and facilitate food-
getting, shelter-getting, and mating and W-type (withdrawal-type) mechanisms, 
which evoke withdrawal reactions and facilitate defense, huddling, flight, and 
protection in general. [Schneirla] proposed that the sophistication of these 
mechanisms varies considerably across species, with those of protozoa and other 
invertebrates being rudimentary and rigid, and those of higher organisms being 
more advanced and flexible. (p. 76) 
The fact that non-chordates display approach-avoidance behaviors brings up the 
question of whether the structural underpinnings of those behaviors are homologous or 
analogous to those found among chordates (Martin & Jones, 2005). Are the brain-
cognitive asymmetries found in chordates ultimately derived via evolutionary processes 
from asymmetries already found among non-chordates (homologous), or did the two lines 
evolve their respective approach-avoidance modules independently (analogous)? Given 
that researchers have found that approach-avoidance functions are lateralized in non-
chordates as well as chordates (e.g. Heuts & Brunt, 2005), the former possibility is more 




asymmetry is an emergent property of nervous systems—a kind of biological law that 
immediately manifested and informed all subsequent evolutionary trajectories. 
Elliot and Covington discuss “the hypothesis that approach and avoidance 
motivation are localized in different cerebral hemispheres” based on experiments that 
have demonstrated that resting hemispheric asymmetry in the prefrontal cortex is 
associated with motivation-based affective experience, such that relatively greater 
resting activity in the left prefrontal lobe is linked to approach-based positive 
affect, whereas relatively greater resting activity in the right prefrontal lobe is 
linked to withdrawal-based negative affect. (p. 81) 
They also note that “this work produces interpretational difficulties” in that the 
“computation of asymmetry implies a single bipolar (reciprocal) continuum of cortical 
activation, which contrasts sharply with the prevailing view of approach and avoidance as 
largely independent motivational orientations” (p. 81). I have already mentioned that a 
brain with halves / fundamental modules massively connected by a corpus callosum—in 
effect, a parallel computer—could generate relatively blended, flexible approach-
avoidance behaviors, and in Section 5.3 I will discuss the computational contours of the 
“single bipolar (reciprocal) continuum of cortical activation” within such a brain, and 
how that continuum relates to the emergence of language. First, though, I will consider 
the archeological evidence for language to determine what it reveals about the essence of 




4.0 - ARCHEOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 
It has its birth in the earth, its strength it does acquire in the fire, and there 
becomes the true Stone of the ancient sages. 
-Arnald of Villanova, physician-alchemist
13
 
Perhaps the low-level computer rather unexpectedly taught itself some new tricks 





4.1 - SETTING THE STAGE 
At the latest, brain lateralization began with fish (~500 Ma), and it seems to have 
been passed down to all other chordates: amphibians (~360 Ma), reptiles (~300 Ma), and 
eventually mammals (~200 Ma) and birds (~150 Ma), the two lines that have the most 
complex brains. For half a billion years and through multiple mass extinctions, evolution 
wrung as much adaptability—as much intelligence—as possible out of the animal 
nervous system. Yet for virtually all that vast stretch of time, there is no evidence of tool 
use or culture, and thus no evidence of language.  
What in the archaeological record constitutes evidence of language? There are 
two lines: the physical remains of proto- / humans, which provide evidence of 
physiological structures associated with language use, and the artifacts produced by 
proto- / humans, which provide evidence of production associated with language use. 
                                                          
13
 As quoted in Charles Nicholl’s book The Chemical Theater (1997, p. 86). 
14




Discussions of those lines of evidence are necessarily conjectural and complicated by the 
fact that the edges of the standard model of proto- / human physical and cultural 
evolution are in constant flux due to a steady stream of new and often surprising 
archeological data. Still, if we move in broad strokes, an evolutionary outline can be 
described in terms of a few key players. 
The currently available data suggests that, after the extinction event that wiped 
out the dinosaurs except for birds, some of our distant, placental-mammal ancestors took 
to the trees (e.g. Plesiadapis tricuspidens, ~60 Ma). There, they ate insects and evolved 
limbs for grasping branches and binocular vision for better determining depth and 
distance (e.g. Teilhardina asiatica, ~40 Ma). From those prosimians, herbivorous 
monkeys with partially opposable thumbs evolved, and later split into two main groups: 
New World and Old World. The latter group of monkeys (e.g. Aegyptopithecus zeuxis, 
~30 Ma) evolved trichromatic vision and became day-active, and from them evolved the 
larger, tailless apes (e.g. Proconsul africanus, ~25 Ma). The apes split into the common 
ancestor of lesser apes such as gibbons (~15 Ma) and the common ancestor of greater 
apes, or hominids, such as orangutans (e.g. Pierolapithecus catalaunicus, ~13 Ma). The 
hominid line then split into the knuckle-walking, herbivorous ancestor of gorillas (~10 
Ma) and the knuckle-walking, omnivorous common ancestor of chimpanzees and humans 
(e.g. Sahelanthropus tchadensis, ~7 Ma). 
Note that, from the beginning of this evolutionary trajectory, the distinguishing 
characteristics of the mammalian brain—the cortex, or wrinkled outer layers that are 
loaded with excitatory pyramidal neurons and inhibitory interneurons, as well as the 




networked brain, primed for neural oscillation-enabled sensory input, motor output, 
information transfer, and mapping (Fries, 2001; Varela, Lachaux, Rodriguez, & 
Martinerie, 2001). And that brain was fundamentally approach-avoidance lateralized, a 
fact which conditioned the unique evolution of the primate hand with significant 
consequences. 
Note also that the evolution of trichromatic vision among Old World monkeys 
and apes involves the splitting of visual data into dorsal and ventral streams after its 
initial processing by the primary visual cortex within the occipital lobe (Rauschecker, 
2012). On the one hand, the dorsal stream consists of relatively low-resolution grey-scale 
data more useful in twilight conditions, which feeds into the movement-sensitive spatial-
motor systems of the parietal lobes. On the other hand, the ventral stream consists of a 
relatively high resolution mixture of grey-scale and trichromatic data more useful in 
daylight conditions, which feeds into the object-sensitive representation-memory systems 
of the temporal lobes. In terms of visual mapping, the dorsal stream is said to be involved 
in perceiving where objects are in relation to each other, and the ventral stream in 
recognizing what objects are and their shape, size, and color (Carlson, 2011, pp. 164 and 
349). In that the visual data streaming into the temporal lobes is pre-filtered for approach-
abstraction (what) rather than avoidance-gestalt processing (where), dorsal-ventral 
partitioning complemented and reinforced the evolution of brain lateralization (see Figure 
13). 
In any case, chimpanzees, like humans, are now known to have a larynx that, over 
the first two years of life, drops past the hyoid bone to a point between the pharynx and 




omnivorous common ancestor of chimpanzees and humans, allowing for more complex 
vocalizations due to greater control of volume and pitch. Such signaling would have 
arisen in conjunction with increasing social cohesion that simultaneously created 
cooperative advantages—especially in terms of hunting, defense, and raising young—and 
generated tensions between the needs and desires of individuals and other individuals and 
hominid society—tensions that can be broadly considered in terms of approach-
avoidance behaviors. 
The earliest known hominin (Orrorin tugenensis, ~6 Ma), or split from the 
common hominid ancestor on the side believed to lead to humans, had a femur with 
characteristics that suggest partial bipedalism, but otherwise seems to have been a 
proficient tree-climber. Fossilized specimens of the genus Ardipithicus (~5.8-4.3 Ma), 
however, are different. With a cranial capacity of about 300-350 ml, or on the lower end 






 And its bowl-shaped pelvis, the angle of its foramen magnum (the opening at 
the base of the skull through which the spinal cord connects to the brain), and its thinner 
wrist bones all indicate an at least partially bipedal stance, where it would have stood just 
under 4 ft. tall. And although Ardipithicus’ feet were still configured for grasping rather 
than long-distance walking, its novel stance might have been advantageous due to the 
way it freed its hands for manipulation. Whether or not that was the case—bipedalism 
might also have conferred benefits related to locomotion, sight, and even regulation of 
brain temperature (Falk, 2009)—the freed hands of this hominin line contributed to the 
evolution of the mid-level cognitive modules that enabled the emergence of language. 
The next actor to take the prehistoric stage was the genus Australopithicus (~4-2.4 
Ma), which included an omnivore-herbivore species range adapted for living on the 
savannah rather than in the forest, and is famously represented by the fossilized remains 
of “Lucy.” Although it still had the long arms of a tree-climber / knuckle-walker, this 
hominin had a spine, pelvis, and legs that indicate full bipedalism, and stood about 4-4½ 
ft. tall. Australopithicus had even more reduced canines than its apparent ancestor, 
Ardipithicus, and its cranial capacity of about 380-500 ml was between that of a modern 
chimpanzee and a gorilla. 
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However, as researched by physical anthropologist Mary Marzke, the physical 
feature that really stands out here is the thumb, which is now long enough and positioned 
such that it can form a “three-jaw chuck” with the index and middle fingers, allowing for 
the focused and accurate manipulation of small objects (1983). Modern orangutans 
(brachiators) and chimpanzees and gorillas (knuckle-walkers) cannot form that manual 
configuration, since their thumbs are too short in relation to the rest of their hand (see 
Figure 14), but Marzke hypothesized that Australopithicus’ “grip could have been 
exploited in the manipulation of small stone flakes and wood probes, and in the 
controlled manipulation of stone missiles” (p. 197). While full bipedalism in conjunction 
with the novel grip would have allowed for overhand stone-throwing (chimpanzees can 
manage an underhand toss), there is not and probably cannot be any evidence of that 
activity. But evidence of the focused and accurate manipulation of small stone flakes has 
surfaced: 
While working in the Afar Region of Ethiopia, [archeologists] found fossilized 
bones bearing unambiguous evidence of stone tool use—cut marks inflicted while 




open to extract the marrow. The bones date to roughly 3.4 million years ago. 
(Heness, 2010) 
There is little evidence that Australopithicus reshaped the stone tools it used; 
rather, they were likely tools of opportunity. Other animals also use tools of opportunity; 
for example, chimpanzees insert sticks to draw termites from their mounds and use rocks 
to crack open nuts (Trivedi, 2004),
16
 otters use stones to dislodge and crack open 
mollusks (“Sea Otters,” n.d.), bottlenose dolphins have been observed to use conch shells 
to trap and eat small fish (“Ingenious Fishing,” 2011), and specimens of the veined 
octopus have been observed gathering coconut shells to assemble them into shelters—
octopi are the only invertebrates known to use tools (Finn, Tregenza, & Norman, 2009). 
Birds are particularly intelligent when it comes to tool use. New Caledonian crows use 
sticks held in their beaks to extract ants from logs, and a laboratory specimen was 
observed to improvise a hooked wire tool with no prior training or experience (Winkler, 
2002). Seagulls leave oysters at city intersections to be cracked open by passing cars 
(Henry & Anzar, 2006), and crows do the same with hard-shelled nuts (“Smart Crow,” 
2010). 
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terms of tool-making capacity.  Additionally, wild chimpanzees have been observed sharpening the ends of 





But the way in which Australopithecus used stone tools of opportunity was 
distinctive in that its thumb allowed it to bring focused and accurate force to bear, and its 
reconfigured, more flexible wrist also acted as a shock absorber. That ability to focus 
force with accuracy directly through a tool might have favored individuals with a 
penchant for finding stones with already-existing edges and points (that left cut and 
percussion marks on bones), causing proto-human tool use to foster a narrowing of 
attention, and thus approach-abstraction over gestalt-avoidance cognition. This possibility 
is supported by a study of Australopithecus cranial endocasts, which “show a distinct left-
occiptial, right-frontal petalial pattern” (101) suggesting “decidedly human rather than 
pongid [hominin rather than merely hominid] patterns of hemispheric asymmetry” 
(102)—in other words, signs of the Yakovlevian torque that figures into the oversized 
planum temporale of modern humans.
17
 Although that study should be considered 
inconclusive due to its small sample size,
18
 it is possible that Australopithicus was 
capable of rudimentary proto-linguistic abstraction and that it generated and passed down 
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warning cries or other exclamations. But being essentially emotional signifiers, those 
simplest of word forms would have been insufficient to indicate any shift from BIT 
consciousness (which is essentially emotional) to Archaic consciousness, a position 
reinforced by the fact that other animals also engage in mimetic behaviors so rudimentary 
as to not be proto-cultural in the technical sense considered here. 
 
4.2 - DRAWING THE CURTAINS 
The next actor to take the prehistoric stage is classified as the first true human: 
Homo habilis, or “handy-man,” famously discovered by the Leakey family at Olduvai 
Gorge in Tanzania. The Leakey family had previously discovered Australopithecus in the 
same area, and the two genera have adjacent time frames, where Australopithecus existed 
from about 4-2.4 Ma and habilis existed from about 2.4-1.4 Ma. Since there is no 
evidence of independent evolution for habilis, it appears that it emerged from an 
Australopithecus line—perhaps something like A. sediba (~2 Ma), which had a very 
sophisticated hand, or A. garhi, which might have reshaped stone tools (~2.5 Ma). 
Habilis apparently scavenged meat, and was hunted by giant cats. It remained short, with 
long arms, but its teeth were smaller and its face less prognathous than Austalopithicus. 
The major anatomical difference, though, was its brain size: habilis had a 600-800 ml 
cranial capacity and thus a brain that was more than half again as large as that of 
Australopithecus, or at and surpassing the upper range of that of the modern gorilla. That 
difference marked the beginning of the process of “encephalization,” whereby the 
hominin cortex rapidly mushroomed as if it was caught up in some sort of evolutionary 




The other major difference was the presence of a roughly reshaped assemblage of 
pounders, scrapers, and choppers referred to as the “Olduwan” toolkit or industry after 
the Olduvai Gorge (see Figure 15). But who started making this toolkit, and who was 
being so industrious? The oldest examples found so far date to 2.6 Ma, or 200k years 
before the earliest known specimen of habilis. Did something like A. sediba or A. garhi 
start the toolkit, and then hand it off (so to speak) to habilis? If so, then an 
Australopithecus species seems eligible for Homo status, and would be first in the human 
line. Such issues point to the limitations of our models, which are based on incredibly 
fragmentary data and artificially discrete categories; as the temporal window under 
consideration narrows, even a single new find can upset our evolutionary applecart. We 
must be willing to gather up our scattered apples, and prop up our cart as best we can—or 
maybe make a new cart, if our old one seems beyond repair. 
In any case, the important thing to note here is that the Olduwan toolkit—which 
was produced for about a million years, from 2.6-1.7 Ma ago,  and constitutes the 




Gebser’s Archaic mind. Olduwan tools were fashioned by using a stone to remove flakes 
from another stone, or core (see Figure 16), and both the flakes and the core were used as 
tools. This process involves a narrowing of attention into something like intention,
19
 and 
can be described as the abstraction of flakes from a gestalt core. And if we think in terms 
of approach-abstraction / avoidance-gestalt brain lateralization or asymmetry, it is 
significant not only that endocasts of habilis crania show an impression of Broca’s area, 
but that an analysis of Olduwan cores “reveals a preferential, clockwise rotation of cores 
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during flaking” that is “a non-random pattern…consistent with that produced by right-
handed toolmakers” (Toth, 1985, p.607). 
The implication of this information is summed up nicely by neurologist Frank 
Wilson, in his book The Hand: How Its Use Shapes Brain, Language, and Human 
Culture (1998): “Handedness may be nearly as old and influential as bipedalism was in 
shaping human development and orienting our subsequent history.” One of Wilson’s 
major concerns is finding 
an explanation of handedness that could be linked to the evolution of lateralized 
specialization of the brain, which is an important possibility to consider since it is 
now known that the left hemisphere (which exerts a powerful influence on the 
movement of the right arm) could provide the temporal precision needed for the 
kind of complex sequenced movements that the dominant hand seems especially 
suited for. 
It is not difficult to recognize that the fundamental approach-abstraction and avoidance-
gestalt modules were elaborated in relation to the dexterous hominin hand to rapidly 
evolve a holographic, novel, technical module, as evidenced by the Olduwan toolkit. 
Wilson might as well be talking about habilis when he says: 
The spatial and temporal scales of movement of the two hands were different, the 
dominant being “micrometric” and the nondominant “macrometric” [and] “the 
nondominant hand (as when adjusting a piece of paper) “frames” the movement 
of the dominant hand: it sets and confines the spatial context in which the 




We should remember those dorsal and ventral visual streams evolved by the 
common ancestor of the great apes, a partitioning perhaps significant enough to constitute 
a restructuring of the fundamental modules. Indeed, in his book The Cognitive 
Neuroscience of Action (1997), cognitive neuroscientist Marc Jeannerod (1935-2011) 
speaks in terms of “parallel visual systems” and “another visuomotor model, no longer 
based on the modalities of visual coding of the movement, but rather on the modes of 
representation of the goal of the movement” (emphases added). Particularly for an 
animal with hands, “objects in space afford two main types of interactions, reaching and 
grasping.” And according to Jeannerod, the dorsal stream “deals with the extrinsic 
properties of these objects (their location in space with respect to the body, their velocity 
of motion, etc.),” and “its function is to transport the hand to the desired location in 
extrapersonal space,” while the ventral stream “deals with the intrinsic properties (like 
shape or size),” and “its function is to shape the hand with the purpose of manipulating, 
identifying, and transforming objects” (p.21). 
 In summing up the issues involved in the emergence of the hominin technical 
module it becomes apparent that it involves a sublimation of avoidance behavior by or in 
relation to approach behavior—a fact reflected in the terms “dominant” and 
“nondominant” (see Figure 17). That process was likely enabled by the prior emergence 
of what cognitive archeologist Steven Mithen refers to as Social Intelligence.
20
 In his 
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 Social evidence for avoidance sublimation might be found at the level of pronoun usage. When a person 
of lesser status communicates with a person of greater status, the former actually tends to use the word “I” 




book The Prehistory of the Mind: The Cognitive Origins of Art and Science (1999), 
Mithen also uses Fodor’s theory of modularity and Gardner’s theory of multiple 
intelligences to discuss possible relations among General Intelligence, Natural History 
Intelligence, Social Intelligence, Technical Intelligence, and Language. For our purposes, 
though, general intelligence can be considered in terms of the degree of flexibility in 
interactions between the low-level approach and avoidance modules, from which, given 
enough flexibility, the mid-level natural history and social modules can emerge. And 
given enough flexibility, those four modules can then interact to generate the high-level 
                                                                                                                                                                             






technical module, from which, given enough flexibility, language can emerge as a form 
of technology—a tool (see Figure 18). 
As will be discussed in Section 5.1, this whole evolutionary trajectory is a nested 
hierarchy with feedback throughout—but the generation of the technical module, and 
thus language, is difficult to imagine without the tool-making flexibility provided by the 
hominin hand. Thus psychologist Lev Vygotsky points out in his book Thought and 
Language (1986) that 
even before language comes thinking in terms of tools, i.e. the realization of 
mechanical connections and the invention of mechanical means for mechanical 
ends. To put it briefly, before the advent of speech, action comes to have 





It should be stressed that this proto-linguistic, technical subjectivity described by 
Vygotsky is not self-aware consciousness, but “only” a sophisticated version of the 
mapping mind outlined by Henriques’ BIT. With habilis, tool-making is present, but 
language proper is not suggested, and in order to understand why that is the case—and 
move on to consider Homo erectus, neanderthalensis, and sapiens—I must first briefly 
consider the essential characteristics of language. 
I have already noted that language is an information-processing system, 
mentioned Dawkins’ concept of memes and mimetic evolution, and I have discussed 
signs as units of meaning. Although I have left the nature of signs an open question that 
will be addressed is Section 5.2, here I will define language as a mapping-signaling 
system that allows for the social-mimetic construction and processing of information-
meaning through representation, recombination, and recursion. Here, put simply: 
 Representation is the use of sounds, words, and phrases to designate 
referents.  
 Recombination is the joining of sounds, words, or phrases to generate 
novel words, phrases, and simple and compound sentences. 
 Recursion is the nesting of simple and compound sentences to generate 
novel complex sentences. 
While I have couched these definitions in easily recognizable terms, they describe a 
general pattern of linguistic evolution that is anchored in experience of both the natural 
world and society, but becomes increasingly complex and eventually self-referential 




As a species, habilis was social, and it was capable of abstractions through which 
it was able to represent its natural world in such a way that it was able to reshape stone. 
But the Olduwan toolkit remained unchanged for hundreds of thousands of years. That 
lack of novelty over a timespan so vast as to be only vaguely conceivable in normal 
human scales clearly indicates only rudimentary recombinatorial capacity—to say 
nothing of recursion and self-awareness—and thus indicates a lack of language proper. 
As already suggested, with habilis, we are likely looking at proto-language and proto-
culture based largely on instinctive abstractions and generating a cusp-Archaic 
consciousness still very much bounded by genetic evolution and an innately neural-
algorithmic technical module. 
I say “largely” because here there is the possibility of contingency-based 
abstraction—or concept formation—that allowed for novel, on-the-fly representations of 
percepts, that is, the first nouns (and noun-adjectives, immediately thereafter). Other 
animals use instinctive, neural-algorithmic, module-based abstractions for purposes of 
mapping and signaling—that is, representation, as in the famous example is the vervet 
monkey, which uses specific alarm calls to signal the presence of specific predators 
(Seyfarth, Cheney, & Marler, 1980). Did habilis have something more? Did it have 
contingency-based representation, if not substantial recombination or recursion? The 
regular and transmitted making of even simple tools is a goal-oriented behavior that 
suggests intention and meaning based on a rewiring of the brain’s capacity for 
abstraction, as suggested by the impression of Broca’s area in habilis. That, combined 
with the static toolkit and absence of art, is why I suggest that habilis possessed proto-




The situation with the next actor to take the prehistoric stage, H. erectus, was 
quite different from that of habilis. There is evidence of erectus going back 1.9 Ma in 
Africa, 1.8 Ma in west Asia, and perhaps 1.7 Ma in east Asia, so its point of origin is 
uncertain. Some have argued for a line of hominin descent in Asia (Begun, 2003; 
Raghaven, Groves, & Pathmanathan, 2003), but the standard model has erectus leaving 
Africa to seed Europe and Asia with the Homo line. If erectus emerged in Africa, than it 
might have split from habilis, or been derived from a common ancestor such as 
Ardipithicus or Australopithecus. There is evidence of its survival in Asia until at least 
100 ka (Anton, 2003, p. 131), which indicates overlapping timeframes with both 
neanderthalensis and sapiens. Standing at just under 6 ft. tall, erectus had longer legs and 
shorter arms than habilis—proportions similar, in fact, to ours. It also had a flatter face, 
smaller teeth, and at 850-1200 ml, a cranial capacity half again larger than that of habilis. 
That continued rapid growth in brain size was likely the phylogenetic equivalent 
of “if you build it, then they will come,” where the thing being “built” was the hand, and 
the “they” was the brain that supported the technical module. But the linear “if-then” 
construction doesn’t take into account feedback, which allows for nonlinear growth (as 
will be discussed in Section 5.1). In other words, bipedalism (e.g. Ardipithicus) allowed 
for the evolution of a manipulative hand (e.g. Australopithicus), which allowed for the 
evolution of the technical module and tool-making (e.g. habilis), which allowed for the 
evolution of a bigger brain with a technical module more tightly wired to handedness 
(e.g. erectus), which allowed for the evolution of a bigger brain with a technical module 




constitutes a phylogenetic illustration of a strong version of Vygotsky, Leont'ev, and 
Luria’s activity theory, which basically states that “the things we make make us.” 
But in nature, there are no isolated systems or feedback loops. The activity of the 
evolving technical module allowed for a better tool kit, but it also fed into the natural 
history and social modules both directly, and indirectly through the approach and 
avoidance modules. The general effect here would have been an increasing emphasis on 
the approach-abstraction function and the increasing sublimation of the avoidance-gestalt 
function. Hence we find evidence that erectus was an active hunter, as well as the first 
hominin to leave Africa to settle across Asia and Europe. Those activities required not 
just greater technical skill, but enhanced social cohesion and understanding of the natural 
world. All of those functions fed back into each other through the evolving dexterous-
hand / big-brain system, which placed a premium on right-hand focus and accuracy and 
left-brain focus and abstraction. And significantly, endocasts of erectus crania clearly 
show the left-occiptial / right-frontal petalia that indicate Yakovlevian torque. 
The Acheulean industry associated with erectus also shows the effects of that 
premium on right-hand focus and accuracy. The oldest examples are African—although 
the toolkit takes its name from a French village where it was first discovered—and go 
back about 1.8 Ma, and the last scattered examples go back about 200 ka. The most 
prevalent Acheulean tool is the flaked-stone hand axe, a tear-shaped, pear-shaped, or 
ovoid core held in the hand for piercing, cutting, and scraping (see Figure 19a). This tool 
comes in various sizes, is bifacial, and shows an attention to symmetry that might be 
more than merely functional (Mithen, 1999, p. 116), especially when considered in 




petroglyphs in the form of apparently non-representational cupules or circular 
depressions (see Figure 19b), sometimes with traces of mineral pigments that suggest 
representational intent (Bednarik, 2011, 62-67).
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But the use of fire by erectus is the most novel and abstract behavior in the history 
of life on Earth up to that point, especially if that fire was started from scratch. Much has 
been written on the importance of the mastery of fire in terms of cooking food and 
providing light, protection, warmth, and a center for communication (e.g. Burton, 2009; 
Wrangham, 2009). While the specific erectus behaviors involved in the generation or 
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reshaped by erectus, but they remain ambiguous. It has been suggested that erectus set up stones about 180 
ka ago at the end of the Wonderwerks Cave in South Africa to modify its acoustic and visual properties 
(Chazan & Horwitz, 2009), and the same site has provided evidence for the earliest use of fire by erectus, 




preservation of fire must have been taught and were therefore proto- / cultural-mimetic, 
the instinctive and distinctive human fascination with fire—at least until the point of 
mastery (Fessler, 2006)—is the product of a hominin brain, in general, and technical 
module, specifically, rapidly expanding towards phase transition criticality. Not only was 
the fascination with fire an extreme instance of the sublimation of avoidance behavior by 
or in relation to approach behavior, but I submit that in terms of abstraction, fire was a 
game-changing tool that not required and reinforced the use of hands, but created its own 
evolutionary feedback loop. It is unlikely erectus would have been able to travel so far 
and adapt to ice age environments without it. 
And speaking of traveling so far, erectus might have constructed seaworthy 
watercraft to populate Flores about 800-900 ka and Crete about 150 ka, since their tools 
have been found and dated at those island locations and others as well. Of course, if such 
activity occurred, it must have been intentional and cooperative, and would have required 
communication both representational and recombinatorial—and likely somewhat 
recursive. Paleo-art expert Robert Bednarik is especially keen on “The Maritime 
Dispersal of Pleistocene Humans” (2002) and its implications: 
The entire destiny of humanity was decided around a million years ago, when 
hominids made a conscious decision to entrust themselves, their very existence, to 
a contraption they themselves had built, and to seek their future in an unknown 
land…. Aspects of “modern human behavior” as defined by this model had 
existed in South-east Asia for the best part of a million years, and included 
language and symbolic production. Complex social systems and technologies 




have been entirely impossible to organise and execute such courageous 
exploits…. For such a colonisation effort to be successful, it had to have a 
minimum number of male and especially female participants of reproductive age, 
perhaps around a dozen individuals. To transport a number of humans and their 
supplies, a vessel of certain minimum requirements needed to be constructed, and 
to do this with stone tools involved a considerable investment of effort and 
material. Common sense tells us so, but it does not provide any further details. 
But there is no direct evidence of such composite construction—indeed, there is no 
evidence that erectus fashioned anything recombinatorial at all. Its stone tools, for 
example, were apparently hand-held, not hafted, since none are “waisted” for hafting or 
show hafting wear; its wooden spears had sharpened, fire-hardened points; and it did not 
seem to have projectile weapons. Moreover, Bednarik fails to address the facts that other 
large animals managed such migrations, and that successive ice ages lowered global sea 
levels enough to nearly connect both Flores and Crete with mainland. 
Still, the fabrication of tools with an eye towards symmetry, the leaving of non-
utilitarian marks on stone and the probable use of pigmentation, the use and probable 
making of fire, and the migration of groups across varied environments—those activities 
all suggest the use of language. However, there is no evidence of erectus religion; as 
noted, their proto-art was apparently non-representational. That implies a lack of inner 
life or subjectivity born of only rudimentary linguistic recursion. It seems that big-
brained erectus had most of the qualifications for language: contingency-based 
abstraction allowing for regular social representation, limited recombination of 




sequential attention and cooperation—although the Acheulean hand axe, like the 
Olduwan chopper-scraper, remained essentially unchanged for hundreds of thousands of 
years. So why only limited recombination and rudimentary recursion? Why does it seem 
that erectus was locked into Gebser’s Archaic consciousness? 
Two possible answers come to mind. The simplest answer is insufficient 
processing power based on brain size and connectivity, where erectus was likely able to 
abstract nouns through time to derive verbs (and verb-adverbs immediately thereafter), 
but was unable to derive function words to allow for anything beyond simple sentences; 
basically, another evolutionary iteration of the hand-brain positive feedback loop (Roby-
Brami et al., 2012)  involving the hominin technical module (see Figure 20) was needed 




limitations in expression, where the hominin vocal apparatus had not changed 
significantly since the common ancestor with chimpanzees, so erectus still lacked the 
vocalization capacity required by speech, and was consequently limited to gestural 
communication. However, modern sign language can generate recursion, and 
congenitally deaf people think recursively in sign language using the same areas of the 
brain associated with thinking in speech, so the first answer is the more likely of the two. 
Here, it is important to elaborate upon the distinction between content and 
function words. In his book The Unfolding of Language: An Evolutionary Tour of 
Mankind’s Greatest Invention (2005), mathematician-linguist Guy Deutscher points out 
that “most words we use, like ‘table,’ ‘kick,’ ‘walk,’ or ‘rabbit,’ have a simple solid 
meaning, so they are often called ‘content words’” (p.26)—nouns and verbs and their 
derivatives. But there are also ‘function words,’ 
a group of words in language whose meaning really is quite a lot less obvious. 
These are the ‘grammatical words’ such as a, the, of, so, that, which, or, 
than…conjunctions, prepositions, articles, and so on. But there is one basic 
property that is common to all of them all: they cannot boast their own 
independent meaning. They don’t refer to objects, actions or properties, or to any 
other concepts that can be imagined in their own right. (p. 26) 
As was discussed in Section 2.3 and will be discussed again in Section 5.2, Saussurian or 
structuralist sign theory does not recognize that words can have “independent meaning” 
because it does not recognize that words can refer to anything other than each other. 




content, and are so dependent on situational context, that they can be treated as proto-
words rather than words proper. 
In any case, the next actor to take the prehistoric stage was not lacking in the 
brain-size department. With a cranial capacity of about 1300-1700 ml, neanderthalensis 
had a brain almost half again as large as that of erectus. And again, that expansion 
occurred so rapidly in evolutionary terms that the hand-brain positive feedback loop 
involving the hominin technical module is implicated. Neanderthalensis ultimately 
emerged from erectus about 400 ka ago, and lived across Europe and into the Levant 
until as late as 24 ka ago. The novel artifacts associated with neanderthalensis constitute 
the Mousterian industry, and are found as early as 300 ka ago and as late as 30 ka ago, 
thus delineating the Middle Paleolithic. Here, the iconic tool was the Levellois point, 
which had actually been a minor component of the Olduwan and Acheulean industries of 
the Lower Paleolithic. 
A Levellois point (see Figure 21), is made by knocking a flat Section from the end 




core in the shape of the final point, then knocking the striking platform so that the final 
point with its edges already trimmed was dislodged from the core. Depending on its exact 
size and shape, a Levellois point can be used as a scraper, knife, or spear point. Of 
course, the manufacture of such a tool—the multi-step abstraction of a stone point from a 
gestalt core—requires careful attention to materials, a careful plan of action, and the 
careful application of force. And while habilis and erectus had crafted the Levellois point 
in limited quantities—presumably because of the relative difficulties involved, compared 
with a chopper-scraper or hand axe—neanderthalensis made it the tool of choice. That 
choice required neanderthalensis to have a well-developed mapping system and to be 
able to engage in complex abstract representation, abilities that likely carried over into its 
signaling system—which was, nevertheless, still proto-linguistic. 
I say that despite the fact that many assume that since neaderthalensis “lived 
250,000 years or more in the harshest climates experienced by primates, not just humans” 
(Alper, 2003), it must have made and worn clothing—although erectus also migrated 
through ice age environments—and there is evidence that neaderthalensis made hafted, 
composite tools (Mithen, 1996, p. 122), so its recombinatorial abilities were qualitatively 
better than those of erectus. Moreover, there is evidence suggesting neaderthalensis 
proto-religion and proto-art, and therefore limited recursion, even before the introduction 
of, and coexistence with, sapiens about 40 ka—namely, there are what appear to be 
simple burials (e.g. at Shanidar Cave in Iraq, dated to 60-80 ka ago, and Qafzeh Cave in 
Isreal, dated to about 90 ka ago), and there are cave paintings. 
While the burials found do not unambiguously include grave goods (Mithen, 




deposits, or sometimes butchered (Viegas, 2010b)—suggests a developing theory of mind 
based on the “mind-reading” function of the social module. The intensification of that 
function went hand-in-hand with the emergence of technical-linguistic abstraction, which 
fed back into the mid- and low-level modules to allow for an increased sense of sympathy 
and altruism, as evidenced by neanderthalensis remains that show signs of survival and 
healing after crippling sickness and injury. Such survival would have been unlikely 
without social assistance. Previously, the natural world, social, and technical modules 
were not as well-developed, and the tendency would have been to eventually shun, leave 
behind, or otherwise avoid a sick or crippled individual. With the unfolding of proto-
language, however, such low-level avoidance responses were sublimated into 
increasingly complex proto-cultural approach responses. 
The flip side of a developing theory of other minds based on the “mind-reading” 
function of the social module as enabled by unfolding but still limited proto-linguistic 
recursion is a developing theory of self. Neuroscientsist Vilayanur Ramachandran (b. 
1951) puts it like this: 
It was almost certainly a two-way street [a positive feedback loop] with self-
awareness and other-awareness enriching each other in an auto-catalytic cascade 
that culminated in the fully human sense of self. You say you are being “self-
conscious” when really you mean being conscious of someone being conscious of 
you. (Thagard, 2007). 
Similarly, psychiatrist and brain imaging specialist Marco Iacoboni states, “The self and 
the other are just two sides of the same coin. To understand myself, I must recognize 




expressed by philosopher Emmanual Levinas in his book Totality and Infinity: An Essay 
on Exteriority (1961), where the recognized Other is the mirror of the self, the ground of 
ethics, and the gateway to religion; the emerging self was and is bound up in reflection, 
responsibility, and reification (the projection and concretization of abstractions) 
With the possibility of neanderthalensis proto-art, we could have evidence of 
limited reflection and reification. Researchers have recently redated fifty sections of 
prehistoric cave painting in eleven Spanish caves such as Altamira, and determined that 
the oldest layers—consisting of geometric shapes and the blown-pigment outlines of 
hands—might have been created by neaderthalensis 35-40 ka ago (see Figure 22). Those 
geometric shapes are probably representations of the abstraction function itself, centered 
in the left-hemisphere approach module and manifested through the handed technical 
module. And interestingly, those hands are probably the earliest known representations of 
self-reflection, although neanderthalensis would have arrived at that point only during 
the final approximately 5% of its duration, and never had the chance to move beyond it—
for it seems the hominin brain-expansion experiment came to an end with them. The 
future of neural information-processing would reside not so much in massive size as in 





4.3 - STARTING THE PLAY 
Of course, the next actor to take the prehistoric stage was sapiens, or we modern 
humans. But what exactly was the relationship between neaderthalensis and sapiens? The 
standard model partakes of the Out of Africa or Replacement Theory (see Figure 23a), 
which posits that sapiens emerged probably from erectus exclusively in Africa, and then 
spread into Asia and Europe (Cann, Stoneking, &Wilson, 1987; Stringer & Andrews 
1988). According to this view, neaderthalensis was descended from the earlier migration 
of erectus from Africa, so when African sapiens later began streaming into Europe, the 
two lines confronting each other would have been different species—and sapiens wound 
up replacing erectus through resource competition, disease introduction, and / or killing 




23b), which posits that sapiens emerged with variation across widely dispersed 
populations of erectus in Africa and Eurasia (Wolpoff, Zhi, & Thorne, 1984). According 
to this view, sapiens had no single origin point, but was an emergent property of an 
interbreeding network established by erectus, and existed alongside other post-erectus 
transitional forms (e.g. ergaster, antecessor, heidelbergensis)—including 
neanderthalensis, with which it was similar enough to produce viable offspring, making 
the two lines different subspecies on the same species spectrum. That theory is supported 
by genetic evidence indicating neaderthalensis ancestry (1-4% contribution) among 
modern human populations across Eurasia. While neither Replacement Theory nor Multi-
Regional Theory can account for all the fossil, genetic, artifact, and linguistic data, the 
former is currently considered more inclusive.
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In any case, the oldest sapiens remains are typically held to be from Ethiopia, and 
go back about 200 ka ago.
23
 Further remains going back to about 125 ka ago have been 
found on the Arabian Peninsula, and in India going back to about 70 ka ago. From India, 
sapiens could have moved into southeast Asia / Malaysia / Indonesia (Sunda), and then 
into New Guinea / Australia / Tasmania (Sahul) —which were joined land masses during 
heavy glaciation—by about 55 ka ago. In Europe, sapiens might have been present as 
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early as about 45 ka ago, and that presents a problem, since its presence among and 
influence upon neanderthalensis cannot be unambiguously disentangled. 
For example, that earliest cave painting in Spain might have been inspired by 
contact with sapiens, or might have been produced by an unknown sapiens population. 
Similarly, a stone and bone “mask” (four inches tall and wide, and crude enough that 
some researchers consider it a natural or modified natural object) found on the banks of 
the Loire in France has been hailed as neanderthalensis art—and it has been dated to 
about 35 ka ago, which is within the sapiens window in Europe (Amos, 2003). The 
upshot of this uncertainty is that it compounds our uncertainty regarding 
neanderthalensis proto-linguistic capacity. A brain half-again as large as erectus’ 
suggests a qualitative jump—something beyond content words. Function words such as 
prepositions and conjunctions would have allowed for grammatical sophistication, 
enabling recombinatorial communication and tool-making (e.g. hafting). Moreover, there 
is fossil evidence that the hyoid bone in neanderthalensis had descended relative to the 
skull to connect the musculature of the tongue and the larynx, which would have enabled 
even more complex vocalizations (remember, the hominid larynx had already descended 
relative to the hyoid bone). Even so, biophysical studies suggest that neanderthalensis 
had a voice that was high-pitched, sharp, and nasal relative to sapiens, and that it would 
have been capable of only slower speech with a smaller number of phonemes. How, then, 
would complex proto-language have been possible? 
In his book The Singing Neanderthals: The Origins of Music, Language, Mind, 
and Body (2005), Steven Mithen presents a diverse body of evidence to theorize that 




a signaling system that was holistic (composed of blended signals), manipulative (of 
emotional states and thus behavior), multi-modal (using vocalizations, expressions, 
gestures, and movements), musical (temporally controlled, rhythmic, and melodic) and 
mimetic (transmitted through imitation). Such a proto-music / language could have helped 
overcome limitations to vocalization, and its right-hemisphere emphases suggest a 
transitional signaling system, where abstract meaning is still very much conveyed by 
prosody and grounded in affect, as in song and poetry. Moreover, after noting a lack of 
symbolic representation among neanderthalensis artifacts, Mithen claims that it did not 
possess symbolic thought. I agree, and submit that symbolic thought is born of a critical 
degree of recursion, where a self-referential mind begins to reify its own thoughts and 
imaginings and project them upon the world—and that moment constitutes the beginning 
of art-religion. For all its sophistication, neaderthalensis apparently lacked the final level 
of recursion necessary for symbolism, self-awareness, true Magical consciousness, and 
language / culture proper. 
So why did neaderthalensis linger at the threshold of Gebser’s Magical 
consciousness? Here, it is important to note that the emergence of proto-linguistic 
abstraction within the hominin line, as evidenced by data ranging from the opportunistic 
use of stones by australopithicus to the making of compound tools and simple burials by 
neanderthalensis, did not happen instantly but in gradual and probably non-discrete 
stages (see Table 1). Granted, we now know that those stages are measurable in “only” 
hundreds of thousands, rather than tens of millions, of years—that is, their pace was 
literally glacial, rather than geological—but they occurred gradually enough to “show 




It is not “difficult to see what links these stages” (degrees of tool use and, by implication, 
communicative complexity increasing within a phylogenetic line) because it is not the 
case that “the stages have no significant analogy” (they are analogous in that they all 
make use of abstraction) or “involve entirely different processes and principles” (they 
involve mapping, signaling, and activity by means of representation, recombination, and / 
or recursion). Moreover, there is every “reason to suppose that the ‘gaps’ are bridgeable” 
because intermediary remains and artifacts are constantly being discovered, and they do 
form “a basis for assuming an evolutionary development of ‘higher’ from ‘lower’ stages” 
(or cognitive modules), and we can “suggest a mechanism whereby transition can take 
place from one stage to the next” (the hand-brain positive feedback loop involving the 




 According to the Modern Synthesis, such a mechanism must have a genetic 
component, and while natural selection operating on random mutations over hundreds of 
thousands of years cannot explain the relatively rapid rate of hominin evolution—hence 
the century of confusion caused by Darwinian natural selection in light of proto-human 
archeology—a hand-brain positive feedback loop operating upon a few key genes might 
account for the speedy change. Regulator genes, which control the expression of other 
genes, including other regulator genes in feedback loops or cascades, through activation 
and repression, are the obvious candidates here (Valentine & Campbell, 1975). For 
example, modern humans and chimpanzees are very similar in terms of genetic sequence, 
but their differences include information that codes for regulator genes involved in the 
developmental growth of the brain (Evans, 2006; Tang, 2006; Somel et al., 2009); those 
small initial differences in genotype are amplified within a complex phylogenetic system 
to make for large differences in eventual phenotype. Regulator genes are the genotypic 
mechanism “whereby transition can take place from one stage to the next” through 
allometry (differing positions and proportions within and among body regions and parts) 
controlled by heterochrony (differing rates in the timing and duration of morphogenic 
events). The most fundamental or embedded regulator genes are the Hox genes, which 
correspond to and control the relative positions and proportions of animal body regions 
and parts. Hox genes determine overall somatic axis and orientation in everything from 
sea anemones to humans, and they are highly conserved (Shubin, 2008,  pp. 107-115). It 
might be objected that regulator genes do not directly relate to language—which is the 




The corresponding phenotypic mechanism can be discerned as the trajectory of 
the hominin line evolving via the general strategy known as neoteny (“new stretch”), 
where the adult form of a line maintains and elaborates characteristics that were 
previously found only in pre-adult forms—a kind of childhood writ large. Evolutionary 
biologist Stephen Gould describes the situation in his book The Panda’s Thumb: More 
Reflections in Natural History (1980): 
Humans are neotenic—we have evolved by retaining juvenile features of our 
ancestors. Our large brains, small jaws, and a host of other features ranging from 
distribution of bodily hair to ventral pointing of the vaginal canal, are 
consequences of eternal youth…. By the time we became upright as A. afarensis 
[the earliest known species of Australopithicus], the game was largely over, the 
major alteration of architecture accomplished, the trigger of future change already 
set. The later enlargement of our brain was anatomically easy. We read our larger 
brain out of the program of our own growth, by prolonging rapid rates of fetal 
growth to later times and preserving, as adults, the characteristic proportions of a 
juvenile primate skull. And we evolved this brain in concert with a host of other 
neotenic features, all part of a general pattern. (p. 133) 
Thus we humans can be viewed as fetal chimpanzees (see Figure 24), the difference 
being that the chimpanzee line remained knuckle-walkers after the split with our common 
ancestor; we are “chimps have little hair and walk upright…just a third species of 
chimpanzee, along with the pygmy chimp of Zaire [the bonobo] and the common chimp 
of the rest of tropical Africa” (Diamond, 1992, p. 2). It was full bipedalism that radically 




allowing for rapid evolution through the mechanism(s) of regulator genes and neoteny. 
And the raw material upon which those processes worked was an already lateralized and 
highly connected primate brain.
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 The general effect of neoteny within the hominin line was to increase the size and 
processing power of the association cortices (Rapoport, 2009), where complex sensory-
motor processing and decision making events take place, but it also involved lengthening 
periods of childhood growth and dependency, where proto-human groups were required 
to cooperate for child-rearing purposes or face extinction. The fetalization of the hominin 
line created ever-larger windows of neuro-developmental plasticity, through which 
vulnerable young brains continued to form synaptic networks in response to natural and, 
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increasingly, social stimuli. Thus neoteny did not simply create larger and more flexible 
brains, but it also dramatically conditioned the social matrices in which they developed 
after birth. Since the technical module evolved out of the natural history and social 
modules (which evolved out of the approach and avoidance modules), proto-language 
(which was a product of the technical module) was communication about nature and 
society. But as both the somatic and proto-cultural structures surrounding proto-language 
evolved, communication became more and more about social webs of reciprocity and 
agreement, especially over issues of proto-linguistic representation. In other words, 
human ancestors simultaneously became increasingly proto-linguistic, neotenic, and 
social—or, as biologist-mathematician Martin Nowak states in this book 
SuperCooperators: Altruism, Evolution, and Why We Need Others to Succeed (2011): 
 [L]anguage, brainpower, and society became intertwined in a three-way dance. 
What resulted as each component moved in step with one another was 
coevolution, a spiral toward more and more social complexity as language 
allowed for even more manipulation and deception, and ever more collaboration 
and cooperation too. Thanks to the new invention of widespread indirect 
reciprocity, coevolution bootstrapped the evolution of the social brain …. (p. 187) 
So we might say that, within the hominin line, manual manipulation and social 
manipulation co-evolved as two sides of the same big-brain coin. 
From that point of view (and assuming a straight line of descent with “missing 
links”), Ardipithicus was a neotenic derivative of Orrorin, Australopithicus was a 
neotenic derivative of Ardipithicus, habilis was a neotenic derivative of Australopithicus, 




derivative of erectus—as was sapiens (Montagu, 1989; Thiessen, 1995).
25
 Indeed, the 
morphological differences between neanderthalensis and sapiens can be framed in 
neotenic terms such that the former exhibited less “retardation” (DeBeer, 1940) of adult 
features than the latter (see Figure 25). Adult neaderthalensis were relatively squat, 
heavy-boned, and barrel-chested, with massive muscles, powerful hands and feet, and a 
long, low, thick skull with a prominent brow ridge, protruding jaw, and a large nose and 
teeth. Adult sapiens are relatively willowy, thin-boned, slightly built, with reduced 
muscles, delicate hands and feet, and a large, round, thin skull with a negligible brow 
ridge, flat face, and a small nose and teeth. 
But while neanderthalensis had a slightly larger cranial capacity than sapiens—
1300-1700 ml compared to 1200-1500 ml, respectively—dental evidence indicates that it 
matured at a faster rate (Mayell, 2004), that is, “Neanderthals Lived Fast, Died Young” 
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(Viegas, 2010a). Those facts suggest a neotenic trade-off, where a slightly larger final 
brain size generated less adaptability or intelligence than did further delays in the rate of 
maturation. If we consider neoteny as Zipf’s principle, thermodynamic efficiency, and 
using the simplest route and the materials available applied to hominin evolution, then the 
larger, more energy-intensive neanderthalensis brain was less valuable than the smaller 
sapiens brain made more plastic through heterochronic regulation—or in information-
processing terms, raw power was less important than prolonged flexibility for forming 
neural pathways in response to mimetic conditioning. Indeed, since the evolution of the 
hominin technical module, of which language is a product, was bound up in neuro-
developmental plasticity and mimetic conditioning, we might say that the technical 
module is neuro-developmental plasticity. That is, it depends upon open and responsive, 
as opposed to genetically preset, neural circuitry. And extreme neuro-developmental 
plasticity is what allowed sapiens to develop language and culture proper, and to 
outperform physically hardier neanderthalensis. 
The FoxP2 gene is a meta-regulatory gene involved in the evolution of language 
(MacAndrew, 2003; Zimmer, 2011) by modulating neuro-developmental plasticity as 
well as other downstream targets (Spiteri et al., 2007; Vernes et al., 2007). FoxP2 is 
thought to be highly conserved—different versions have been implicated in bat and 
cetacean echolocation, songbird song, and alligator and fish vocalization (Scharff & 
Haesler, 2004; Webb & Zhang, 2005)—and mutations in the human version are known to 
cause severe language and speech impairment (Lai et al., 2001; MacDermot et al., 2005). 
Presumably, selective pressures could work upon such a pivotal gene to induce adaptive 




of FoxP2 as modern humans (Kraus et al., 2007), which suggests that it was necessary 
but not sufficient for the emergence of language proper (Benítez-Burraco et al., 2008). 
Other than handedness, what factors drove evolution toward big brains and neuro-
developmental plasticity? In his book Reason and Wonder: A Copernican Revolution in 
Science and Spirit (2011), mathematician-philosopher Dave Pruett notes that 
Hominids have not always sported such disproportionately large brains. Within a 
relatively short period—a mere three million years—the brains of our ancestors 
quadrupled in size. It is now widely accepted that our brains grew of necessity, so 
that humans could adapt to the one constant of existence—change. The period of 
bulging brains coincides conspicuously with the onset of a succession of ice ages. 
During the epoch of ice, on a cycle of roughly 100,000 years, glaciers periodically 
buried one quarter of the globe. Brain capacity was the adaptation most beneficial 
for human ancestors to cope with severe climate oscillations. (p. 280) 
If a succession of ice ages constituted the major factor behind the emergence of the 
hominin big brain and thus language, then why is there so much genetic and linguistic 
variation in Africa, which was never glaciated, and from which sapiens emerged, 
according to the Out of Africa or Replacement Theory? I submit that there is so much 
African variation because there was less population movement and thus less genetic and 
linguistic reshuffling due precisely to a lack of glaciation. Given more stable 
environments, proto- / humans were more likely to stay put, to not mate with outsiders, 
and to elaborate their own proto- / cultural traditions—to segregate into relatively isolated 
populations. The issue of human emergence then becomes a question of which is more 




Regional Theory). While diversity is a sign of environmental stability or sustainability, 
novelty is emergence, which is the essence of evolution. 
 Does the archeological evidence support the idea that ice age emergency drove 
modern human emergence? Recently, there has been a push to emphasize evidence of 
non-European novelty in terms of dawning art-religion. For example, in his essay “The 
First Stirrings of Creation” (1998), Bednarik argues: 
Art as such did not appear suddenly, but developed gradually with the cognitive 
evolution of humans. By the time that the famous cave art of France and Spain 
was being produced, art traditions are thought to have been well established at 
least in southern Africa, the Levant, eastern Europe, India and Australia, and no 
doubt in many other regions that have yet to be examined adequately. (p. 4) 
Bednarik goes on to state, “The oldest known rock art was produced in India two or three 
hundred thousand years ago. It consists of cup marks and a meandering line hammered 
into the rock of a sandstone cave” (p. 5)—a reference to the erectus proto-art mentioned 
earlier (see Figure 19b)—and then says, “At about the same time, simple line markings 
were made on a variety of portable objects (bone, teeth, ivory and stone) which have been 
found at the camp sites of early humans” (p. 5). Since the earliest sapiens remains are 
dated to about 200 ka ago, the “early humans” executing “simple line markings” must 
have been erectus or neanderthalensis. Bednarik continues, stating: “Sets of bunched 
engraved lines first appear in central and eastern Europe; they developed into distinctive 
arrangements that can be recognized as motifs such as zigzags, crosses, arcs and sets of 




 The earliest such abstract markings have since been found in Blombos Cave, 
South Africa: crosshatching scratched into pieces of ochre found in association with 
finely flaked bifacial blades, polished bone tools, small shell beads, and probable 
pigment-mixing containers (abalone shells), all variously dated to 70-100 ka ago (see 
Figure 26a-e), with evidence of (shell)fishing going back about 140 ka ago.
 
The blades 
are delicate and more advanced (pressure flaking technique) than other tools made about 
the same time, as are the bone tools (nonexistent in Europe for tens of thousands of 
years). The ochre hatch marks are possibly incidental and are, in any case, non-
representational. And of course, fishing is utilitarian. Interestingly, the women of the 




ornament themselves, but to protect themselves from the sun—and they wear shell-bead 
anklets to warn away snakes (“Himba People,” 2012).  
 To my mind, the Blombos artifacts, while modern human in origin, do not provide 
unambiguous evidence of art-religion (although pigment-mixing containers are, of 
course, suggestive); they are likely the products of cusp-Magical consciousness. 
However, the discovery of South African “stone points” with traces of blood, bone, and 
plant-based glue, and dated to about 64 ka ago—apparently the earliest arrow heads (Gill, 
2010)—provides evidence of advanced tool-making in the form of projectile weapons 
(meta-tools), which suggests something more than limited recursive abstraction. Africa’s 
earliest dated representational art is comprised of a handful of animal images painted on 
stone slabs discovered in the Apollo 11 Cave (thus named because the discovery occurred 
on the day of the first moon landing) in Namibia and dated to 23-25 ka ago. But that is 
likely to change, since Africa actually has myriad rock art traditions (e.g. Figure 27a-f), 
some of which have so far resisted dating due mainly to situational and / or weathering 
factors: 
[E]vidence of the earliest rock art is notoriously difficult to confirm, but its 
tradition is not—from desert to forest to savanna, we see a vast display of 
spectacular rock art, both paintings and engravings, depicting a staggering array 
of subjects…. As more rock art is discovered, and dating techniques become more 
sophisticated, greater light is shed on the thoughts, beliefs, joys and fears of our 
African ancestors. (“African Rock Art Archive,” 2012) 
 On the other hand, a large body of evidence for the early emergence of Australian 




Human Origins Research (2009), by geochronologist Claudio Tuniz, radiocarbon dating 
expert Richard Gillespie, and science journalist Cheryl Jones. For example, the rock faces 
of the Ubirr region in northern Australia have been continuously painted and repainted by 
the Australian aborigines from about 40 ka ago to the present, and depict non-indigenous 
species (e.g. Figure 28a). In the Dynamic Figure tradition the Ubirr rock paintings depict 
stick-like human(oid) figures engaged in hunting and other activities (e.g. Figure 28b), 
and in the so-called X-Ray tradition, they depict more naturalistic figures—including 
extinct animals—with quasi-internal features showing (e.g. Figure 28c). The most sacred 
site at Ubirr is the traditionally women-only path or “songline” traced by the Rainbow 
Serpent as she moved across the world, singing its rocks, plants, animals, and people into 
existence during the Dreamtime or creation. We are on Magical ground here, although it 
is difficult to disentangle what came earlier from what came later (e.g., most of the Ubirr 




Interestingly, the Australian aborigines say their ancestors had nothing to do with 
the distinctive Gwion Gwion or Bradshaw (the native and colonial names, respectively) 
rock painting tradition of western Australia (e.g. Figure 28d-f), the remains of which 
encompass an estimated 100,000 sites spread over 50,000 square kilometers and depict 
human(oids) wearing clothing and ornaments, as well as non-indigenous and extinct 
plants and animals. The Gwion Gwion rock paintings have been dated to at least 17 ka 
ago, although they are possibly much older (accurate dating is thwarted by pigment-
invading bacteria and fungi); indeed, it must be in reference to the Gwion Gwion rocking 
paintings that Bednarik states, “In Australia, some specimens of rock art may be up to 
60,000 years old, as old as the human occupation of the continent itself,” before noting in 
reference to traditions like those found at Ubirr, “and hundreds of sites contain examples 




So it is Australia—due perhaps to ecological and historical flukes of 
preservation—that seems to have the earliest known, full-fledged, and unambiguous 
traditions of art-religion that indicate the emergence of Magical consciousness, language 
proper with regular nested or recursive features, culture proper, and primal justification 
narratives still very much grounded in the natural history module as well as the social 
module. Thus, in her collection of lectures titled True Stories (2000), historian-
anthropologist Inga Clendinnen observed that the earliest inhabitants of Australia 
developed steepling thought-structures—intellectual edifices so comprehensive 
that every creature and plant had its place within it. They travelled light, but they 
were walking atlases, and walking encyclopedias of natural history…. Detailed 
observations of nature were elevated into drama by the development of multiple 
and multi-level narratives: narratives which made the intricate relationships 
between these observed phenomena memorable. (p. 132) 
Starting about 40 ka ago, the situation of sapiens in Europe was shaping up 
similarly to that of sapiens in Australia. Until recently, archeologists referred to that 
European situation as “The Upper Paleolithic Revolution” or “The Creative Explosion”—
terms describing an expansion of novelty which actually took a little while to transition 
from the neanderthalensis Mousterian toolkit (300-30 ka ago) into what have been 
designated the Châtelperronian (~35-29 ka ago), Aurignacian (~32-26 ka ago), and 
Gravettian (~28-22 ka ago) cultural complexes, whose dates vary depended upon 
location. But those revolutionary / explosive terms are sometimes no longer used, or their 
meaning has been expanded to include items such as 250 ka-old erectus proto-art 




obscures the fact that—again, due perhaps to ecological and historical flukes of 
preservation—in Europe we have a uniquely broad body of evidence for the emergence 
of modern human culture. Without going into detail or considering order of appearance, 
the novel cultural complexes snowballed new stone tool techniques and shapes, as well as 
the use of hitherto unexploited materials such as bone and antler, novel tool types such as 
awls and needles (the presence of clothing is now assured), personal ornamentation such 
as pendants and bracelets, and the making of the spear thrower and probably the bow and 
arrow, ropes and nets, wind instruments and possible calendric devices, unambiguous 
burials with grave goods, and elaborate cave art and portable sculpture (see Figure 29). 
 The rate of the introduction of these novelties over a period of about 20 ka is 
unprecedented, and it implies re-regulation of the highly lateralized technical module. 




technical module open to prolonged mimetic conditioning, providing a basis for culture 
proper. Re-regulation would have affected the cerebral cortex, and especially the left 
hemisphere and the corpus callosum, allowing for the emergence of language proper. The 
particulars of that process and crucial word from resulting from it will be discussed in 
Section 5.3, but here it is important to recognize exactly how intertwined the emergence 
of culture and language were, as evidenced by symbolic art-religion, the hallmark of 
Magical consciousness. 
 Here, we are concerned with the elaborate cave art and portable sculpture of the 
Upper Paleolithic, which constitute a long-lasting iconography with two foci: large 
animals (and humans in relation to them), and the female body.
26
 These images (see 
Figure 30) are the most concrete form of writing, a system of symbols through which 
language—as yet indistinguishable to itself from the natural world and a society fraught 
with approach and avoidance experiences and emotions—was reified and projected. 
Magical consciousness is described by philosopher Ernst Cassirer in his book Language 
and Myth (1946): 
At this point, the word which denotes…thought content is not a mere 
conventional symbol, but is merged with its object in an indissoluable unity. The 
conscious experience is not merely wedded to the word, but is consumed by it. 
Whatever has been fixed by a name, henceforth is not only real, but is Reality. 
The potential between “symbol” and “meaning” is resolved; in place of a more or 
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less adequate “expression,” we find a relation of identity, of complete congruence 
between “image” and “object,” between the name and the thing. (p. 58) 
There is but a single step from Magical consciousness to sympathetic magic, as practiced 
by the manual projection of the reified word upon a cave wall or a chunk of ivory. 
And that moment was nested within and recapitulated during the transition from 
Magical conscious to Mythic consciousness, where the manual projection of the reified 
word was eventually expressed in abstract writing—a system of symbols through which 
language began to distinguish itself from the natural world and a society fraught with 
approach and avoidance experiences and emotions, thus laying the foundation for Mental 




But a full consideration of the Neolithic and the ages of metal are outside the scope of 
this text. Suffice to say that 
Language and myth stand in original and indissoluble correlation with one 
another, from which they both emerge but gradually as independent elements. 
They are two diverse shoots of the same stem, the same impulse of symbolic 
formulation, springing from the same basic mental activity, a concentration and 
heightening of sensory experience. In the vocables of speech and in primitive 
mythic figurations, the same inner process finds its confirmation: they are both 
resolutions of an inner tension, the representation of subjective impulses and 
excitations in definite objective forms and figures ( p. 88) 
That “concentration and heightening of sensory experience” and “inner tension…of 
subjective impulses and excitations” is generated fundamentally by the interplay of the 
approach and avoidance modules, where wonder + dread = awe. And “the representation” 
of primal awe “in the vocables of speech and in primitive mythic figurations” is the 
beginning of art-religion. 
The two foci of primal European culture are asymmetric in that big beasts 
represented more the avoidance-dread side of awe and the natural world module—after 
all, it was dangerous to stumble upon a bear, to hunt elk or bison, or to be stalked by a 
great cat. The female body (or big breasts), on the other hand, represented more the 
approach-wonder side of awe and the social module—after all, it was advantageous to 
have a generous mother, to be favored by a woman, or to nurture new life through 
cooperation. In his essay “On the Problem of the Venus Statuettes in the Eurasian Upper 




The psychological background of the idea derives from the feeling and 
recognition of women, especially during her periods of pregnancy, as the center 
and source of an effective magical force…. And from the point of view of the 
history of thought these…Venus figurines come to us as the earliest detectable 
expression of that undying ritual idea which sees in Woman the embodiment of 
the beginning and continuance of life, as well as the symbol of the immortality of 
that earthly matter which is itself without form, yet clothes all forms.
27
 
And that valorization of the approach-wonder side of awe and the social module fed into 
the development of ever-more abstract language through cultural-mimetic evolution, 
leading eventually to complex syntactical-symbolical constructions and civilization, 
where the Great Mother became the Great Goddess.
28
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Mythology (1960), p.314. 
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philosopher-psychologist Ken Wilber’s book Up From Eden: A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution 
(1981). 
5.0 - FEEDBACK AND CONTINGENCY 




Physicists like to think that all you have to do is say, these are the conditions, now 





5.1 - SCIENCE OF SCIENCES 
In this Section, I work to focus the lines of evidence discussed thus far into a 
unified argument for the emergence of language as a function of brain hemispheric 
feedback. Those lines of evidence relate to linguistics, neuropsychology, and evolution. 
But as mentioned in the introductory Section, the concept of evolutionary change must be 
expanded beyond biology into general evolutionary systems theory. And while 
Henriques’ ToK and my nested spiral variation thereof are applications of such an 
architectonic, here I am particularly indebted to geologist Lynn Fichter. 
That indebtedness might seem odd if one asks, “What has geology to do with 
evolution?” But remember that Darwin read Lyell’s Principles of Geology while 
voyaging on the Beagle, and Lyell later encouraged Darwin to publish The Origin of 
Species. Moreover, the line of disciplinary influence came full circle with the formulation 
during the 1970s of the Gaia hypothesis by chemist James Lovelock, with developmental 
assistance from biologist Lynn Margulis, most famous for her contributions to 
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endosymbiotic theory (where she postulated that mitochondria and chloroplasts 
developed from proteobacteria and cyanobacteria, respectively). Since that hypothesis 
has been supported by empirical studies and it has made useful predictions, it is now 
considered Gaia theory, and it views the entire Earth—hence “Gaia,” the Earth Mother of 
titans, gods, and humanity from Greek mythology—as a living organism, an emergent 
property generated by feedback loops permeating and connecting its geosphere, 
atmosphere, hydrosphere, and biosphere, as well as the Sun and outer space. Geologists 
like Fichter do not treat the geosphere in isolation, nor do they treat it synchronically; 
rather, they speak in terms of “geophysiology,” and think of the Earth as a set of 
interlocking networks (see Figure 31) evolving over time in ways fundamentally 
deterministic but ultimately unpredictable—that is, as “chaotic” dynamical systems. 
The Course Information website for the ENVT 200: Environmental Systems 
Theory (formerly Evolutionary Systems Theory) class taught by Fichter and colleague 
Steve Baedke notes that “Evolutionary Systems is non-disciplinary and interdisciplinary. 
Its subject matter belongs to no department, yet its concepts and ideas pervade every 
discipline” (Fichter , 2011b) Furthermore, its Course Description web page states that 
Evolutionary Systems are rooted in complex systems, complex systems are rooted 
in complexity theory, complexity theory is rooted in chaos theory, and chaos 
theory is rooted in non-equilibrium thermodynamics. The study of Evolutionary 
Systems seeks to explain how complex system such as the geochemical systems, 
organisms, ecosystems, and economies organize, grow, and evolve by bottom-up 




In Section 5.3, I shall argue that the complex mapping-signaling system we call 
“language” evolved as an epiphenomenon of bottom-up processes within a 
neurobiological system functioning according to non-equilibrium thermodynamics. But 
first I must review and make relevant the basics of complexity theory and chaos theory, 
in this Section, as well as delineate a theory of signs, in Section 5.2. 
If we understand complexity science as “the study of the phenomena which 
emerge from a collection of interacting objects” (Johnson, 2007, pp. 3-4), and recognize 




complexity science has been called “the science of sciences” (Clippinger, 1999, p. 1). 
Indeed, theoretical physicist Jules Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) was investigating the 
three-body problem in celestial mechanics—he was trying to predict the motions of the 
Earth, Moon, and Sun based on their gravitational interactions—when he discovered that 
the behavior of such a system was deterministic but unpredictable (Barrow-Green, 1996), 
thus laying the foundations for chaos theory. 
 What exactly does that mean, “deterministic but unpredictable”? Like classical 
physics, chaos science deals with natural dynamical systems, and since the underlying 
order of natural systems is determined by intrinsic cosmic principles or natural laws, they 
are deterministic. However, classical physics limits its treatment of change by modeling it 
only in linear terms, where “there is a constant correspondence between one variable and 
another,” resulting in “a straight line on a graph” (Fichter, “A Glossary”). For example, 
Newton’s law of gravity states that every point-mass in the universe attracts every other 
with a force that is directly proportional to the product of their masses and inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between them. That law allows for the 
relatively simple prediction of a stable state within a two-body system—for example, the 
Earth and the Moon. However, when the distant but massive Sun is thrown into the 
equation, equilibrium behaviors within the newly complicated system become hopelessly 
unpredictable because positive feedback generates nonlinear perturbations (Barrow-
Green, 1996) and novelty, that is, emergent properties. 
The terms in that last bit have begun to enter common usage, and I have been 




In brief, feedback is recursive behavior, and comes in two varieties (see Figure 
32): positive feedback is “when the output of a system is fed back into the system 
resulting in out of control amplification of the effect”—the hominin hand-brain positive 
feedback loop is a prime example, as is the expression of the FoxP2 meta-regulatory 
gene—and negative feedback is “when the output of a system, fed back into the system, 
tends to dampen or regulate the effect” (Fichter, “A Glossary”)—as when socialization or 
the use of fire sublimated avoidance responses into an approach responses. Both forms of 
feedback recursively generate temporary disequilibria before establishing stable states, 
before generating temporary disequilibria before establishing stable states, etc. (kind of 
an order-chaos yin-yang, which is a good way to envision complexity), although an 
unregulated positive feedback loop leads to explosion and / or collapse, and a negative 




Nonlinear effects are generated by “a system where one variable varies irregularly 
with respect to another variable” due to positive feedback—and “most of the interesting 
things in this universe are not linear, or predictable. They are nonlinear and 
unpredictable, but produce the vast majority of the great complexity and order that we 
observe all around us” (Fichter, “A Glossary”). A nonlinear dynamical system driven by 
positive feedback generates a distinctively dramatic, exponential rate of change known as 
a power law curve (see Figure 33), which is reminiscent of Kurzweil’s Law of 
Accelerating Returns. Interestingly, any segment of such curve is proportional to any 
other segment of that curve; this property is referred to as the scale invariance of the 
equation that describes the curve. Also, the distribution of effects under a power law 
curve is disproportionate such that about 80% of them come from about 20% of the 
causes; this property is referred to as the Pareto principle, and it is an indication of the 
instabilities that lead to sudden transformations in complex systems: avalanches, phase 
transitions, tipping points—emergent properties. The buildup to such novelty is 




to as self-organized criticality, where the novel state emerging is more stable than the one 
immediately preceding it.  
Finally, emergence distinguishes complexity in the technical sense (novelty) from 
complexity in the ordinary sense (complicated), and is the generation of relatively 
complex (in both senses) patterns from relatively simple interactions, where that 
generation is synergistic—that is, the novelty of its effects is greater than the sum of its 
causes. To reiterate and elaborate: an emergent property is “an outcome which is the 
result of all the individual components interacting but which cannot be found in any one 
of those components,” and it is “a complex outcome emerging from the action of simple 
rules” (Fichter, “A Glossary”). 
Just as classical physics works to quantify or model linear systems, chaos science 
works to quantify or model nonlinear systems. But before the development of sufficiently 
powerful computers, the number crunching involved in modeling nonlinear systems was 
beyond daunting: it was prohibitive (Briggs, 1992, p. 47). Which explains why Poincaré’s 
discovery was largely ignored—a sleeping dragon—in favor of “good enough” classical 
physics, until 1960, when MIT mathematician-meteorologist Edward Lorenz (1917-2008) 
was using a Royal McBee LPG-30 to model weather systems (Maugh, 2008). He 
unexpectedly found that if he rounded his input to the nearest thousandth, his output 
became not merely similar, but completely different (Briggs, 1992, p. 15-17, 56-60). 
Lorenz decided to focus upon that phenomenon with computer assistance—to awaken 
Poincaré’s dragon—and thus modern chaos science was born with the principle of 
sensitive dependence on initial conditions at its heart. Indeed, in 1972, Lorenz presented a 




Tornado in Texas?”—thus inspiring the popular phrase denoting the founding principle 
of chaos science: The Butterfly Effect.
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Mathematical models of feedback systems can be graphically represented in terms 
of the trajectories of their states through n-dimensional phase space (Gleick, 1987, pp. 
49-52) The simplest feedback systems are merely iterative and, strictly speaking, linear 
(completely regular in progression), so their trajectories do not exhibit true novelty, but 
are limited to a scaled self-similarity akin to the scale invariance of the power law curve. 
Examples include the golden ratio—made by drawing circle-arcs to connect the opposite 
corners of tiled squares whose sides are successive numbers in length (where each 
number is the sum of the previous two)—and the Koch snowflake—made by dividing the 
sides of an equilateral triangle into three equal segments with further equilateral triangles 
and continuing that process to infinite crenulation. These examples (see Figure 34) are of 
the most elementary kinds of feedback or recursion, which underlie many natural forms 
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(e.g. the nautilus shell and the snowflake). They are often treated as icons of recursion, in 
general, and chaos science, in particular, even though they do not exhibit emergent 
properties, that is, complexity. 
Nonlinear feedback systems, on the other hand, exhibit both scaled self-similarity 
and emergent properties. Poincaré’s investigations into the three-body problem had 
invigorated the rarified study of complex system dynamics, as exemplified by the work of 
mathematician Gaston Julia (1893-1978), who during the first part of the twentieth 
century envisioned exotic structures composed of differential equations unfolding in 
phase space—the Julia set, in particular. But, again, it wasn’t until sufficiently powerful 
computers were available that the field really became accessible. 
In 1963, Lorenz handed three linked equations—derived from a simplified 
topological model of atmospheric convection—to a UC Santa Cruz graduate student who 
configured an old analog computer to run them. That student became the first person to 
view an unfolding Lorenz attractor (see Figure 35), a self-similar positive feedback loop 
that swirls diachronically about two asymptotic poles, where the synergistic outputs of 




equations themselves. In his book Chaos: Making a New Science (1987) journalist-author 
James Gleick describes the student’s viewing situation: 
He spent several nights in the basement, watching the green dot of the 
oscilloscope flying around the screen, tracing over and over the characteristic 
owl’s mask of the Lorenz attractor. The flow of the shape stayed on the retina, a 
flickering, fluttering thing…. It seemed to have a life of its own. It held the mind 
just as a flame does, by running in patterns that never repeat. (p. 246) 
Since it is a nonlinear system, the Lorenz attractor not only never repeats itself, but it is 
sensitive to initial conditions so that any difference in input results in usually rapid 
topological divergence. Thus there are infinite variations on the theme described by the 
Lorenz attractor’s equations, and the exact characteristics of each variation can never be 
known a priori—that is, the outputs are emergent and unpredictable, and can only be 
determined empirically. 
 The Lorenz attractor is emblematic of dynamical systems because it is a bistable 
system, where its two poles represent states of thermodynamic stability separated by 
interlocking vortices of thermodynamic instability. Most dynamical systems are bistable 
in that their extremes consist of two low-energy (stable) states separated by a maximum-
energy barrier that must be overcome in order to transition from one state to the other. 
Overcoming that barrier (i.e. getting to phase transition criticality) requires the input of 
activation energy, and that process of overcoming can be regulated by external factors to 
create a switching mechanism for the system. Additionally, internal regulation of 
switching by hysteresis, or modifications to a system’s sensitivity due to cause-and-effect 




 There are three basic types of dynamical systems, and their long-term bistable 
oscillations can be illustrated as both periodic series and phase space trajectories (see 
Figure 36). The first type is a pendulum system that has a point attractor, and is 
characterized by decreasing oscillations between its two low-energy states, leading 
eventually to complete stability—at which point the system is no longer really dynamical. 
The second type is a limit-cycle system that also has a point attractor, but is characterized 
by circular oscillations between its two low-energy states, creating complete stability—a 
repetitious dynamic made possible by the regular input of energy. The third type is a 
nonlinear system built on positive feedback (such as the Lorenz attractor), and is 
characterized by oscillations of infinite value among its emergent low-energy states, 
creating chaotic stability and bounded novelty made possible by the regular input of 





 Of course, the Lorenz attractor is by no means the only algorithm built on positive 
feedback and made hauntingly visible with computer graphics. The Julia set mentioned 
earlier is another such attractor (see Figure 37a)—but the most famous strange attractor 
must be the Mandelbrot set (see Figure 37b), named for mathematician Benoit 
Mandelbrot, who first plugged its equation into a computer in 1979, and watched it 
unfold within phase space. Gleick describes the moment: 
Then Mandelbrot turned his attention to a simple mapping that was particularly 
easy to program. On a rough grid, with a program that repeated the feedback loop 
just a few times, the first outlines of disks appeared…. To the right and left of the 
main disks, hints of more shapes appeared. In his mind, he said later, he saw 
more: a hierarchy of shapes, atoms sprouting smaller atoms ad infinitum. And 
where the set intersected the real line, its successively smaller disks scaled with a 




refining those first crude images, and he soon discovered dirt cluttering the edge 
of the disks and also floating in the space nearby…. To his surprise the growing 
messiness was the sign of something real. Sprouts and tendrils spun languidly 
away from the main island. Mandelbrot saw a seemingly smooth boundary 
resolve itself into a chain of spirals like the tails of seahorses. The irrational 
fertilized the rational. (p.223) 
It was an apotheosis, and Mandelbrot became a prophet of chaos. He coined the term 
fractal—”broken, irregular”—specifically to describe the structures generated by 
nonlinear dynamical systems (although the term is also used to encompass simple 
recursive structures, such as the golden ratio and the Koch snowflake, that exhibit scaled 
self-similarity). And Mandelbrot wrote a book called The Fractal Geometry of Nature 
(1982), in which he laid out the foundations for the postmodern science of chaos that 
could begin to model the messiness of the cosmos (e.g. see Wolfram, 2002)—which is to 
say, the vast majority of natural things, including living and evolving systems.
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Most evolving systems are nonlinear dynamical systems, so they exhibit chaotic 
oscillations, power behaviors, and emergent properties. This explains why 
From a human perspective, evolutionary change is not linear; it is exponential in 
time.
33
 The pace of evolution accelerates at a fantastic clip. Peering backwards at 
the evolutionary panorama from the vantage point of the steep rise at its current 
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Fractals: The Hidden Dimension (Schwarz & Jersey, 2009). 
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epoch, humans find it tempting to conclude that we are evolution’s end point and 
its ultimate purpose. (Pruett, 2012, p. 186) 
But if we avoid teleological projection, and understand evolution not only in neo-
Darwinian terms, but as “any process that leads to increases in complexity, diversity, 
order, and / or interconnectedness” (Fichter, 2010,  p.59), then we can see that 
evolutionary systems are working against entropy. In thermodynamic as well as 
informational terms, evolutionary systems are necessarily open, and here on Earth, they 
ultimately receive their energy from the Sun or from the planet’s core. 
According to Fichter, there are “at least three distinct mechanisms, or theories of 
evolution: elaboration, self-organization, and fractionation,” where  
Elaborating evolution begins with a seed, an ancestor, or a randomly generated 
population of agents (individual interacting units, like birds in a flock, sand grains 
in a ripple, or individual units of friction along a fault zone) and evolves by 
generating and randomly mutating, a large diversity of descendants which are 
evaluated by an external fitness function; those that do not measure up are 
selected out. (Fichter, 2010, p. 59) 
This is the most familiar evolutionary mechanism, since Darwinian natural selection or 
“survival of the fittest” is a biological case of elaboration, which proceeds according to 
the “General Evolutionary Algorithm: 1) differentiate, 2) select, 3) amplify, 4) repeat” (p. 
60). On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Eames, 1968). This classic short includes an explicit nod to scaled self-similarity on a cosmic scale: 




Self-organizing evolution begins with an initial state of random agents that 
through the application of simple rules of interaction among the agents (e.g. an 
algorithm, or chemical / physical laws) evolves a system of ordered structures, 
patterns and / or connections without control or guidance by an external agent of 
process. That is, the system pulls itself up by its own book straps—a.k.a. Local 
Rules leads to Global Behavior” (p. 60)  
Examples of this evolutionary mechanism are “widespread, common, and diverse, and 
technically belong to the realms of chaos” (p. 60), which are modeled theoretically using 
fractal mathematics and strange attractors such as the Lorenz attractor and the Julia and 
Mandelbrot sets. And finally, 
Fractionating evolution begins with a complex parent which is physically or 
chemically divided into fractions through the addition of sufficient energy 
because of differences in the size, weight, valence, reactivity, etc. of the 
component particles. Because fractionating systems follow chemical / physical 
laws, it is possible to predict (calculate) the evolutionary path of the system, and 
its end state. (p. 61) 
This evolutionary mechanism is associated with inorganic systems, “including the 
compositional evolution of the atmosphere and oceans, and the evolution of rocks” (p. 
61), but it does not involve positive feedback or produce nonlinear effects such as chaotic 
oscillations, power law behaviors, and emergent properties.
34
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 Understanding the origin of language requires an understanding of emergent 
properties, in particular, and evolutionary systems, in general. For example, the hominin 
hand-brain positive feedback loop can be viewed as an example of elaborating evolution, 
while the meta-regulatory system that underlies neoteny can be viewed as an example of 
self-organizing evolution (Misteli, 2009; Törönen et al., 1999; Tucker, 2002, pp.57-58). 
Those two mechanisms intertwined over hundreds of thousands of years, and the 
resulting positive feedback generated emergent proto-linguistic / cultural systems that 
were themselves both elaborative and self-organizing, and might also have fractionating 
components—although diachronic linguistics emphasizes elaboration, and synchronic 
linguistics emphasizes self-organization. 
 The general pattern of emergence created by nonlinear systems can be described 
thermodynamically as a bifurcation diagram (see Figure 38), where periodic series are 
modified so that their horizontal time axis becomes r, a measure of the amount of energy 
being dissipated by the system. As r increases, the bistable system—represented in the 
modified series as a single curve—becomes increasingly unstable. Eventually, a point of 
self-organizing criticality is reached, and the curve bifurcates as a novel low-energy state 
emerges, through which energy is more efficiently dissipated. If r continues to increase, 
each arm of the newly bifurcated system becomes increasingly unstable, and eventually 
reaches its own point of self-organizing criticality, thus generating further bifurcation and 
novelty-emergence. That iterative process—called period doubling to chaos—is modified 
by changes in r and by the recursive algorithm that bounds the system, and it can 
continue ad infinitum to produce a strange attractor with scaled self-similarity throughout. 




terms, which can be applied towards understanding the evolutionary emergence of 
language. 
 
5.2 - THEORY OF SIGNS 
Here, I must backtrack and elaborate in order to approach unification. As 
discussed in Section 2.3, Saussure’s theory of signs holds that the linguistic sign is a 
conjunction of a signifier or speech itself—the “utterance”—and the signified or an idea, 
a situation which has the effect of cutting language off from perception, sensation, and 
the world (see Figure 39). Thus, for Saussure and the structuralists that followed him, 




defined not in any positive terms, but only in terms of relational differences. But is that 
position justified? Is it not similar to the “revelation” that the words in the dictionary 
might be defined only in relation to each other? Can ideas be grounded in anything but 
other ideas? No, yes, and yes. I maintain that ideas, to varying degrees, must be grounded 
in sensation and perception—that the mind is embodied (e.g. see Lakoff & Johnson, 
1999)—and that claims to the contrary are ultimately variations on the sophomoric theme 
of “How can I be sure that what I’m calling ‘red’ is the same thing you’re calling ‘red’?” 
(The answer, of course, is that our eyes work basically the same way—except when they 
do not, in which case the exception underscores the rule). 
 It is worth considering that while the students who compiled their lecture notes 
into A Course in General Linguistics were certain in defining the sign as an utterance-
idea dyad, Saussure’s own notes, later compiled into Writings in General Linguistics, 
offer no explanation for that definition. Indeed, his text problematizes the issue, and then 




following extended quotation, which retains its original paragraph breaks, emphases, and 
capitalization: 
Langue has a physical side and a psychological side. But the unforgivable 
error which is found in every paragraph of the grammars is the belief that the 
psychological side is an idea, while the physical side is the sound, the form, the 
word. 
Things are rather more complicated than that. 
It is not true, indeed it is extremely false to imagine there to be a 
distinction between the sound and the idea. These are in fact inseparably one in 
our minds. 
The distinction . . . [trails off] 
Thus we have on one side a word (physical entity), on the other side its 
meaning (psychological entity). Langue has a physical side and a psychological 
side. For students of language the meaning of this common sense truth has to be 
perfectly clear: otherwise there is no way of knowing what belongs in the physical 
domain and what belongs in the psychological domain.  
The traditional, straightforward distinction is perfectly disastrous, for it 
eliminates any hope of rational study of language by presuming that the 
psychological side is simply the IDEA or signification, while the physical side . . . 
[trails off] (p. 41) 
It is thus difficult to really understand or grapple with Saussure’s theory of signs. 
However, we can note that his reference to the “rational study of language” implies a 




mathematically—a longing manifested by the post-Saussurian positivist-structuralist tribe 
within the social sciences, of which Chomsky is now chieftain. 
A more useful understanding of signs was offered by American scientist-
philosopher Charles Peirce (1839-1914), who was greatly admired by his friend and 
benefactor, the psychologist-philosopher William James. Roughly, Peirce treated the 
process of signification in triadic terms, where the representamen is the material 
component of the sign (e.g. the word “cat,” spoken aloud), the object is that to which the 
representamen refers (e.g. a cat), and the interpretant is the effect produced upon the 
mind (e.g. the concept “cat”) by the representamen (see Figure 40). This system has the 
advantage of linking language to experience through the object, but its details were 
overly complicated and poorly explained, and it does not provide an account of concept-
formation, so it places the horse (interpretant) of signification before its cart 
(represetatmen). 
That last problem is likely a cause or effect of Pierce’s doctrine of “infinite 




become representamen themselves. The resulting chain of linguistic signification (is it 
recursive, or merely reiterative?) supposedly has no beginning or end (…horse, cart, 
horse, cart…), and here Peirce seems to forget about his object and agree with Saussure 
that words can refer only to ideas, which are generated by words, which can refer only to 
ideas, etc. Here, we might object that “unlimited semiosis is only a potential, of course, 
since at one point the necessities of practical life demand that the interpretation stops” 
(Atkins, 2010)—but what remains after interpretation? Perhaps only the right hemisphere 
knows, given that Gazzaniga locates his “interpreter mechanism” in the left. 
Peirce also famously argued that the representamen-object relation comes in three 
basic types: the icon, the index, and the symbol. If the relationship is based on similarity 
(e.g. a painting of cat), it is iconic; if the relationship is based on causality (a heard 
“meow”), it is indexical; and if the relationship is arbitrary (the word “cat”), it is 
symbolic. Peirce recognized that these categories are not hard-and-fast, and did much to 
elaborate upon their interpenetrations, but for our purposes it is important to note that the 
ability to engage in one form of signification suggests the ability to engage in the other 
forms. For example, Herring gull chicks instinctively peck at a patch painted on a stick, 
because the patch resembles the one found on their mothers’ beaks (Ten Cate, 2008). 
That behavior simultaneously partakes of iconic signification (the stick and beak patches 
are similar), indexical signification (peck patch, get fed), and symbolic signification (the 
patch can be modified, and still elicit pecks)—but that behavior is instinctive rather than 





In any case, the theory of signs I offer here takes into account the evolutionary 
lateralization of the brain, especially in regards to the hominin hand-brain feedback loop 
or activity pump, and thus the fact that the brain is thoroughly intertwined with the rest of 
the body (e.g. bipedalism allowed for an opposable thumb), resulting in embodied 
cognition and embodied mind. The structuralist theory of signs, on the hand, seems 
influenced by the Cartesian idea of the brain suspended in a vat by an inscrutable demon. 
My theory is simply this: the sign is the “utterance,” the signifier is a left-
hemisphere “word,” and the signified is a right-hemisphere “image” (see Figure 41). The 
“utterance” is a sign because language is a signaling system. It makes no sense to treat 
the utterance as a component of the sign, as structuralism does; rather, the utterance itself 
constitutes a semiotic complex—the vocal sign—and speech is a series of vocal signs. 
The signifier or left-hemisphere “word” is a contingency-based abstraction or 
concept, and has its neurological bases in the “phonological loop” (Baddeley, 1993) that 
operates primarily across the superior longitudinal fasciculus, a bi-directional bundle of 




the auditory association cortex, which overlaps with Wernicke’s area (see Figure 42). As 
neuropsychologist Neil Carlson puts it in his Foundations of Behavioral Neuroscience 
(2011), “thinking in words probably involves two-way communication between the 
speech areas and surrounding association cortex” (p. 392), and       
the connection between Wernicke’s area and Broca’s area appears to play an 
important role in short-term memory of words and speech sounds that have just 
been heard. Presumably, the rehearsal of such information can be accomplished 
by “talking to ourselves” inside our head without having to say anything aloud. 
Imagining ourselves saying the word activates the region of Broca’s area, whereas 
imagining that we are hearing it activates the auditory association area of the 




That typically subvocal “rehearsal” of utterances used to signify that which is signified, 
or to refer to that which is referenced, is essential to contingency-based abstraction or 
concept-formation, whereby a series of referents with perceived common qualities are 
lumped together through reiteration. Thus, the phonological loop provides the necessary 
but not sufficient left-hemisphere component of language. (And its “two-way 
communication” also underlies the entirety of Saussurean sign theory, as well as Peirce’s 
infinite semiosis). 
The signified or right-hemisphere “image” begins as emotionally impactful gestalt 
data, and has it neurological bases in the perception and memory circuits of the occipital 
and temporal lobes, which are “activated by categories such as animals, tools, cars, 
flowers, letters and letter strings, faces, bodies, and scenes.” In particular, “a relatively 
large region of the ventral stream of the visual association cortex, the lateral occipital 
cortex (LOC), appears to respond to a wide variety of objects and shapes,” and “special 
face-recognizing circuits are found in the fusiform facial area (FFA) located in the 
fusiform gyrus on the base of the temporal lobe” (Carlson, 2011, p. 167). Significantly, 
the occipital cortex is asymmetrically activated, such that the right hemisphere responds 
more to “global” (gestalt) stimuli and the left hemisphere responds more to “local” 
(abstract) stimuli (Han et al., 2001). Additionally, while the FFA “of the right hemisphere 
has the ability to quickly recognize unique configurations of people’s eyes, noses, lips, 
and other features of their faces even when the differences between two people’s faces 
are very similar” (Carlson, 2011, p. 403), in experiments “the most selective region 




visually represented] words” (pp. 402-403) and has thus been designated the “visual 
word-form area.” 
The tendency here is such that abstract-technological imagery (especially writing) 
is left-shifted, while gestalt-organic imagery (especially faces) is right-shifted, and that 
tendency extends to subcortical structures: “In general, pictures or spatial information 
activates the right hippocampal formation, and verbal information activates the left 
hippocampal formation” (Carlson, 2011, p. 364). Moreover, there is a link between 
deficits associated with imagistic lateralization and gender, since as “the human brain is a 
sexually dimorphic organ” in which “the two hemispheres of the women’s brain appear 
to share functions more than those of men’s brains do” (p. 261), and “the behavioral 
characteristics of people with autistic spectrum disorders appear to be exaggerations of 
the traits that tend to be associated with males.” Men are four times more likely than 
women to be on the autistic spectrum, in general, and nine times more likely to have 
Asperger’s disorder, in particular, and “the lack of interest in or understanding of other 
people as reflected in the response of the autistic brain to the sight of the human face,” 
with “little or no activity in the fusiform face area of autistic adults looking at pictures of 
human faces (p. 480). The “extreme male brain” (Baron-Cohen, 2002) emphasis on 
abstraction might be partially innate, since “even at 1 day of age, baby boys prefer to 
watch a moving mobile and baby girls prefer to look at a human face,” and it might have 
a pre-hominin basis, since “young vervet monkeys showed the same sexually dimorphic 
preferences in choice of toys that children do: Males tend to play with a car and a ball, 




My point here is that while lateralization deficits can lead to language 
dysfunction, the left-hemisphere abstract word (signifier) needed to be properly balanced 
with or framed by the right-hemisphere gestalt image (signified) for language to 
emerge—and after the emergence of language, such a balance or framing must be 
maintained to avoid dysfunction on an individual or cultural level. After all, the right-
hemisphere contribution to language is nothing less than the gestalt grounding of 
meaning through the affective evaluation (BIT) of approach-and-avoidance situations 
already filtered through the natural history and social cognitive modules: “[T]he 
image…determines what might be called the current behavior of any organism or 
organization. The image acts as a field. The behavior consists in gravitating toward the 
most highly valued part of the world” (Boulding, 1956, p. 155). In short, the right-
hemisphere-emphasized image sets the initial conditions for language—which like all 
nonlinear dynamical systems, exhibits sensitivity to initial conditions. 
The grounding function of the image includes contextualization by vocal 
intonation and prosody, which “is a special function of the right hemisphere, undoubtedly 
related to the more general role of this hemisphere in musical skills and the expression 
and recognition of emotions” (Carlson, 2011, p. 394; see also Joseph’s chapter “Right 
Hemisphere Language,” 2000). Interestingly, people with William’s syndrome speak 
lyrically, enjoy music and singing, engage faces and eyes, and are overly emotional, 
friendly, and trusting (“1 of 2 Williams Syndrome,” 2011). Those behaviors suggest that 




of autism (Brock, Einav, & Riby, 2008; Byrnie, 2010), where the former might be 
associated with left-hemispheric deficits, and the latter, with right.
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Although language has evolved beyond percept-based or concrete forms of 
speech, even the most deliberately abstract concepts (e.g. as within strict monotheism or 
theoretical physics) are signaled with an imagistic component. Indeed, as sound, 
expression, and gesture, speech is inevitably imagistic, and as visible sign, so is writing. 
Thus, in Writing and Difference (1967), philosopher Jacques Derrida asserts “an 
animality of the letter which assumes the forms of the letter’s desire, anxiety, and 
solitude” (p. 88) and, even more inscrutably: 
The animality of the letter certainly appears, at first, as one metaphor among 
others…But above all it is metaphor itself, the origin of language as metaphor in 
which Being and Nothing, the conditions of metaphor, the beyond-metaphor of 
metaphor, never say themselves. Metaphor, or the animality of the letter, is the 
primary and infinite equivocality of the signifier as Life. (pp. 88-89) 
Here, I take Derrida to mean that proto-language required the comparative grouping of 
images by perceived similarity (concept formation), and that such comparisons created 
primal metaphors, where one image stood for or against another—as evidenced by 
therianthropic cave art, for example. Abstraction thus allowed for metaphor, which 
ruptured the unity of Archaic consciousness and formed the basis of symbolic thought, 
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through which humanity lives and moves and has its being—or as philosopher-historian 
Mircea Eliade states in Images and Symbols: Studies in Religious Symbols (1952): 
Symbolic thinking . . . is consubstantial with human existence, and it comes 
before language and discursive reason. The symbol reveals certain aspects of 
reality—the deepest aspects—which defy any other means of knowledge. Images, 
symbols, and myths are not irresponsible creations of the psyche; they respond to 
a need and fulfill a function, that of bringing to light the most hidden modalities 
of being. (p.12) 
It is important to establish a scientific context for these phenomenological claims. 
For example, Henriques’ Architecture of Human Mind model (see Figure 43) is brain-




it to approach-avoidance considerations (underlined)—and it stresses the importance of 
Imaginative Thought, which is equivalent to Gebser’s Archaic consciousness (just as 
Linguistic Justification is equivalent to at least Magical consciousness, and Operant-
Experiential mind is equivalent to BIT consciousness). In this model, we can clearly see 
how the linguistic functions operate fundamentally upon imagistic input before they get 
caught up in their own phonological-conceptual positive feedback loop. In other words, 
the image and the imagination precede the word and narration—claims to the contrary 
(e.g. “In the beginning was the Word”) are revisionist and / or the product of an 
interpreter-effect blind spot—and the image remains nested within the word such that the 
word “transcends but includes” (Wilber, 1995, p.59) the image. The gestalt image 
provides the foundation for abstract metaphor and symbolic meaning, and cannot be 
removed without reducing “meaning” to a set of empty relations. 
Henriques’ Architecture of Human Mind model is empirically grounded and 
therefore valuable, but it makes sense to directly examine cognitive research that focuses 
on image-word differences such as degrees of abstraction and brain lateralization. The 
following extended discussion focuses critically on two such studies to consider and 
evaluate their theoretical frameworks, methodologies, and analytical techniques. 
First, in their article “Dissociating Verbal and Nonverbal Conceptual Processing 
in the Human Brain” (2006), Thierry and Price explain how they used differential stimuli 
in conjunction with functional neuroimaging to investigate how brain function is 
localized during verbal and nonverbal conceptual processing. The authors define 
conceptual processing as “access to long-term memory representations of meaningful 




mechanisms by which these properties are assessed / compared / related prior to a 
decision” (p. 1018). 
According to a literature review, both verbal and nonverbal conceptual 
processing—everything from categorization, comprehension, reading for meaning, 
pictures of objects, and environmental sounds—induce left-hemisphere-lateralized neural 
activation. However, “there is also evidence for verbal / nonverbal functional 
dissociations at both the perceptual and conceptual levels” (p. 1018). For example, 
subjects with pure word deafness and dyslexia have difficulties with auditory-spoken or 
visual-written verbal tasks relative to nonverbal tasks (left-hemisphere deficiencies?), and 
subjects with auditory agnosia without aphasia or visual problems have difficulties with 
nonverbal tasks relative to auditory-spoken or visual-written verbal tasks (right-
hemisphere deficiencies?). There is also research showing greater right-hemisphere 
activation in response to images and greater left-hemisphere activation in response to 
words, but that research failed to “exclude the contribution of perceptual confounds” (p. 
1025). 
Based on these data, the authors hypothesize that “verbal and nonverbal access to 
meaning may be neuro-anatomically segregated” (p. 1018). That is, even though 
conceptual processing is a generally left-hemisphere-lateralized function, it might exhibit 
differences in lateralization depending on its perceptual content. Such differences may 
exist not just between the processing of verbal versus nonverbal stimuli, but also between 
the processing of visual-written versus auditory-spoken verbal stimuli. 
In a previous study, the authors had compared the processing of spoken words 




that “left anterior temporal activation was greater for spoken words than sounds and, 
conversely, right posterior superior temporal activation was greatest for sounds” (p. 
1019). Here, the authors combine that previous data with the results of their latest 
research to test their hypothesis and fill a research gap: “Functional imaging evidence for 
a verbal / nonverbal dissociation is implied when the results from the verbal and 
nonverbal studies are compared in either the auditory modality of the visual modality. 
However, no clear double dissociation between verbal and nonverbal conceptual 
processing has yet been demonstrated when perceptual differences are controlled.” (p. 
1019) 
This study involved 24 male native speakers of English, half of whom were 
presented with visual verbal and nonverbal stimuli (text and mute video images), and the 
other half with auditory verbal and nonverbal stimuli (speech and environmental sounds). 
Meaningless control stimuli were also presented to establish a neuroimaging baseline, 
and all subjects were required to perform two conceptual tasks—simple categorization 
(animal or not animal) and more difficult sequence interpretation (ordered or 
disordered)—on each stimulus. In both the visual and auditory groups, the effect of task 
on reaction times and error rates was significant (p < .001), where sequence interpretation 
> categorization > baseline, but there was no effect of stimulus type (verbal or nonverbal) 
on either reaction times or error rates. 
In terms of neuroimaging, as expected, meaningful stimuli “independent of 
sensory modality and independent of verbal status revealed a shared network in the left 
hemisphere” (p. 1023). However, greater activation of specific areas of the left 




greater activation of specific areas of the right hemisphere was observed for nonverbal 
stimuli in both the visual and auditory groups (p < .05 corrected for entire brain). In the 
visual group, there was also a specific left-hemisphere area that was activated by “visual 
words more than all other conditions,” although the authors state that they were unable to 
“unable to exclude the contribution of perceptual confounds within each modality” (p. 
1025). In general, the data indicated that “a left versus right verbal / nonverbal functional 
double dissociation is observed irrespective of sensory modality, which implies that the 
effects originate at the conceptual, not perceptual level” (p. 1026), and did not disconfirm 
their experimental hypothesis. 
 This study seems well-designed to accomplish its goal, which is to tease apart the 
differences in the location and intensity of brain activation during both categorization and 
sequence interpretation processing of both verbal and nonverbal stimuli presented in both 
auditory and visual modalities. However, the theoretical construction and discussion of 
the study might have been improved had the research model been more nuanced than a 
straight conceptual-versus-perceptual binary. Conceptual processing might exhibit 
degrees of left-right difference in lateralization across a conceptual (left)-perceptual 
(right) spectrum. The root problem here may relate to the author’s definition of 
conceptual processing, which seems to relate to linguistic abstraction, but has no 
imagistic component (this despite “concrete or abstract”). It is more reasonable to expect 
that verbal concepts are not entirely abstract, but are more or less rooted in perceptual 
experience. For example, “cow” might activate areas more associated with visual 




should be noted that the study seemed to account for this possibility, since it used only 
concrete-perceptual words (animals) as verbal stimuli. 
 In statistical terms, the study used Z-scoring to normalize PET scan measurements 
across the entire brain, as well as t-tests to generate p-values / evaluate the significance of 
difference among activation responses to stimuli. The Z-scoring seems reasonable, but 
the t-test approach is probably too simple given the unknown and probably complex 
nature of the relationships among the different variables being investigated. The study 
assumes relationships among the variables based on differences rather than associations 
(no correlation or regression analysis), and treats those relationships as simple rather than 
complex (no ANOVA). This can be viewed as a chicken-or-the-egg modeling problem, 
where researchers are trying to establish the nature of the variable relationships, but in 
order to do so must use statistical tools that assume particular relationships. In any case, 
the simple t-test feels too much like a leap of faith; I would have liked to have seen a 
discussion of a more complex statistical treatment of the relationships among the 
variables. Of course, the use of t-tests was necessitated by the unknown population 
standard deviations and the small sample sizes (n = 12). The next study should increase 
those sample sizes (n = 30+) to allow for more sophisticated analyses and understanding. 
Second, in their article “An Image is Worth a Thousand Words: Why Nouns Tend 
to Dominate in Early Word Learning” (2010), McDonough et al. explain how they used 
statistical analyses of already-existing data to investigate why nouns are learned earlier 
than verbs. Their analyses centered on data gathered using the MacArthur-Bates 




instrument that asks parents to report when their children produced a word by checking it 
off from a list” (p. 183). 
After noting that “nouns tend to appear before verbs…across the globe,” the 
authors state that verbs require “that children perceptually abstract the invariants of an 
action across multiple exemplars that show wide variation” (p. 181) and that “nouns are 
generally (though not always) more imageable and easier to see as distinct separate 
entities than those represented by verbs.” The authors define imageability as “the ease 
with which a concept evokes a mental image,” and they speculate that ease of learning 
might be explained not “by the linguistic phenomenon of form class [noun versus verb], 
but by a conceptual distinction between what these word classes tend to label.” In short, 
the authors hypothesize that, if nouns tend to have more concrete referents than verbs and 
“imageability is highly correlated with concreteness,” then “imageability may play a role 
in word acquisition” (p. 182). 
A literature review conducted by the researchers provided some support for their 
hypothesis. For example, adult subjects asked to guess words spoken by mothers on 
silent, child-interaction videos were “far more successful at guessing the nouns than the 
verbs,” and word imageability was a significantly better predictor of word identifiability 
than word class. Word imageability was also a significant predictor of successful naming 
of actions and objects by young (three- and five-year old) children (p. 182). Moreover, 
parents rated nouns more imageable than verbs, and reported that their children learned 
more imageable words earlier. The authors note, however, that prior-research limitations 




among very young subjects, and a dearth of studies relating to the imageability of verbs 
in particular (p. 183). 
In their current study, the authors compare previously gathered subject 
imageability ratings for words with CDI word-acquisition data, after noting that parent-
reported CDI data have a .61 median correlation with laboratory data. There were 76 
nouns and 44 verbs that appeared in both the imageability study and the CDI study, and 
those overlapping words provided a basis for statistical analyses. It was first determined 
that, on average, nouns are acquired at a significantly younger age and have significantly 
higher imageability ratings (p < .001). Additionally, the CDI age of word acquisition 
correlated significantly with imageability for all words (p < .001) and for nouns and verbs 
alone (p < .001 and .02, respectively). 
The authors then applied hierarchical multiple regression, where the CDI age of 
word acquisition was the dependent variable, and word class (noun = 1, verb = 2) and 
imagability ratings were the independent variables. First, they controlled for word class, 
and determined that it accounted for 11% of the variance of the dependent variable (p < 
.001), and that the effects of imageability on the CDI age of word acquisition showed 
normal distribution, so it was unnecessary to transform the variables. Then, they 
conducted regression analysis, which showed that word class and imageability ratings 
correlated significantly with each other and with the CDI age of word acquisition, and 
that imageality rating accounted for another 11% of the variance of the independent 
variable (p < .001). In short, “form class and imageability rating together accounted for 




holding imageability rating or word class is held constant, nouns are acquired 1.63 or 
2.31 months earlier than verbs, respectively. 
The authors conclude  that “the imageability rating not only predicts CDI age of 
acquisition above and beyond a word’s form class, but its predictive power also exceeds 
that of the word’s form class using the current data set” (p. 185). Further, they speculate 
that “the early dominance of nouns may not be simply a function of form class. Rather it 
may have a conceptual explanation—highly imageable words may be easier to learn” (p. 
186). 
On the whole, this statistical study of already existing data seems well-conceived. 
The only thing that might be a problem is directly related to the measurement technique 
employed in the Communicative Development Inventory. That instrument provides the 
dependent variable for the current study: the age of word acquisition, as provided by 
parents. As previously mentioned, McDonough et al. discuss (1) that prior research 
limitations included dependence on the memory of subjects and (2) that parent-reported 
CDI data have a .61 median correlation with laboratory data. That correlation is not 
significant enough to be the foundation for complex statistical analyses, which means that 
this study suffers from a research limitation similar to that discussed by the authors. The 
CDI is an established index, but it is not without controversy (e.g. Feldman et al.). An 
alternate way to conduct the current study would be to base it entirely on word 
acquisition data obtained in a more controlled, laboratory environment. That solution 
would be more expensive and time-consuming, but it would yield more solid results. 
I have dwelt on these two studies to show not only how they are consistent with 




nonverbal (RH) lateralization of visual-written and auditory-spoken stimuli (see also 
Kateb et al., 2002), while the second indicates that words are more easily learned if they 
have a more imagistic component (see also Casasanto, 2003)—but to show that such 
studies need to be approached cautiously, with an awareness of their particular 
limitations. Science is provisional due to both incomplete data and imperfect 
methodologies. 
 
5.3 - EMERGENCE OF LANGUAGE 
Among other things, the following items have already been discussed: the general 
pattern of brain lateralization as approach-avoidance modularity, hominin handedness 
and neotony and their contributions to extreme brain lateralization and neuro-
developmental plasticity, the evolution of nonlinear systems through feedback, and the 
sign as abstract word-gestalt image dyad. We are now in position to understand the 
emergence of language as a function of brain-hemispheric feedback by using complexity 
and chaos concepts in a strictly qualitative fashion, being careful to avoid the 
mathematical enthusiasm that has been called “The Cult of the Golden Ratio” (Martin 
Gardner, 1994). 
First, a Lorenz attractor can be used to neurologically model language as a 
complex dynamical system swirling about the word and image poles of the linguistic sign 
(see Figure 44).
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 This bistable system has two low-energy states centered within the 
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 This model is conceptually extrapolated from computer modeling of cells firing within a human olfactory 
bulb, as a particular scent prompts their self-organizing behavior. The resulting neurological strange 




cerebral hemispheres, and separated by the maximum-energy barrier centered within the 
corpus callosum. Overcoming that barrier requires the input of activation energy, and that 
process of overcoming is regulated by the language system’s internal hysteresis (bottom-
up organization) and by an external switching prompts (top-down organization) centering 
on the cingulate cortex, which wraps around the corpus callosum (see Figure 6) and 
projects into both the cortex and into subcortical structures. The cingulate cortex 
apparently evolved as a substantially audition-based interface between the vision-based, 
relatively approach-oriented and cognitive functions of the cortex and the scent-based, 
relatively avoidance-oriented and emotional functions of the limbic. And it is worth 
noting that the anterior or angular cingulate cortex emphasizes attentional-motivational / 
executive functions system (Devinsky, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995; Paus, 2001), while the 
posterior cingulate cortex underlies and projects directly into the primary auditory cortex, 
Wernicke’s area, and the angular gyrus—and into the areas of the corpus callosum 




Here it must be noted that, just as the hemispheres of the cerebral cortex are 
approach-avoidance lateralized, so are subcortical structures such as the amygdala and 
hippocampus.  This suggests that the emergence of more complex or “higher” brain 
structures in order to generate greater intelligence—that is, flexibility or adaptability in 
terms of more nuanced approach-abstraction (and thus learning and risk-taking) 
behaviors—follows a fractal curve. In humans, then, the left neomammalian complex 
(cortex) is more approach-oriented than the right, and the entire neomammalian complex  
is more approach-oriented than the paleomammalian complex (limbic system). Similarly, 
the left paleomammalian complex is more approach-oriented than the right, and the entire 
paleomammalian complex is more approach-oriented then the reptilian complex, which is 
itself lateralized. The implication of this scaled self-similarity is that the right side of each 
brain evolutionary level has more in common with the previous level than does the left 
(e.g. the right hemisphere is more emotional than the left, and the limbic system is very 
emotional), and that the right side might act as a kind of bridge between the two levels—
which conjures a spiral image not inconsistent with the twisting motion involved in 
Yakovlevian torque.  
In any case, probably the best way to appreciate the auditory nature of the 
switching function carried out by the cingulate cortex within the Lorenz attractor of the 
emerging linguistic sign is by considering the arguments set forth by cognitive scientist 
Mark Changizi in his book Harnessed: How Language and Music Mimicked Nature and 
Transformed Ape to Man (2011). Changizi points out that “vision excels at answering the 
questions ‘What is it?’ [ventral stream] and ‘Where is it’ [dorsal stream] but not What 




events have trouble visually outshouting all the showy nonevents.” On the other hand: 
“Audition excels at ‘What’s happening’ sensing a signal only when there’s an event” (p. 
34). The question of whether or not “an event” has occurred, is occurring, or is about to 
occur is, of course, a matter of concern for the fundamental approach and avoidance 
modules, which accords with Changizi’s claim that “if there is a ‘core grammar’ to 
nature, then this core would have been a highly steady invariant over our evolutionary 
history, and would thus have been a strong shaper of our visual and auditory systems” (p. 
18). 
So switching back and forth between the approach and avoidance modules across 
the corpus callosum is best controlled by audition, which evolved to pay attention to and 
evaluate nature’s fundamental sounds to determine what sort of events are underfoot. 
And according to Chanziri, “most events we hear are built out of just three fundamental 
building blocks: hits, slides and rings” (p. 35), and “hits, slides, and rings are, therefore, 
nature’s primary phonemes. They are a consequence of how solid physical objects 
interact and vibrate” (p. 37). The main claim of Harnessed is that language is a signaling 
system of complex vocalizations that evolved to take advantage of an already-existing 
attentional and motivational system, in general, and—I maintain—the cingulate cortex 
switch, in particular. This explains why “human speech sounds like solid-object physical 
events” (p. 19, original emphasis), where “language’s hit, slides, and rings, are 
respectively, plosives, fricatives, and sonorants” (p. 38). 
Interestingly, Changizi also points out that the way phonemes are put together 
follows patterns found in solid-object physical events: “Language’s most universal 




physics” (p. 69). Moreover, “words are not only approximately the size of solid-object 
physical events—i.e., having several interaction sounds—words also take the amount of 
time for a typical event” (p. 75). It is worth noting here that, inasmuch as “language 
carves at nature’s joints” (p. 56), it is not entirely arbitrary, as claimed by Saussure and 
his followers. 
 Changizi extends his argument by stating that “music sounds like humans moving 
and behaving (usually expressively)” (p. 19, original emphasis). This explains why music 
can be so moving, both literally and emotionally: “To emote literally means to move or 
prepare for action” (Maxwell and Davidson, 2007, p. 1113), and music takes advantage 
of a system and a switch that evolved to pay attention to and evaluate natural events, in 
general, and human movement, in particular. Of course, that system describes the mid-
level natural history and social modules, which evolved out of the low-level avoidance 
and approach modules; thus, “culture learned how to package language and music so that 
they fit right into our brains. Culture learned how to harness us” (p. 22). 
Here it is worth considering Goldenberg’s hypothesis (2009) that, as components 
of an integrative system designed to track events in space, the left hemisphere emphasizes 
the relatively micrometric-categorical (fine) perception and production of phonemes and 
tongue movements (28-40 Hz range), while the right hemisphere emphasizes the 
relatively macrometric-coordinate (coarse) perception and production of syllabic rate and 
jaw movements (3-6 Hz frequency). I would add that the left hemisphere likely 
specializes in vowels, while the right hemisphere specializes in consonants, in accordance 





If phonemes and the phonemic structure of syllables and words have their basis in a 
complex dynamical nervous system (bottom-up organization) interacting with auditory 
environmental inputs (top-down organization), does that fully explain the emergence of 
language? It does not—it “only” explains the phonological properties of speech and 
inadvertently provides a better understanding of the cingulate cortex switch that regulates 
the strange attractor of linguistic emergence. In order to understand the nature, order, and 
criticality of the novelties generated by that chaotic system, the issues of brain 
lateralization and abstract versus gestalt cognition must be addressed. For example, the 
emergence of word forms or parts of speech out of brain-hemispheric feedback can be 
modeled as a Koch snowflake (see Figure 45), where exclamations are treated as 
holophrases that establish the ground of linguistic emergence, and pronouns are treated as 
metawords that allow for full syntactical recursion. Let us first address the exclamation—
typically considered a simple or coarse word form—because the beginning is a good 




When it comes to applying developmental models to evolutionary scenarios, we 
are reversing Haeckel’s already-provisional formulation “ontogeny recapitulates 
phylogeny,” so we must be doubly careful. However, it is difficult not to make certain 
extrapolations when Linguist David Crystal tells us in his book How Language Works: 
How Babies Babble, Words Change Meaning, and Languages Live or Die (2005) that 
The earliest stage of grammatical development hardly seems like grammar at all, 
since only single words are involved—utterances such as Gone, More, Dada, and 
Bye-bye…. The ‘one-word’ stage is usually most noticeable between twelve and 
eighteen months. But to talk about it solely in terms of ‘words’ is misleading. In 
many respects, these early utterances function as if they were sentences…. For 
example, one child uses the word dada in three different ways: as she heard 
someone approach outside, she said Dada?, with a rising intonation; as she saw it 
was indeed daddy, she said Dada, with a triumphant, falling intonation; and then 
she said Da-da!, with an insistent, level intonation, with her arms outstretched. 
(pp. 254-255) 
Note that Chanziri tells us that a “rising pitch…suggests…that events are coming your 
way” (p. 80), while a “falling pitch means the object is directing itself less and less 
towards you” (p. 83)—and he points out that “people overlay the sterile solid-object 
event sound of speech with emotional overtones. We add intonation, a pitch-like 
property…[and] these prosody-related emotional overtones turn Steven Hawking 
computer voice speech into regular human speech” (p. 99). Crystal continues: 
At a later stage in development, these three functions would be called a question, 




grammatical form, but the use of prosody and gesture conveys the force of these 
sentence types nonetheless. In such cases, many scholars describe them as one-
word sentences, or holophrases. (p. 255) 
I suggest that proto-language was hinted at—possibly among Australopithicus (Table 
1)—by contingency-based exclamations that amounted to holophrases.
37
 Here, the exact 
meaning of the left-hemisphere “word”—question, statement, or command?—was 
profoundly modulated by its right-hemisphere imagistic component, or “intonation” and 
“prosody and gesture.” In other words, the manner in which an abstracting signal was 
differentiated from its gestalt field was determined by the perceived intensity and 
frequency (audition) of its emotional-auditory activation energy. Again, we must be 
careful not infer too much from a developmental situation that is embedded within an 
already-existing cultural matrix—that would be an unforgivable error—but it seems 
reasonable to conclude that, as contingency-based abstraction, the exclamation is a 
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 In asserting that language evolved from contingency-based exclamations or holophrases, I am supported 
by researchers such as  Wray (1998, 2000) and Kirby (2002), but I am in opposition to researchers such as 
Tallerman (2007) and Heine & Kuteva, whose arguments essentially boil down to: 
[W]e are not aware of any diachronic evidence to the effect that such a segmentation process can 
commonly be found in language change. New grammatical categories do not normally arise via 
the reinterpretation of complex, unanalyzed propositions; accordingly, we consider this hypothesis 
to be less convincing for reconstructing language evolution . . . . (2007, p. 26, emphasis added) 
For a single-volume intertextual discussion of this topic, see The Emergence of Protolanguage: 





standardized representation (contingency-based abstraction) of an emotional-situational 
state (gestalt). 
My own view is that such primal holophrases were so bound up in their 
contextual fields that they did not even indicate proto-language, but that view is not 
arbitrary or dismissive. Rather, I think that, in terms of signaling, the pre-language of the 
exclamation established the emotional ground for the glacially gradual emergence of 
syntactical recursion, the crystallization of language from protolanguage, and the 
movement (for better or worse) of immanent nature and body towards transcendent 
culture and consciousness. In his book The Genesis of Syntactic Complexity: Diachrony, 
Ontogeny, Neuro-Cognition, Evolution (2009), linguist-writer Thomas Givon states of his 
subject that “at least theoretically, one could go in two directions,” which he describes as: 
 Expansion (analysis): Start from an undifferentiated holistic signal and 
then reanalyze it as a composite of morphemes (a word) or of words (a 
clause). 
 Combination (synthesis): Start from the small units (morphemes, words) 
and then build up the word or clause combinatorially. (p. 8, emphases in 
the original) 
Both “directions” were likely required, where proto-language emerged from the pre-
linguistic holophrase through left-hemisphere analysis, and then proto-language gradually 
evolved into language proper through inter-hemispheric and inter-personal positive 






 But crucially, the primal exclamation established the mechanism of 
contingency-based abstraction or concept formation by means of the left-hemisphere 
phonological loop made possible through neoteny and torque-related cerebral 
reorganization.  
Language involves contingency-based representation, then recombination, and 
then recursion, where more abstract and complex concepts can be formed for mapping 
and signaling purposes at each of those levels, stages, or scales. Animals have innate or 
phylogenetic concepts—instincts—that they use to negotiate the world. Presumably, 
humans also have such innate or phylogenetic concepts or “archetypes” (Jung, 1981), 
which can be treated as transcendent attractors in a sort of hermetic, “as-above-so-below” 
fashion. But the formation and communication of novel concepts is proto- / cultural 
behavior, and since language is mimetic, rather than genetic, it is non-instinctive. Note 
that there are animals that seem capable of rudimentary representational pre-language or 
contingency-based exclamations in the wild (e.g. chimpanzees), which suggests 
Australopithecus-level BIT consciousness and pre-culture, as evidenced by the use of 
tools of opportunity. And especially with human assistance, there are animals (Koko the 
gorilla, Nim Chimpsky the chimpanzee, and Alex the African Grey parrot) that seem 
capable of habilis-level proto-linguistic abstraction: limited contingency-based 
representation (nouns and adjectives, with perhaps a few verbs) and rudimentary 
recombination (phrases, with perhaps a few simple sentences). 
Interestingly, male songbirds use contingency-based recombinatorial and 
recursive signaling to attract mates, and ornithologists refer to songbird “culture” 
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(Rowlett, 2011) despite the fact that birdsong has no apparent referential base or 
representational function, and should therefore be described as para-linguistic. Female 
songbirds are “simply” attracted to the emergent properties of nonlinear birdsong as a 
perceived function of male fitness, which suggests that females possess their own 
complex algorithms for evaluating birdsong strange attractors (Sasahara & Ikegami, 
2007). Human music also exhibits nonlinear or fractal properties (Joyce, 2012) and may 
be viewed as para-linguistic. Language-making, like all tool-making, is novel and 
interesting precisely because it is not instinctive, and proto-linguistic tool-making—
which is mimetic and proto-cultural, as opposed to genetic and instinctive—is novel and 
interesting for the same reason. 
The understanding of language as a mapping-signaling system involving 
contingency-based abstraction or on-the-fly concept formation is contrary to Steven 
Pinker’s eponymous thesis in his book The Language Instinct: How the Mind Creates 
Language (1994). The claim that language is “innate” or “instinctive” among humans is, 
I think, overstated and / or careless. It is based primarily on the poverty of the stimulus 
argument, which asserts that it must be impossible for children to learn the rules of their 
native languages so quickly without those rules being somehow instinctive—an argument 
that fails to consider the extreme neuro-developmental plasticity that is humanity’s 
defining evolutionary heritage. Pinker bolsters his claim that language is innate with the 
examples of a child-centered transition from a pidgin to a creole and the spontaneous 
emergence of signing among a community of deaf children—but in both cases the 




Thus Pinker is likely inferring too much evolutionary information from a developmental 
situation that is embedded within an already-existing cultural matrix. 
Pinker’s examples can be explained in terms of developing neural circuits, already 
set in adults, that encode an emerging “consistent grammar” (p. 25) and allow for a 
“grammar explosion” (p. 33). Those circuits are part of a highly mimetic-adaptive 
technical module that forms in response to natural history and social stimuli. Moreover, 
the nonlinear language systems resulting from their formation are composed of multi-
level networks (Ferreira et al., 2006; Kello & Beltz, 2009; Steyvers & Tenenbaum, 2005) 
that exhibit power law effects such as scale invariance, self-organizing criticality (e.g. 
pidgin to creole), and Zipf and Pareto behaviors—for example, where the least 
communicative effort is achieved by differentiating  rules or words, selecting about 20% 
of them to do about 80% of the work, amplifying those rules or words, then repeating 
(e.g. rapid deaf community). 
Here, we should consider Partha Niyogi’s section on “Gradualism versus 
Abruptness (or the S-Shaped curve)” in The Computational Nature of Language 
Learning and Evolution (2006), where he quotes earlier researchers when discussing “the 
S-shaped nature of [linguistic] change while introducing the notion of community 
(population) and the possibility of change being actuated by children (learning)” (p. 29): 
“A given change begins quite gradually; after reaching a certain point (say, 
twenty percent), it picks up momentum and proceeds at a much faster rate and 
finally tails off slowly before reaching completion. The result is an S-shaped 




That self-organizing, critical “twenty percent” is an example of Pareto behavior—and 
with further energy input (perhaps due to a population), the stable logistic system 
represented by an S-shaped curve proceeds by period doubling to chaotic bifurcation 
(Fichter, “But First: What is Chaos?”) 
In any case, there is no reason to treat the brain as a steady-state computer with 
genetically preset linguistic algorithms (determined, no doubt, by a linear translation of 
the human genome). Due to the hand-brain feedback loop and meta-regulatory neoteny, 
humans have inherited a very large, plastic, and well-connected brain with a powerful 
technical module. Language is a socially constructed product of that technical module; it 
is a tool, not an instinct. Pinker’s desire to declare language an instinct clashes with his 
own common sense: first he states that “language is no more a cultural invention than is 
upright posture” (p. 5), then he refers to “ordinary speech” as “a technology” (p. 15). 
Perhaps he is making a Saussurean distinction between langue and parole? We do not 
know, but the technical module involves the most plastic circuitry in the brain, and due to 
sensitivity to initial conditions, the rapid development of its abstract cognitive potentials 
depends crucially upon early cultural immersion and mimesis. The stages of language 
acquisition are well-known, as are the effects of missed developmental windows 
(Penfield & Roberts, 1959; Lenneberg, 1967).
39
 Pinker’s assertion that language “is not 
something that parents teach their children” (6), his claim that the wug test does not 
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measure mimetic language acquisition but instead provides a “demonstration that normal 
children do not learn language by imitating their parents” (38), and his complaint that 
“many parents…think that mothers provide children with implicit lessons” (p. 28) are 
understandable only in ideological terms. If, unlike the children in his favorite poverty-
of-the-stimulus examples, a human child did somehow grow up entirely apart from 
culture—à la the Wild Boy of Aveyron—he or she would no more be able to speak than 
craft a Levellois point. But Pinker is well aware that recovered feral children “are 
permanently incapable of mastering the full grammar of the language” (p. 296), and that 
“despite intensive training and impressive gains in other spheres, [their] syntax is bizarre” 
(p. 298), so his claim that “your parents need not bathe you in language or even command 
a language” (p. 43) is nonsensical. 
It is precisely the grammar and syntax of language—the rules for abstract 
representation, recombination, and recursion—that Chomsky has claimed are instinctive. 
As previously mentioned, his Universal Grammar (UG) and Language Acquisition 
Device (LAD) have been presented as innate without any discussion of how they came to 
be so. On the one hand Chomsky seems eager to link linguistics with the discovery of the 
genetic code, presumably because such a move might provide additional relevancy and 
legitimacy, but on the other hand, he seems uninterested in evolutionary theory because 
of its diachronic concerns, which conflict with Saussurean-structuralist synchronic 
concerns. As a result of that contradiction, one of the greatest living thinkers has been 
unable to come to grips with the modern evolutionary synthesis (at least so far as 




said about behavior or thought at the level of abstraction at which animal and human 
communication fall together” (p. 60), which are apparently intended to stymie discourse. 
There was never any significant evidence for Chomsky’s UG or LAD. Indeed, I 
cannot determine why they were ever considered theories, or even hypotheses, given the 
lack of suggestions for testability / falsifiability.
40
 The obvious thing to do would be to 
conduct a comparison of the world languages to determine whether or not a UG can be 
discerned, but for some reason such a comparison was not attempted until 2011, when 
a group of researchers at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics…found 
that word-orders in languages from different language families evolve differently. 
The finding contradicts the common understanding that word-order develops in 
accordance with a set of universal rules, applicable to all languages. Researchers 
have concluded that languages do not primarily follow innate rules of language 
processing in the brain. Rather, sentence structure is determined by the historical 
context in which a language develops. Linguists want to understand how 
languages have become so diverse and what constraints language evolution is 
subject to. To this end, they search for recurring patterns in language structure. In 
spite of the enormous variety of sounds and sentence structure patterns, linguistic 
chaos actually stays within certain limits: individual language patterns repeat 
themselves. For example, in some languages, the verb is placed at the beginning 
of the sentence, while with others it is placed in the middle or at the end of the 
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 Here, computational linguist Geoffery Sampson (b. 1944) is most consistent and dogged in his criticism 
of Chomsky’s UG (1979, 1980a, 1997), and he also presents of strong defense of empirical linguistics 




sentence. The formation of words in a given language also follows certain 
principles. (“Weak Evidence for Word-Order Universals,” 2011; originally 
reported in Dunn, Greenhill, Levinson, & Gray, 2011) 
While this study disconfirms the idea of a UG, it supports the idea that languages are 
fundamentally—that is, at the level of grammar as well as word formation—complex 
dynamical systems. Every language can be viewed as an unfolding strange attractor 
defined by its own grammatical “equations,” with emergent properties based on 
sensitivity to initial conditions. And evolutionarily related languages have similar 
grammars and thus similar fractal forms, where “in spite of the enormous variety of 
sounds and sentence structure patterns, linguistic chaos actually stays within certain 
limits: individual language patterns repeat themselves.” Of course, the converse is also 
true: less evolutionarily related languages have less similar grammars and thus less 
similar fractal forms.  
 A lack of UG does not mean that even the most distant languages would be 
completely dissimilar. The evolutionary history of the human organism presumably sets 
biosemiotic boundaries on what sorts of grammatical variations are possible, in both 
physiological-phenomenological terms and in terms of neural-algorithmic plasticity (cf. 
the theoretical biology and comparative psychology of Jakob von Uexküll). The former 
can include factors such as sensory and perceptual limitations and the nature of events 
themselves, where for example, “stuff happens” or “happening stuff” (noun-verb or verb-
noun). But such boundaries might be insignificant and / or unimaginable in principle. 
Interestingly, Chomsky approvingly quotes the naturalist-explorer Alexander von 




underlying the mental act of raising articulated structurally organized signals to an 
expression of thought” and “a recursively generated system, where the laws of generation 
are fixed and invariant, but the scope and the specific manner in which they are applied 
remain entirely unspecified.” Chomsky himself talks about language’s “deep and surface 
structure” and “transformational operations,” and “the new field of mathematical 
linguistics” (p. 62)—and he mentions “one possible direction for future research…of 
highly abstract principles and structures that determine the character of human mental 
processes” (p. 63). But he fails to discuss, or even name, that direction of research. It 
might have been computational linguistics, which arose from cybernetics and artificial 
intelligence studies, or it might have been L-systems, the equations used by biologist 
Aristid Lindemayer to model the development of plants. In 1968—the year Language 
and Mind was published—Chomsky used the latter for modeling syntax, but he applied 
the equations sequentially, rather than simultaneously as Lindemayer did, and he thus 
missed their feedback or nonlinear characteristics (“L-Systems,” n.d). Still, Chomsky 
talks about “a fairly small number of features that can be specified in absolute, language-
independent terms [that] appear to provide the basis for the organization of all 
phonological systems” (p. 65), “cyclic ordering,” “infinite generative capacity,” and “the 
abstract structure of the various patterns that appear at various stages of derivation” (p. 
66)—language that sounds vaguely fractally. But Mandelbrot would not coin the word 
fractal until 1975, and the Lorenz attractor was only a half-decade old. Moreover, even if 
Chomsky had known about complex dynamical systems, there is no reason to think he 
would have treated language in anything but synchronic, non-evolutionary terms. Likely, 




In order to understand the full significance of the greatest challenge to Chomsky’s 
UG, though, we must return to the model of language crystallization as a Koch 
snowflake, where contingency-based exclamations set the pre-linguistic ground 
(Australopithicus). The first true word form to emerge—that is, the first word form to be 
more abstract-approach lateralized than gestalt-avoidance lateralized—is the noun, which 
establishes the proto-linguistic ground of referential representation. Likely, the sequential 
use of nouns was the most rudimentary form of recombination, and laid the groundwork 
for the emergence of adjectives and phrases (habilis). The most rudimentary form of 
recursion was the abstraction of the verb from temporal-iterative considerations of a-
noun-nced objects, which laid the groundwork for the emergence of adverbs, and allowed 
for simple sentences, regular representation, and better if still limited recombination 
(erectus). Better if still limited recursion was made possible by the abstraction of 
relational-locational signifiers such as conjunctions and prepositions, which allowed for 
regular recombination and compound sentences (neanderthalensis). And the abstraction 
of self-referential pronouns, or the first metawords, allowed for regular recursion and 
complex sentences, and thus the emergence of language proper (sapiens). 
I recognize that the emergence of regular recursion and language proper—and the 
difference between neanderthalensis and sapiens—is a lot to put upon the shoulders of 
the humble pronoun, although it is really no more than I have burdened exclamations 
with. It is true that the idea first came to me while reading from Mine, All Mine: A Book 
About Pronouns (1999), by Ruth Heller (1923-2004), “a children's author and graphic 
artist known for her use of bright color and detail in both geometric design and the 




Pronouns take the place of nouns so we don’t have to say “Mike said Mike 
walked Mike’s dogs today. Mike walked Mike’s dogs a long, long way.” How 
boring what we say would be without the PRONOUNS his and he. King Cole 
would call for Kind Cole’s pipe. King Cole would call for King Cole’s bowl and 
fiddlers three. On and on…it makes me yawn. It’s awkward and wordy. The 
rhythm is gone. Pronouns make our language flow. 
This caused me to consider how pronouns allow for easier linguistic nesting or 
embedding—that is, recursion—and complex sentences. Then I realized that pronouns 
are words that do nothing but refer to other words—that is, they are metawords. Such 
signifiers are abstractions of abstractions that encourage enhanced abstraction across all 
word forms and point to self-reference, as exemplified by the pronoun I.
41
 
A quick survey of pronoun theory (“Pronoun,” 2012) did not turn up anything 
particularly interesting, although I learned that pronouns have been classified as: 
 “indicative words” (Karl Brugmann, Karl Bühler, Uriel Weinreich) 
 “indexes” or “indicators” (Charles Sanders Peirce, William Edward 
Collinson) 
 “words with changeable signification” (Adolf Noreen) 
 “moveable identifiers” (Otto Jespersen, Roman Jakobson) 
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pronouns, and their deficits in grammatical “raising,” or linguistic recursion  / embedding, often last into 




 “updating” or “means of transferring from language to speech” (Charles 
Bally, Émile Benveniste) 
 “words of subjective-objective lexical meaning” (Alexey Peshkovsky) 
 “word remnants” or “substitutes” (Lev Shcherba, Leonard Bloomfield, 
Zellig Harris) 
 “represents” (Ferdinand Brunot) 
 “survivals of special part of speech” (Viktor Vinogradov) 
The problem with these structuralist-formalist classifications is that they are largely 
synchronic; at most, some of them hint at linguistic evolution. It wasn’t until reading The 
Origin of Language: Tracing the Evolution of the Mother Tongue (1994) by linguist 
Merritt Ruhlen (b. 1944) that I understood the possible evolutionary importance of 
pronouns. Among other things, Ruhlen discusses the breakthroughs made and difficulties 
faced by linguist Joseph Greenberg (1915-2001), whose work revolutionized language 
classification systems based significantly on pronominal patterns. First, from 1949-1954, 
Greenberg used mass comparison of words to discern fundamental similarities across 
1000+ African languages, which allowed him to group them into just four major families. 
Those fundamental differences were not just pronominal, but they were primarily so, and 
the most fundamental differences were across the first-person pronouns I and you (pp. 36 
& 91). Later, in his book Language in the Americas (1987), Greenberg did essentially the 
same thing with hundreds of Native American languages, grouping them into three major 
families based primarily on first-person pronominal differences (pp. 86-93)—an much-
contested move recently supported by genetic data that suggests “at least three distinct 




Greenberg’s American conclusions were prefigured and likely inspired by the 
pronominal work of linguists Alfred Trombetti and Edward Sapir (Ruhlen, p. 87), but he 
nonetheless knew how those conclusions would be received: “‘I am . . . well aware that 
what is attempted in this work runs against the current trends in Amerindian work and 
will be received in certain quarters with something akin to outrage’.”  He was correct; for 
example, one Americanist urged his colleagues to “‘shout down’” Language in the 
Americas without having read it (p. 90), and another declared that its author’s “‘avowed 
values are subversive and should be explicitly argued against’.” Ruhlen recounts how “a 
noted physical anthropologist, not involved in this debate . . . characterized the reactions 
to Greenberg’s book as ‘hysterical’,” and maintains that “the kind of verbal abuse that 
has recently been directed at Greenberg is usually reserved for religious heretics rather 
than scholars with new ideas” (p. 91).   
For our purposes, the take-away from this linguistics controversy is two-fold. 
First, in regard to the one of the counterclaims, made by Americanists defending the 
status quo, that Native American languages share pronominal patterns due to ubiquitous 
pronominal borrowing, Ruhlen points out:  “It is well known in linguistics that pronouns 
are almost never borrowed, and such promiscuous borrowing, among many different 
groups, as the Americanists propose is simply unheard of in the linguistic literature” (pp. 
92-93). The conservation of pronominal patterns—that is, the relative infrequency of 
pronominal borrowing—points to both the antiquity of pronouns and to their centrality in 
the emergence of language proper, that is, a signaling system that includes regular 
recursive abstraction. Second, in regard to the Americanists making the counterclaims, 




Europeanists, whom they so studiously emulate), these scholars are strictly creationist. 
An evolutionary answer, plausible or not, is simply not acceptable” (p. 93). The 
Americanist historical-comparative status quo is a product of Sausurrean structuralism, 
and cannot abide anything other than synchronic interpretations of linguistic data—
interpretations that vigorously avoid considerations of evolutionary possibilities. 
Here, the obvious move is to examine a language that exhibits pronominal 
borrowing (an exception to the rule) to see if and how it might otherwise be unusual. It 
turns out that the most unusual language that exhibits pronominal borrowing—and 
perhaps the most unusual language, period—is Pirahã. And the controversy surrounding 
that tongue is fierce, on-going, and involves Noam Chomsky and his followers. 
Pirahã is spoken by a group of only few hundred hunter-gatherers living in the 
Amazonian interior, who refer to themselves as “the straight ones” and anyone speaking 
another language as having a “crooked head” (Everett, 2005a, p. 234). The principle 
ethnographer of the Pirahã people has been linguist Daniel Everett (b. 1951), who 
presented his research in a Current Anthropology article titled “Cultural Constraints on 
Grammar and Cognition in Pirahã: Another Look at the Design Features of Human 
Language” (2005a) and in his book Don’t Sleep, There Are Snakes: Life and Language in 
the Amazonian Jungle (2008). Everett came among the Pirahã people in 1977, as a 
Christian missionary with his family, and initially studied their language to convert them. 
However, over about a decade, he became fluent in their language, and his experiences 
among them wore down and eventually eliminated his faith. As he worked to become a 
linguist, Everett became increasingly interested in understanding the Pirahã people on 




The most unusual aspect of the Pirahã language, according to Everett, is that it 
lacks syntactical recursion: “It is the only language known without embedding (putting 
one phrase inside another of the same type or lower level, e.g., noun phrases in noun 
phrases, sentences in sentences, etc.)” (2005a, p. 622). Limited semantical recursion 
seems possible, if awkwardly so, through the use of interrelated simple and compound 
sentences (p. 629), but the linguistic nesting that characterizes complex sentences is 
absent. And significantly, “Pirahã has the simplest pronoun inventory known. It also 
appears that all its pronouns were borrowed recently” from a nearby but unrelated 
language group.
42
 The Pirahã people prefer not to use pronouns—Everett notes that “this 
reduced role for pronouns is striking” (p. 628)—and without regular recursion, their 
language is necessarily less abstract than others, and their culture is necessarily less 
complex than others; for example (p. 622): 
 Pirahã is the only language known without number, numerals, or a concept of 
counting. 
 It also lacks terms for quantification such as “all,” “each,” “every,” “most,” 
and “some.” 
 It is the only language known without color terms. 
 It has no perfect tense. 
 It has perhaps the simplest kinship system ever documented. 
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when combined with the lack of regular recursion, suggests that it might be an isolate recently evolved 




 It has no creation myths—its texts are almost always descriptions of 
immediate experience or interpretations of experience. 
 Pirahã in general express no individual or collective memory of more than two 
generations past. 
 They do not draw, except for extremely crude stick figures representing the 
spirit world that they (claim to) have directly experienced. 
The art-religion aspect of this culture is interesting in that there really is none. 
The closest thing to art not prompted by outsiders is when the Pirahã people “make 
necklaces from seeds, home-spun cotton string, and teeth, feathers, beads, beer can pull-
tabs and / or other objects, that show little symmetry and are very crude and unattractive 
compared with the artifacts of other . . . groups in the region”—but “these are decorative 
only secondarily, their primary purpose being to ward off the evil spirits they see almost 
daily” (2005b, p. 30). And relations with these mundane “spirits” constitute the sum total 
of their religious life: 
The Pirahãs, I learned, have no concept of a supreme or creator god. They have 
individual sprits, but they believe they have seen these spirits, and they believe 
they see them regularly. When we looked into it, we saw that these aren’t 
invisible spirits that they’re seeing. They are entities that take on the shape of 
things in the environment. They’ll call a jaguar a spirit, or a tree a spirit, 
depending on the kinds of properties that it has. Spirit doesn’t really mean for 
them what it means for us, and everything they say they have to evaluate 




This hallucinatory (from our perspective) animism smacks of psycholinguistic 
reification-projection and pre-Mental consciousness or Julian Jaynes’ bicameral mind, 
and I submit that “everything they say they have to evaluate empirically” is a gentle 
statement of just how concrete-bound the Pirahã people are in their thinking—it could 
easily have been written that “they cannot think except in terms of more or less 
immediate experience or concrete terms.” Indeed, Everett elsewhere gives a blunter 
assessment of the limiting effects of the Pirahã language on the lives, experiences, and 
narratives of its speakers: 
Grammar and other ways of living are restricted to concrete, immediate 
experience (where an experience is immediate in Pirahã if it has been seen or 
recounted as seen by a person alive at the time of telling), and immediacy of 
experience is reflected in immediacy of information encoding—one event per 
utterance. (2005a, p. 621) 
The former missionary tries to smooth over any possible political incorrectness (it 
does not matter)
43
 while clarifying some important points: 
No one should draw the conclusion from this paper that the Pirahã language is in 
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 For example, a researcher at the Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, commenting immediately 
after Everett’s Current Anthropology article, stated: 
Having made the Pirahã sound like the mindless bearers of an almost subhumanly simple culture, 
Everett ends with a paean to “this beautiful language and culture” with “so much to teach us.” As 
one of the few spokespersons for a small, unempowered group, he surely has some obligation to 
have presented a more balanced picture throughout. (2005a, p. 638) 





any way “primitive.” It has the most complex verbal morphology I am aware of 
and a strikingly complex prosodic system. The Pirahã are some of the brightest, 
pleasantest, most fun-loving people that I know. The absence of formal fiction, 
myths, etc. does not mean that they do not or cannot joke or lie, both of which 
they particularly enjoy doing at my expense, always good-naturedly. Questioning 
Pirahã’s implications for the ‘design features of human language’ is not at all 
equivalent to questioning their intelligence or the richness of their cultural 
experience and knowledge. (2005, p. 621) 
The emphatic disavowal of the possibility that Pirahã is a relatively simple or “primitive” 
language is in keeping with Pinker’s assertion that there can be “no such thing as a Stone 
Age language” (p. 14). The problem for Pinker, though, is that the Pirahã tongue exhibits 
profound lexical-grammatical (left-brain) simplicity on every level from the phonemic 
up, and that its richness lies precisely in its prosodic-semantic (right-brain) “singing-
Neanderthal” qualities: 
The phonemic inventory of Pirahã women is the smallest in the world, with only 
seven consonants and three vowels, while the men’s inventory is tied with 
Rotokas and Hawaiian for the next-smallest inventory, with only eight consonants 
and three vowels . . . . The Pirahã people communicate almost as much by 
singing, whistling, and humming as they do using consonants and vowels . . . . 
Pirahã prosody is very rich, with a well-documented five-way weight distinction 
between syllable types. (2005, p. 622) 
The absence of formal fiction and myth implies a lack of regularly recursive 




story-telling tradition?) that it cannot be entirely offset by the abilities to joke or lie—
abilities that indicate a theory of other minds, or limited recursion. A theory of one’s own 
mind, or self-reference, goes hand in hand with the ordinary use of (especially first-
person) pronouns and the presence of regular syntactical recursion. 
Of all the “design features of human language,” regular syntactical recursion is 
the most crucial, because Chomsky has declared syntactical recursion the sine qua non of 
language. But because Chomsky is a linguistic creationist—that is, he refuses to consider 
how language might have emerged more or less gradually—he thinks of language as 
being an all-or-nothing proposition, like an on-off switch: one day there was no language 
or anything like it, and then the next day language existed with regular syntactical 
recursion. But according to the model developed within this thesis, language emerged as 
a nonlinear dynamical system, a positive feedback loop swirling about word-image / 
approach-avoidance poles, where each word form and corresponding stage, segmentation, 
or articulation of grammatical complexity was an emergent property (see also Wildgen, 
2008). It can allow that the emergence of regular syntactical recursion through pronoun 
usage represented the flowering of language proper, and at the same time acknowledge 
the proto-linguistic structures that preceded it. 
Finally, a bifurcation diagram can be used to show how language evolved as an 
adaptive system of energy dissipation (see Figure 46)—after all, “the human brain is only 
about 2 percent of the weight of the body, but it consumes about 20 percent of the energy 
in the body at rest” (Brown, 2000, p. 156)—resulting in a strange attractor capable of 




therefore I am.” Thus Gebser’s Mental consciousness and culture proper evolved 
reiteratively from a simple mapping-signaling system. 
Finally, in closing, we should note two things. First, the BBC documentary The 
Grammar of Happiness (2012) reviews Daniel Everette’s lifework, and shows how his 
efforts have so displeased the linguistic establishment—and Noam Chomsky, in 
particular—that he has been banned from further contact with the Pirahã people, who are 
his good friends (see also Pullum, 2012 and Schuessler, 2012). Moreover, the Brazilian 
government has simultaneously taken unprecedented steps to intervene in their previously 




culture. It appears Pirahã is now an endangered tongue, and the chance to study it in order 
to better understand the evolution of language is quickly disappearing. This is a sad state 
of affairs for both the Pirahã people and science, and serves only to protect academic 
dogmatism based on willful ignorance. In The Grammar of Happiness, researchers 
subject recordings of Pirahã to computer analysis, and find no evidence of syntactical 
recursion. That finding clearly threatens Chomsky’s UG idea, which features nesting or 
embedding. 
Second, the connection between pronouns and vowels needs to be explored, 
where the most abstract word forms might have been enabled by precise phonemic 
control. The left-hemisphere functions involved here are implicated in the emergence of 
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